Article Title: Wilson, Bryan, and the American Delegation to the Abortive Fifth Pan American Conference, 1914


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Article Summary: Formal inter-American relations received a rude shock in the autumn of 1914 when the war in Europe forced the postponement of at least four hemispheric conferences. The Fifth Pan American Conference was scheduled for Santiago, Chile on November 29, 1914. Who were the delegates chosen to represent the US in 1914? How were they selected? And would the delegation composed under Democratic auspices have been noticeably different from its predecessors and, if so, for what purposes?

Cataloging Information:


Photographs / Images: Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, 1913; President Woodrow Wilson; Samuel Avery, University of Nebraska chancellor from 1909 to 1927, with NU professor of botany Charles E Bessey; John Barrett, director of the Pan American Union, 1907-1920
WILSON, BRYAN, AND THE
AMERICAN DELEGATION TO THE ABORTIVE
FIFTH PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE, 1914

By James F. Vivian

Formal inter-American relations received a rude shock in the
autumn of 1914 when reverberations emanating from the war in
Europe forced the postponement of at least four hemispheric
conferences. The Fifth Pan American Conference, the most
important of these, was scheduled to convene in Santiago, Chile,
on November 29. President Woodrow Wilson believed the
conference should assemble as planned, especially because of the
peaceful contrast it would present to a troubled world. For a time
the Chilean government thought likewise.1 Yet, it also became
increasingly apparent that the war was wreaking economic havoc
in Latin America, and that Chile was suffering some of the
sharpest dislocations anywhere on the South American
continent. In late August Chile announced that it could not take
part in the Panama-Pacific Exposition at San Francisco,
California, in February, 1915. By mid-September the worsening
economic crisis had produced “a delicate internal situation,”
according to Henry P. Fletcher, United States ambassador to
Chile. Chilean sentiment in favor of postponing the conference
would have solidified earlier, he noted, except for the
embarrassment of having to withdraw the invitations issued since
March.2

Wilson reacted sympathetically. When Argentine leaders also
wavered, his administration advised Fletcher on September 23
that it would not oppose postponement. Then, on October 5,
Wilson wrote John Barrett, director of the Pan American Union,
that in view of Latin America’s economic and financial plight, “I
am confident that they would all be greatly relieved if the
suggestion came from us.”3 Two days later the governing board
of the Union unanimously approved a request from the Chilean
ambassador to postpone the conference indefinitely. The board
then adopted a Chilean-sponsored resolution deploring the
"awful strife" enveloping Europe, which US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, in his capacity as board chairman, cabled to the belligerents within the week. Accordingly, on October 17 the Department of State prepared nine identical letters notifying the recently appointed members of the American delegation of the board’s action. The letters contained no intimation that the appointments would be continued should Chile reconvene the conference in the near future, although the administration later necessarily moved to extend its congressional authorization in anticipation of the event. Who were the delegates chosen to represent the United States in 1914? How were they selected and upon whose recommendation? And, given the fact that Republican leadership had been responsible for American participation at four previous Pan American Conferences, would the delegation composed under Democratic auspices have been noticeably different from its predecessors and, if so, for what purposes?

Applications for appointment began arriving at the State Department as early as the summer of 1913, chiefly as a result of press notices publicizing tentative arrangements reached to date on the conference. Eventually, by the summer of 1914, a total of fourteen men had applied. The applicants included six practicing lawyers, four university professors, two jurists, a journalist, and an expert on international trade. The lawyers were William M. Collier of New York, formerly chief of the Bureau of Corporations and US minister to Spain under President Theodore Roosevelt; Peter V. Davis, justice of the peace and municipal official in a suburb of Seattle, Washington, who has spent some time in the Philippine Islands at the turn of the century; Frederico Degetau, a prominent figure in Puerto Rican political, press, and literary affairs; Phanor J. Eder of New York City, Colombian-born scion of a pioneer sugar-growing family, who had just completed a history of his homeland; Clarence J. Owens, managing director of the Southern Commercial Congress, a private organization headquartered in the capital engaged in promoting industrial and mercantile interests; and Joseph Wheless of St. Louis, Missouri, a student of comparative—especially Mexican—law whose firm operated a branch office in Mexico City.

