Article Title: Civil War Problems in the Central and Dakota Superintendencies: A Case Study


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Photographs / Images: 1854 Treaty with Oto and Missouri Indians
Before the Civil War, Commissioner of Indian Affairs George W. Manypenny in 1854 concluded a treaty with the Oto and Missouri Indians, after which he wrote the above admonition to Chief Ar-kee-kee-tah (transcription of document on page 423).
CIVIL WAR PROBLEMS IN THE CENTRAL AND DAKOTA SUPERINTENDENCIES: A CASE STUDY

By EDMUND J. DANZIGER, JR.

As WHITE AMERICANS pushed across the continent in the nineteenth century, a major task of the Office of Indian Affairs was to teach the reservation tribes to become self-supporting farmers while simultaneously protecting them from white as well as Indian encroachers. Nowhere during the Civil War years did western expansion generate more complex administrative problems for the Indian Office than in Kansas and in Nebraska and Dakota Territories, which straddled the pulsating line of settlement. How successfully the Office responded to the challenge reveals much about its specific weaknesses.

As part of the Interior Department, the Office of Indian Affairs directed and managed Indian relations, and its most important functionary was the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. To his busy Washington office came all official communications from the field. From his desk, after consulting records of the proper subdivision of the central office, the commissioner dispatched orders and decisions to superintendents and agents throughout the country. In the field the chief representatives of the Indian Office were the superintendents, who had general responsibility for Indian affairs in a geographic area (usually a state or territory) and directed the work of the agents and their staffs. Scattered across the vast frontier, agents implemented decisions made in Washington. Each was immediately responsible for one or more tribes. When Indian reservations with definite boundaries were established in the 1850's, the agent protected these sanctuaries from unlicensed traders and instructed the tribesmen in agricultural techniques. The year 1861 found the understaffed Office of Indian Affairs unequal to the task of administering the reservation policy. The dynamic frontier, particularly after the Mexican War, had taxed its resources to the limit and beyond. With the addition of

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new tribes and territories, the prodigious responsibilities of the Commiss­ioner of Indian Affairs and his staff doubled between 1852 and 1856. Yet Congress, preoccupied with the slavery question, neglected the new needs of the Indian service.

Since most emigrants passed through rather than located in Nebraska during the 1840's and 1850's, the territory's population was less than twenty-nine thousand by the eve of Fort Sumter. White settlements dotted the eastern third of the territory, clustered mainly in the Missouri and Little Blue valleys and along the Platte as far west as Fort Kearny. Beyond this point the traveler saw only ranches and stage stations.

The settlement pattern in Kansas during the early 1860's was strikingly similar to Nebraska's, though the population in Kansas was three times greater. Large towns like Atchison, Leavenworth, and Lawrence flourished in the state's eastern river valleys; more adventurous pioneers pushed westward up the Kansas and Smoky Hill Rivers as far as Salina. The Civil War's beneficial effects on the state's economy could be seen in the towns and elsewhere. Farmers and cattlemen enjoyed strong markets. Freighters and merchants fulfilled army contracts, fed reservation Indians, and supplied the demands of the overland trade despite the state's primitive transportation network. Kansans had little to fear from the Indians within their borders. Some nomads along the frontier line threatened isolated settlers; but, on the whole, the red man was more alarmed at land-hungry whites than vice versa.

With headquarters at St. Joseph, Missouri, the Central Superintendency embraced what is today southeastern Wyoming, Nebraska, and Kansas north of approximately the thirty-eighth parallel. Some sixteen tribes under the superintendent's jurisdiction numbered about 13,000 and represented a striking variety of cultures, since many of the tribes were not native to the area, having been uprooted at an earlier time from eastern states. The Indians ranged from the wild and savage nomads of the western Plains portion of the superintendency to the more acculturated who lived on permanent reserves in central and eastern Kansas and Nebraska.

The federal government reserved tracts for three agencies in east-central Kansas. At the Osage River Agency the Miami and four confederated tribes (Peoria, Piankashaw, Kaskaskia, and Wea) maintained nominal tribal ties; of the approximately 360 members, most farmed, lived in cabins located on head-rights, and wore European dress. Immediately to the west on a twelve mile square reserve dwelt the Sac and Fox, who numbered 1,341 in
1861. They too had a severalty program. The confederated Chippewa and Munsee and the Ottawa, neither of whom was numerous, were included under the jurisdiction of the Sac and Fox agent. In 1863 the Indian Office established the Ottawa Agency. On the Neosho River about twenty miles west of the Sac and Fox lands was the Kansas reservation which embraced 146 families, most living in stone or log houses.

Northeastern Kansas was a crazy quilt of reservations. More than 2,200 Potawatomi resided north of the Kansas Agency. Shawnee lands on the south side of the Kansas River adjoined the state of Missouri. Until 1863 the Shawnee agent supervised the 430 Wyandot as well as his own charges; the government then transferred the Wyandot to the Delaware Agency immediately to the north. By the terms of an 1854 treaty, the Northern Kickapoo, after ceding 618,000 acres, retained 150,000 just west of Horton. The southern bands migrated to Texas in the 1850's and lived by the chase. When the Civil War broke out, they refused a rebel alliance. About six hundred found new homes in Kansas and with Union encouragement raided against the Confederacy.

Four hundred Iowa Indians and the Sac and Fox of Missouri farmed individual patches on the fertile and well-watered Great Nemaha reserve north of the Kickapoo's on the Kansas-Nebraska border.

Nebraska Indian reserves in the eastern part of the territory were also rather scattered. On the gently rolling prairie along the Big Blue River south of Beatrice dwelt the 470 members of the confederated Oto and Missouri tribes. Their land was fine for grazing, but high winds and long droughts made agriculture uncertain. The Pawnee reserve was an irregularly shaped fifteen by thirty mile strip of fertile bottomland on the Loup River. Their villages of circular lodges fifty to sixty feet in diameter lay between the Loup and Beaver Creek. In 1860 the Omaha numbered about 950. They hunted and harvested corn, wheat, potatoes, and other vegetables on a 300,000 acre reserve fifteen miles south of Sioux City, Iowa. The Upper Platte agent resided in the vicinity of Fort Laramie and was responsible for the Northern Cheyenne, Northern Arapaho, and certain Sioux bands. Unlike tribes with permanent reservations, these wanderers did not confine their lives to any limited area.

Organized in March 1861, Dakota Territory was that gently rolling Plains region north of the forty-third parallel and west of Minnesota. The previous year's decennial census showed a population of about 4,800. Pioneers gathered in towns scattered along the valleys of the Red, Big Sioux, and Missouri. Lincoln's gubernatorial appointees, who resided at
the cluster of sod and log cabins called Yankton, also served as _ex officio_ Superintendents of Indian Affairs. During the war years Missouri River steamboat traffic brought vital supplies to settlements, fur traders, Indian agents, and grubby Montana gold miners. The Minnesota Sioux uprising of August 1862 had a significant impact on Dakota affairs. After the attack on Sioux Falls, terror-stricken citizens rushed to settlements on the Missouri or scattered to neighboring Nebraska and Iowa. An estimated one-fourth never returned. The Santee Sioux war and General Alfred Sully's campaigns retarded settlement and development of the territory and fed the flames of racism. In January 1863 the Yankton _Weekly Dakotian_ reprinted a report of the Territorial Council's Select Committee on Indian Affairs, which labeled the Indian an implacable enemy who hated the white man's way of life and who could be ruled only by coercion and fear. The colonization of exiled Minnesota Sioux at Crow Creek angered some Dakotans; they were tolerated by the _Weekly Dakotian_ because it would mean two or three new forts and 1,500 to 2,000 more troops for the territory.

The principal tribes native to the Dakota Superintendency included the Ponca, Gros Ventres, Mandan, Arikara, Assiniboin, Crow, Blackfoot, and Sioux. Disregarding amity agreements, the government had treaties with only the Blackfoot, Yankton Sioux, and Ponca, and only the latter two lived on reservations. The Ponca Agency was on the Niobrara River near the Nebraska-Dakota border; the Yankton lands lay on the northeast side on the Missouri above Chouteau Creek. The majority of both tribes had given up the hunting life in 1858 and with their agents' help began to break land for farming.

Prior to the year 1864 the Mandan, Gros Ventres, Arikara, Assiniboin, Crow, and the Dakota Sioux of the Plains (excluding the Yankton Sioux and those bands attached to the Upper Platte Agency) belonged to the Upper Missouri Agency. In that year the Indian Office assigned the non-Sioux tribes to the new Fort Berthold Agency. As bitter foes of the Sioux, the numerically few but peaceful Mandan, Gros Ventres, and Arikara lived for mutual protection in a farming village of dirt lodges close to Fort Berthold, though they claimed most of western Dakota. Poor but friendly, the Assiniboin ranged from the lower Yellowstone to Canada. The Crow numbered about 4,000, the same as the Assiniboin. These fine warriors roamed the entire Yellowstone valley until 1865, when the Sioux overpowered them and pushed them beyond the Missouri. The defiant and independent Sioux were one of the most powerful people in North America. Theirs was a horse culture. Ranging from the James
River to the Big Horn and from the Platte to Devils Lake, living like nomads in skin tipis, they hunted the buffalo, elk, deer, and antelope. The Teton or Plains Sioux had seven major tribes: the Oglala, Brule, Miniconjou, Two Kettles, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, and Sans Arc. The Yanktonai, divided into Upper and Lower subtribes, were a separate division of the Sioux. Since many Sioux bands were hostile to whites, they had little contact with the Indian Office, except when their agent delivered some annuity goods. The Blackfoot Agency was transferred to the new Idaho Superintendency in 1863. With the organization of Montana Territory the following year, the Interior Department placed the Blackfoot under the jurisdiction of this superintendency.