The four professors who filed applications were Glen L. Swiggett of the University of Tennessee, a linguist who had
achieved regional stature as an interpreter of international affairs; Walter Lichtenstein of Chicago, the librarian at Northwestern University who concurrently performed adjunct services related to commerce and banking through the University of Illinois; Carl H. Eigenmann, professor of zoology and dean of the Graduate School at Indiana University; and Leo S. Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania, whose most recent governmental assignment as a commissioner on the US-Panama Joint Land Commission ended in July, 1913.8

The two jurists were Walter Clark of Raleigh, North Carolina, chief justice of the state Supreme Court, and Emilio del Toro, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. George L. Lawson of Los Angeles, California, the journalist, was a magazine writer and editor of a short-lived newspaper called Las Dos Republicas. Henry T. Wills of New York City, author of Scientific Tariff Making: A History of the Movement to Create a Tariff Commission (1913), was a widely traveled authority on foreign trade and secretary of the American Manufacturers' Export Association. He died in April, 1914, before the selection process had really begun.9

Some applicants' interests were keener than others, judging by the recommendations they obtained. Clark, Owens, Rowe, and Swiggett won support from one senator each: respectively, Lee S. Overman of North Carolina, chairman of the Committee on Rules; Duncan U. Fletcher of Florida, chairman of the Committee on Printing; Henry F. Hollis of New Hampshire, chairman of the Committee on Enrolled Bills; and Luke Lea of Tennessee, chairman of the Committee on the Library. Both Missouri senators, William J. Stone and James A. Reed, as well as Tennessee Congressman Joseph W. Byrns, endorsed Wheless. James C. McReynolds, Wilson's first Attorney General, spoke for Wills. Puerto Rican Governor Arthur Yager advanced del Toro's name following the death of Degetau in January, 1914. Two university presidents, William M. Bryan and A. W. Harris, wrote respectively on behalf of Eigenmann and Lichtenstein. In addition, Eigenmann received endorsements from four academicians, including David Starr Jordan of Stanford University, and from Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana. Two businessmen each promoted Collier and Eder. Eigenmann and Rowe, followed closely by Swiggett, successfully solicited the largest number of recommendations. Rowe's support was particularly impressive, even without Senator Hollis: a New York state official; a trustee
of the University of Pennsylvania; the director of the Wharton School of Finance; a history professor at Princeton; Virginia Congressman Andrew J. Montague, who had been a member of the American delegation at the Third Pan American Conference in 1906; and Wall Street financier Jacob H. Schiff.10

Meantime, in March, 1914, the Chilean government began issuing formal invitations to the forthcoming conference. A special invitation requesting Secretary Bryan's attendance prompted the first serious discussions within the administration on the selection of delegates. Apparently the discussions were based largely on a list of thirty-five names submitted by Director Barrett during an interview with Wilson at mid-month. One decision followed—that Bryan would accept the Chilean invitation, thereby becoming the first delegate chosen and, by implication, head of the group.11

Compiled at the behest of Wilson and Bryan, Barrett's list of suitable persons was an amorphous combination of the illustrious and influential, of the prominent and private, and of the experienced and inexperienced.12 It sparkled with a clutch of famous names: ex-President William Howard Taft, Andrew Carnegie, and Cyrus McCormick. It drew liberally from the roster of delegates to previous Pan American Conferences: John Bassett Moore, Henry White, Lewis Nixon, Lamar C. Quintero,
Charles M. Pepper, and Rowe. And it gestured suggestively toward academic and professional specialists: William R. Shepherd of Columbia University, President Edwin A. Alderman of the University of Virginia, President John C. Branner of Stanford University, Edward A. Ross of the University of Wisconsin, Philip M. Brown of Princeton University, and others. Barrett's criteria in compiling the list, apart from those instances reflecting personal fame, were linguistic ability and individual familiarity with Latin America. There was a notable lack of similarity between his conception of qualified persons and those who actually applied for a position. He concurred with only four names: Rowe, Collier, Owens, and Swiggett.13