Whether pushing up the Kansas, Platte, or Missouri Rivers, pioneers trespassed on reservation lands, debauched Indians, and destroyed game. In the face of the swelling white wave, the Indian Office's dual task was to protect and care for the friendly red men of Kansas, Nebraska, and Dakota and to pacify the hostiles.

The diminishing game supply necessitated that the reservation tribes become self-supporting farmers. However, drought and insects played havoc with Indian Office plans. Lack of rain during the growing seasons of 1863 and 1864 brought starvation to the agencies, undermined the Indian loyalty and friendliness toward the United States, neutralized the agricultural expenditures of the Office of Indian Affairs as well as the work of its agents and discouraged those red men whom the government sought to settle. In fact, field officials urged some Indians to resume their hunting trips to procure provisions for the winter. The Yankton and the Ponca, whose farms looked promising in 1862, lost their corn crops to severe drought and armies of insects in 1863 and 1864. In August of 1864, Governor Newton Edmunds reported that for the next year all Dakotans would have to get provisions from eastern states.

During this time crops failed throughout the Central Superintendency, including the Upper Platte Agency.

Communal land ownership was another obstruction to agricultural progress and a major cause of Indian idleness and other social problems, according to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Indian reluctance to abandon their tribal ways could be seen in the widespread opposition to regular manual labor. Fathers wanted their sons to become warriors, and young men found it difficult to farm when ridiculed by squaws. A schism developed in the Potawatomi tribe between the pro-severalty
“mission band” and the “prairie band,” which opposed any change from traditional customs. It was also difficult during a drought to give the Indians a practical demonstration of the advantages of severality. For example, many Potawatomi had to flee their allotments in search of subsistence, and at the Ponca reservation funds budgeted for a manual labor school were diverted to purchase provisions. Nevertheless, the government had some success with individual tracts on the Delaware, Great Nemaha, Kansas, and Potawatomi reserves, and with manual labor schools at all the Central Superintendency agencies except the Osage River and the Kickapoo.

Three classes of whites also disturbed the government’s reservation program in the Central and Dakota Superintendencies: thieves and unlicensed traders, Civil War raiders, and dishonest Indian Office personnel. Field officials reported many cases of white encroachment. Bandits stole Indian stock and timber on the Potawatomi, Delaware, Ottawa, Kickapoo, and Great Nemaha reserves; Mahlon Wilkinson of the Upper Missouri Agency was convinced in 1864 that American Fur Company employees at Fort Berthold sold whiskey to Indians; in 1864 and 1865 Governor Edmunds of Dakota Territory accused certain sutlers and other persons attached to the military organization or under the protection of the military of violating the Indian trade and intercourse law. So serious was the resultant demoralization of reservation red men that it partially undid the work of agents, missionaries, and teachers. Some Upper Platte Indians ambushed emigrants and settlers in order to get guns and horses to trade for whiskey. The Sac and Fox agent noted that his tribesmen would go anywhere to find alcohol and sell anything to buy it. Because whites and Indians were usually unwilling to testify against hucksters and because military protection or the means for stopping the whiskey trade were not available to remote agents, it was impossible to keep white troublemakers and red men apart.

Certain white raiders acted in a quasi-official capacity during the Civil War years. Operating along the Kansas-Missouri border, Quantrill’s men and other guerilla bands attacked the Osage River, Kickapoo, Ottawa, Kansas, and Shawnee agencies. Hardest hit were the Shawnee, apparently because they furnished warriors for the Union army. By mid-September of 1862, raiders had stolen $8,000 worth of horses and driven Black Bob’s band from its home, leaving many families destitute. At the close of 1864, border trouble still discouraged the Shawnee from extensive farming and horse raising.
Corrupt agency officials intensified Indian poverty and suffering, further eroded their trust in the government, and gave them another reason to reject the culture that produced such scoundrels. The “Indian Ring” operated efficiently on several Central Superintendency reservations. Usually three interdependent elements composed the group: the politician, the agent, and the contractor or trader. The politician helped to secure the agent’s appointment; the agent issued the indispensable license to the trader; and the wily trader defrauded the red man of his annuity payment from the government. The stakes ran high in such an operation, for the profit on trade goods ranged from one hundred to four hundred per cent.35

In 1865 Arkaketch and other Oto and Missouri chiefs detailed conditions on their reservation. Not only did their agent force them to buy supplies from the licensed trader, who charged twice as much as other merchants, but he did work for white citizens in the Indian blacksmith shop and mill and kept the profits for himself. Even the Indian owners were charged a fee.36 Another technique for robbing the red man was to allow individual tribesmen to accumulate large debts at the trader’s store, which they could never repay; tribal funds were then used to settle the accounts. This penalized the industrious members of the Indian com-
As long as easy credit was available, two Delaware wrote to Caleb Smith in 1862, the young men would never work for a living.\textsuperscript{37}

Whites also coveted Indian land. Agent Charles B. Keith aided greedy Kansas railroad promoters in obtaining the fraudulent Kickapoo Allotment Treaty of 1863, which opened up over 125,000 acres of remaining Kickapoo land. Yankton agent Walter A. Burleigh apparently was bent on making a maximum profit from his position. Such was the opinion of Yankton chiefs who testified before a Congressional investigator in August 1865. By withholding annuity goods and money, Burleigh, who arrived at the agency in 1861 with only a trunk, was “high up—rich” by 1865.\textsuperscript{38} In addition to the isolation of the agencies and the confiscation or falsification of records, another reason why such illegalities were not made public and eliminated was the Indian Office’s fear of embarrassing Lincoln’s government. This was the case in October 1864 when Superintendent William Albin filed his first annual report. The document pointed out some of the most common swindles at the agencies. The commissioner sharply rebuked Albin for making the objectionable statements, disparaging his agents, and furnishing ammunition to the enemies of the administration.\textsuperscript{39} Albin’s offensive remarks were deleted in the published version of his report.

Another insidious threat to the reservation Indians of the Central and Dakota Superintendencies came from hostile bands to the west. They were either traditional enemies of the border tribes or felt that the friendly government wards no longer should be allowed to hunt on the Plains. But the wards had to hunt; the drought ruined their crops. Still, the government would neither arm the red men so they could protect themselves on the Plains nor provide security for the agencies. During the war years the hostiles harried the vulnerable Omaha, Delaware, Pawnee, Ponca, and the lesser tribes of the Upper Missouri.

In the Central Superintendency the plight of the Pawnee was most serious. During the early 1860’s the nomadic Sioux and Cheyenne drove the weaker Pawnee from their Plains hunting grounds and so terrorized their reservation that the Pawnee were afraid to work in the fields. By 1863 life was increasingly insecure; in fact, white agency employees were afraid to stay. In its 1857 treaty with the Pawnee, the government promised protection, but numerous Indian Office requests for arms and the permanent location of troops on the Pawnee reserve brought no positive response from the War Department. Nor could Washington obtain an amity treaty between the Pawnee and their Indian enemies.
Unable to procure adequate sustenance from any source, the destitute and disillusioned Pawnee blamed the federal government for their predicament. 40

The Ponca’s condition was comparable to that of the Pawnee. Bold Sioux raiders took advantage of the poverty and military weakness of the Ponca, the absence of nearby white settlements, and the War Department’s inability to spare weapons for the tribe’s defense. Afraid to do much farming, the Ponca spent the winters of 1863-1864 and 1864-1865 at the Omaha reserve, where they obtained temporary subsistence. Not until 1865 did they produce a good crop on their own reservation. 41 The delay of military protection enabled hostiles to intimidate the Assiniboine, Arikara, Mandan, and Gros Ventres in the same manner. Furthermore, the United States lost the support of some friendly Sioux bands. Agent Samuel N. Latta met with their headmen in May 1862 and was informed that since the government could not defend the bands, the Sioux would break off relations and rejoin the hostiles. A decade of work with these red men and thousands of dollars were lost. 42

Besides the need to protect and care for the reservation red men, the Indian Office tried to placate the hostile tribes of the two superintendencies who were angered by increased emigrant travel. Early in 1864 Commissioner Dole asked Father Pierre Jean De Smet to accompany a government expedition to the Upper Missouri. His mission was to warn the Sioux about the great military power of the government and to induce the Indians to lay down their arms and establish peaceful relations with the United States. De Smet accepted the challenge. However, a meeting with General Alfred Sully on July 9 convinced the priest of the army’s determination to punish the Indians prior to any peace talks. De Smet had no alternative but to return to the States. 43