Bryan contemplated the possible nominees in July, 1914. Ultimately, he sent the President a list of thirteen names, three of which were drawn from among the applicants: Swiggett, Clark, and Wheless. The balance, with one exception, could be found on Barrett's list: Moore; Alderman; industrialist Cleveland H. Dodge of New York, a personal friend of Wilson; philanthropist Archer M. Huntington, also of New York, president of the Hispanic Society of America; Congressman Henry D. Flood of Virginia, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Congressman Montague of Virginia; Senator Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, president of the American Peace Society; and Supreme Court Justice Joseph R. Lamar and former Solicitor General Frederick W. Lehmann, both of whom had just finished serving as Wilson's special commissioners to the ABC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) Mediation Conference at Niagara Falls on US-Mexican relations. The exception was Chancellor Samuel Avery of the University of Nebraska, who neither applied for a position nor attracted Barrett's attention.14

Wilson's reply of July 30 constituted a second list of thirteen names, "any eight" of which he said would be satisfactory.15 The President concurred in six of Bryan's choices: Clark, Flood, Huntington, Lamar, Lehmann, and Moore. His seven personal "suggestions" consisted of Senator William J. Stone of Missouri, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; veteran diplomat Henry White, a delegate to the Fourth Conference in 1910; Wisconsin sociology professor Ross; Stanford University President Branner, a noted Brazilianist; Quintero of New Orleans, another former delegate to the Fourth Conference; Puerto Rican Justice del Toro; and Paul Fuller of New York City, a lawyer specializing in international claims.16
Since neither Bryan nor Wilson traded explanations, it is difficult to discern what criteria each employed or what objectives each had in mind. A comparison of the two lists is merely suggestive. Bryan, who accepted three original applicants in deciding his preferences, selected six Democrats, three Republicans, and four independents. Their regional identification favored the South (7) as opposed to the North (5) and West (1). Four of his choices were fluent in or familiar with Spanish. Five could point to at least some diplomatic experience, two of them at past Pan American Conferences. Conversely, Wilson retained none of the applicants. The seven Democrats, one Republican and five independents who comprised his list indicated broader regional orientation, with the South (6) still predominating over the North (4) and West (2). His desire for linguistic competence was somewhat more in evidence: four men knew Spanish, one Portuguese. Wilson also emphasized diplomatic experience: of five men qualified in this category, three had been participants at the Fourth Pan American Conference.

In sum, both leaders agreed that the delegation should be composed of men of varied backgrounds and vocations, and that only one position, the nomination of Judge Clark, could be sacrificed to political necessity. Bryan and Wilson differed mainly in the areas of experience and competence. Wilson showed more interest in continuity between conferences and in prior diplomatic experience, even if these qualifications assumed party loyalty. For his part, Bryan exhibited the greater tendency to recognize old friends and fellow pacifists. He weighted the candidates in favor of men with academic and congressional
backgrounds. Yet it was Wilson who deleted Dodge, the only businessman, from the roster. Wilson’s choices acknowledged active support of and loyal service to the administration. Although logical, Moore’s appointment was somewhat irregular in that he had resigned as State Department counselor only six months earlier, partly in protest against Bryan’s policies and practices.\(^\text{18}\)

Official invitations were mailed on August 3 to all those on the President’s list except to Fuller, who had just been appointed executive agent in connection with Mexican problems,\(^\text{19}\) and to del Toro. An invitation to Avery followed the next day, after Bryan had personally interceded on his behalf on grounds that Nebraska thus far had not fared very importantly in the administration’s patronage decisions, and that Avery could represent the Pan American Union’s desire to improve student and faculty exchanges between hemispheric universities. At the same time, Bryan thanked Wilson for accepting Clark as a member of the delegation, since Clark had appealed directly to the secretary in the matter.\(^\text{20}\) At the request of Professor Samuel M. Lindsay of Columbia University, Bryan also shortly urged that Rowe be reconsidered for appointment, even if it meant
creating a vacancy to accommodate him. Wilson did not respond. Lamar and White declined the honor owing to pressing private and other commitments. Ross wanted to accept, but his university administration refused to grant him leave to attend the conference during the school year. Finally, in mid September, Bryan rescinded without explanation his earlier promise to participate in the conference.

After July, mounting uncertainties effectively inhibited an appropriate publicity campaign in advance of the conference. An exception appeared in October when, scarcely a week before it was postponed, the *Washington Post* carried an article purporting to name most of the American delegation, which the paper described as comprising "some of the ablest men in public and private life in this country." Although undoubtedly obtained through administration sources, the information reported was incomplete and inaccurate. Only seven members were named—that is, less Clark, Quintero, Branner, and Huntington, who had not yet declined the nomination. Conversely, White was included even though he had declined and the administration had made no attempt to change his mind.

When the conference was postponed a week later, the American delegation consisted of nine men. This number would have been reduced to eight with Huntington's belated withdrawal on November 11, so that, had the conference actually convened, the delegation would have included two incumbent legislators (Stone and Flood), two academicians (Avery and Branner), a jurist (Clark), an experienced policy advisor (Moore), and two lawyers (Lehmann and Quintero). A sketchy, undated memorandum from the third assistant secretary of state, career diplomat William Phillips, suggests that Moore would have been named chairman of the group. Moore himself seems to have assumed as much if White, who headed the 1910 delegation, declined to accept appointment.

Thus, the first delegation appointed by a Democratic administration was of the same size as the Fourth Conference in 1910 and the Fifth Conference that finally met in 1923. The average age of the delegates was 56 years, again about the same as had participated in previous conferences. As in the past, also, there was no effort to select representatives from among organized labor, women, or blacks. An untypical interest was shown, however, in appointing luminaries from the arts and belles-lettres with a deeper and keener appreciation of Latin
American life than usual. In this regard the Wilson administration deserves high marks. Doubtless the delegation would have produced a salutary effect in Santiago.

Yet, the method of selection was no less casual and subjective than before. Not only did the executive assume complete control of the procedure according to precedent, without either inviting the legislative branch to participate or to consent, but it persisted in the time-honored practice of extending unsolicited invitations based upon peremptory judgements. The administration may have been the first to contend with a large number of declared applicants, all of whom it was able to reject without apparent recrimination; and it may have been the last to enjoy virtual insulation in choosing those whom it wished, free of overt political and private pressures.28

The Pan American conference delegation of 1914 was remarkable in two respects. The first of these was its pronounced partisan character. Five of its eight members were avowed Democrats. Two members, Avery and Branner, the university presidents, were independents. Only one member, Lehmann, was a Republican, and he seems to have loosened the tie since serving under President Taft. Whatever the faults of Republican appointed delegations, both past and future, aggressive partisanship was not among them. Wilson’s conception was plainly better balanced according to geographic origins and avocational interests. In its political cast it contrasted poorly with the administration’s general inclination to insist on party regularity.29

Second, Wilson’s delegation continued the trend dating from 1906 of limiting the involvement of businessmen. Not a single
member in 1914 personified a commercial mentality. It may have been true, of course, as the Post claimed, that the delegation would "go to Santiago armed with the best suggestions from businessmen of this country regarding just exactly what is needed in the way of [trade] agreements and plans." However, the membership does not directly reflect this goal and, indeed, may be said under the circumstances to have been deficient in it. Consequently, Wilson's appointments would seem to contradict the contention that his Pan Americanism disguised a coherent policy program like "Dollar Diplomacy." Actually, since the element of consistency between conferences was no more pronounced than in the past, the membership hints at little in the nature of an inherited grand design.

Given the lack—or official suppression of—draft instructions for the delegation, it is difficult to discern the administration's leading objectives. There can be little doubt that the administration was moving rapidly to take advantage of wartime conditions and opportunities to mount a major commercial drive in Latin America and to capitalize on the opening of the Panama Canal. Plans already under way to convene the First Pan American Financial Conference at the turn of the year, for instance, provide ample evidence of it. But the inclusion of Stone and Flood, together with Moore, Lehmann, and Quintero, implies other, less commercial and economic objectives involving the prospect of serious negotiations, possibly treaty arrangements. If the assumption is valid, these would have revolved mainly around the Calvo doctrine, at once the most substantive and controversial topic scheduled for consideration under the eleven-point conference program adopted in December, 1913.