Hoping, no doubt, to avoid an expensive military campaign and to open the roads to Idaho and Montana, Congress appropriated $20,000 in 1865 for peace negotiations with the Dakota Sioux. President Andrew Johnson appointed a commission of military and civil officials in August. Talks began two months later at Fort Sully, near Pierre. The commissioners concluded treaties with the Upper and Lower Yanktonai and the seven tribes of Teton Sioux, who pledged to maintain peace and to withdraw from the overland routes through their hunting grounds. The Lower Brule accepted a permanent reservation above White River. Though the Fort Sully treaties brought peace to the Missouri River, the western Teton
bands did not attend, and when the government began construction of the Laramie-Bozeman road, Chief Red Cloud and the Oglala protested and eventually resisted with force. Thus began Red Cloud's War (1865-1868).

Likewise bothersome were the hostiles of western Kansas and Nebraska, many of whom came under the jurisdiction of the Colorado Superintendency and the Kiowa Agency (established in 1864 and not attached to any superintendency). Since the Civil War somewhat slowed emigration, the years 1861-1863 were generally peaceful. The number of Indian raids increased in the spring and summer of 1864, particularly along the South Platte in Colorado. In August the Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Brule launched major attacks all along the central and western Platte valley, which sent frightened Nebraskans fleeing eastward to the Missouri. Full-scale war also erupted in western Kansas. Cheyenne and Arapaho descended on frontier settlements in the Little Blue valley, while Kiowa, Arapaho, and Comanche struck the Sante Fe Trail. Throughout the rest of 1864 and 1865, the nomadic hostiles kept up their raids against the ranches and stations of the overland lines. Not until after the Appomattox peace could the nation turn its full attention to these frontier troubles.

The plight of the Central and Dakota Superintendency Indians was more desperate than many of the eastern and far western tribes: the semi-arid climate in much of the region made farming a risky economic base; the reservation tribes were caught between the swelling tide of whites from the east and outraged nomadic cousins to the west; and the Indian Office did little to improve the situation. It could not achieve self-sufficiency for these red men or shield them from danger. The combination of drought, insects, the Indians' reluctance to abandon tribal ways, white encroachment and Civil War incursions, dishonest personnel, and the attacks of non-reservation warriors overpowered the most honest and hardworking field officials, who had neither the military power nor the administrative machinery to implement government policies successfully.

Because the fate of these Indians was not unique in the nineteenth century, it has a broader significance. It is a vivid illustration of the impotence of Indian Office field officials and of the tragic, irreconcilable inconsistency between American expansion and the United States government's desire to protect and to "civilize" the red man.
CIVIL WAR INDIAN PROBLEMS

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LETTER FROM INDIAN COMMISSIONER MANYPENNY

(See Page 410)

To
Ar-kee-kee-tah,
or
Stay By It.

Department of the Interior,
Office Indian Affairs,
March 20, 1854.

Principal Chief of the Confederate Bands of OTTOE and MISSOURI Indians

Having concluded the business which brought you here, I deem it my duty on your departure for your home, to express to you my approbation of your official conduct while here, and to commend the interest you have shown for the Ottoe and Missouri people.

On your return to the Ottoes and Missourias, you will find many perplexities and difficulties; but by constant perseverance and a firm determination to do right at all times and under all circumstances, you will be sustained in all your efforts for the civilization of your people; and it may be allotted to you to yet see them in quite an advanced state of intellectual improvement, and each family comfortably situated.

Enjoin on them habits of industry. Teach them to abhor idleness and the accompanying vices—such as gambling and the like.

Urge them to cease the use of ardent spirits, for intemperance is their greatest enemy.

Encourage the young to go to school. and let all fear God and keep his commandments.
A great responsibility rests on you and the other Chiefs—and I ardently hope you may all be found equal to any emergency that may arise in your country and among your people.

I cannot impress too strongly on you the necessity of at all times conducting yourself properly. Your example should be such as to inspire your people with confidence. Much depends on this. I confidently hope you will appreciate the deep responsibility that rests on you, and set an example of diligence, temperance, patience and kindness before your people.

I will often think of you when far, far away, and shall be anxious to hear the news from your country, hoping that it may always be good.

Your friend, GEO. W. MANYPENNY,
Commissioner.

(The original of the above document is now in the museum of the Nebraska State Historical Society).