Three additional goals appear implicit in the composition of the American delegation: to defend and justify the administration's militant diplomacy in Mexico and the Caribbean; to sustain Bryan's program in international conciliation and mediation; and to promote Wilson's "New Pan Americanism." That the administration was prepared to move outside these themes seems, in retrospect, quite unlikely. Wilson was even then resisting certain South American pressures to formulate a regional position on neutral rights and the protection of commerce, so that by December, 1914, he refused to range the United States behind a collective effort through the Pan American Union to define hemispheric neutrality. Nor was
Wilson inclined to look favorably upon mounting efforts to "modernize" the Monroe Doctrine by converting it into a multinational instrument. The State Department, if counselor Robert Lansing's view is any gauge, plainly opposed it.35

For its part, Chile sought to couple the conference with a meeting between the foreign ministers of the ABC countries and the US secretary of state. Indeed, Chile let it be known that failure to arrange the special meeting would provide additional cause for cancelling the conference itself.36 Presumably the ministers, with the recent success of the US-Mexican mediation in mind, were to have dealt with questions attendant upon a permanent scheme of binding arbitration similar to the equally abortive ABC alliance concluded in May, 1915. Again, there is no evidence to indicate that the United States would have supported such a proposal beyond steps already taken in the form of Bryan's series of bilateral agreements, the famous "cooling-off" treaties. Wilson may have later regretted not having pressed harder for the Pan American Pact, as one of his ambassadors reported, but Chilean apprehensions prompted it early to seek specific assurances that the United States would not introduce the plan into the conference proceedings.37

All of these considerations further underscore the conscious limits of Wilson's Pan American diplomacy. The Fifth Pan American Conference, had it assembled in 1914 as originally planned, would have witnessed a strong American effort to enlist Latin American opinion and support behind its precepts and ideals, yet without presuming any sacrifice of independent initiative or action.38 However solicitous and impressive its membership, the American delegation would not have enjoyed a wider latitude in its instructions than earlier delegations, and might even have been provided with a notably advertent document. In inter-American relations World War I had the effect neither of stimulating the movement toward hemispheric solidarity nor of converting Pan Americanism into a "dynamic force."39 Rather, World War I renewed the opposite; it confirmed a sense of heightened nationalism throughout the Americas that in several governments, including the United States, was "equivalent to a policy of isolation."40 Self-reliance rapidly became every government's foremost preoccupation after August, 1914.
NOTES


2. Republica de Chile, Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Diciembre de 1915-Noviembre de 1919 (Santiago de Chile, 1920), 214-216; Leo S. Rowe, The Early Effects of the European War upon the Finance, Commerce, and Industry of Chile (New York, 1918), 48, 51; Washington Post, August 28, 1914, 2; Fletcher to Bryan, September 19, 1914, Wilson Papers, Reel 62.

3. Wilson to Barrett, October 5, 1914, copy enclosed in J. C. Branner Papers (Stanford University Archives), SC 34, Box 11, fol. 37. See also Barrett to Ross, September 26, 1914, E. A. Ross Papers (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison).


5. Records of the Department of State, 1910-29, RG 59 (National Archives, Washington, DC), 710E/33; US Statutes at Large, XXXVIII (1913-1915), Pt. 1, 1126.

6. RG 59, "Applicants for Appointment as Delegates to the Fifth Pan American Conference...1914," Entry 334, Box 2.


10. Letters of recommendation contained in Entry 334; Schiff to Wilson, December 30, 1913, Wilson Papers, Reel 218, Case 111; Donald J. Murphy, "Professors, Publicists, and Pan Americanism, 1905-1917: A Study in the Origins of the Use of 'Experts' in Shaping American Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970), 391.

11. Pan American Union, Bulletin, XXXVIII (April, 1914), 537; Barrett to Wilson, March 13, 1914, Wilson Papers, Reel 218, Case 111; 710E/11. I have consciously omitted Bryan's early suggestion that Thomas M. Campbell, two-term Democratic governor of Texas, 1907-11, and Daniel J. Campau of Detroit, Michigan, long-time Democratic committeeman, be considered for appointments. Neither man figured in later discussions. Bryan to Wilson, April 6, 1914, "Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915," Microcopy T-841 (National Archives), Roll 2.

12. Barrett's list contained in 710E/54; Barrett to Branner and Ross, August 6, 1914, Branner and Ross Papers.

13. On Moore, see DAB, Sup. 4, 557-599; on Alderman, ibid., XXI, 21-22; on Dodge, National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXVI, 407-408; on Huntington, New York
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15. Any eight, that is, in addition to the secretary. Wilson to Bryan, July 30, 1914, 710E/54.

16. On Stone, see DAB, XVII, 88-89; on White, Allan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York, 1930); on Ross, Julius Weinberg, Edward Alsworth Ross and the Sociology of Progressivism (Madison, Wisconsin, 1972); and on Branner, Pan American Union, Bulletin, XXXVIII (January, 1914), 71-72, and DAB, II, 602-603; on Quintero, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), October 31 and November 1, 1921, 1 and 10, respectively; and on Fuller, National Cyclopedia of American Biography, XVI, 380.

17. Clark was a disappointed contender for nomination to the US Supreme Court; Bryan and William H. Taft were vice-presidents of the American Peace Society at the same time that Senator Burton was president of the organization. Ambrey L. Brooks and Hugh T. Letter (eds.), The Papers of Walter Clark (2 vols., Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1950), II, 191-182, 254-255; Advocate of Peace (Washington, DC), LXXVI (1914).


20. Bryan-Wilson exchange, August 3 and 4, 1914, Wilson Papers, Reel 60; Bryan to Avery, August 4, 1914, 710E/42b; "Program and Regulations for the Fifth International American Conference," 710E/8, 4; Paolo E. Coletta, "The Patronage Battle between Bryan and Hitchcock," Nebraska History, 49 (Summer, 1968), 121-138.

21. 710E/17; Bryan to Wilson, August 24, 1914, Wilson Papers, Reel 319, Case 1615. Although Lindsay was professor of social legislation at Columbia, former commissioner of education in Puerto Rico, and frequent visitor to Latin America, his appeal on behalf of Rowe stemmed from his personal involvement in currency reform. Rowe himself spent the last half of 1914 as guest professor at the University of La Plata, having helped persuade Congress to provide for a second Pan American Scientific Congress in 1915. On Lindsay, see New York Times, November 13, 1959, 26; on Rowe, Murphy, "Professors, Publicists, and Pan Americanism," 387-392.

22. Lamar to Wilson, August 12, 1914, Wilson Papers, Reel 61; White to Bryan, September 23, 1914, Entry 334. Nevins, Henry White, 330, says White's concern for his wife's health prevented him from accepting the nomination, but in his letter to Bryan, White intimated that he preferred a European assignment.


26. Memo, undated, contained in 710E/54; Moore to Bryan, Aug. 16, 1914, 710E/49; Huntington to Robert Lansing, November 11, 1914, 710E/40. Huntington, who was
visiting Carlsbad when the war erupted, exited Europe only with difficulty and after
German authorities detained him at Nuremberg. Washington Post, August 24, 1914, 2.
27. Richard M. Gannaway, "United States Representatives at the Inter-American
Conferences, 1889-1928" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1968),
329-331.
28. Ibid., 331; Kenneth J. Grieb, "The United States and the Fifth Pan American
Conference," Inter-American Review of Bibliography, XX (April-June, 1970), 160-161;
Henry W. Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations (Baltimore, 1929),
138-139, 601. Swiggett was later appointed assistant secretary of the Second Pan
American Scientific Congress, and Rowe became secretary of the First Pan American
Financial Conference.
29. Gannaway, "U.S. Representatives," 331-332; Ichman, Professional Diplomacy,
120-131; Seward W. Livermore, "Deserving Democrats: The Foreign Service under
30. Washington Post, October 1, 1914, 8.
31. Murphy, "Professors, Publicists, and Pan Americanism," 2-4; Gordon
33. Burton I. Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization in the
34. 710E/8.4.
35. El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), October 28, 1914, 3; Ray Stannard Baker,
Peterson, Argentina and the United States (Albany, New York, 1964), 325-326; Arthur S.
37. 710E/7; Frederic J. Stimson, My United States (New York, 1931), chap. 38;
Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963),
150-154. Stimson was ambassador to Argentina. The ABC treaty is reproduced in "The
New Pan Americanism," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, VI (February, 1916),
50-53.
38. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 327-331; Emily S. Rosenberg, "World War I
39. Percy A. Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925), 548. See also F. A.
Kirkpatrick, South America and the War (Cambridge, England, 1918), 74-75.
European War and Pan Americanism," Columbia University Quarterly, XXI (April,
1919), 87-90; William R. Shepherd, The Hispanic Nations of the New World (New Haven,