Were They Really Rogues? Desertion in the Nineteenth-Century U S Army

Full Citation: John D McDermott, “Were They Really Rogues? Desertion in the Nineteenth-Century U S Army,” *Nebraska History* 78 (1997): 165-174


Date: 7/21/2010

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Photographs / Images: Ritual humiliation of wearing a wooden barrel; Fort Bridger, Wyoming, soldier riding wooden horse about 1866; soldiers chopping firewood at Fort Grant, Arizona Territory, 1885; 1866 document listing equipment carried away by four deserters from the First Nebraska Veteran Volunteer Cavalry; Reward poster, 1909, for Christopher Zigler deserter; Disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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During the nineteenth century one of the most discussed and written about problems in the United States Army was that of desertion. The army generally defined the practice as "the willful abandonment of military service by a soldier or officer duly enlisted or commissioned, or in the pay of the government without leave and without an intention to return." Military newspapers and periodicals, such as the Army and Navy Journal, the Army and Navy Register, United Service magazine, the Journal of the Military Service Institution, and The Public Service Review, addressed the problem in letters, articles, and editorials. Soldiers all the way from the commanding general down to privates expressed their opinions, and even deserters wrote in to tell why they had given the army "the grand bounce." In the 1880s interest in the phenomenon heightened as general orders made it mandatory for officers to interrogate captured deserters. Newspaper reporter Frank Woodward of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch served in the Fourth U.S. Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks from June 8 to August 19, 1889, in order to investigate stories of mistreatment that had caused many recruits to desert, and his expose, The Dogs of War, led to a court of inquiry that recommended reforms.

Considered a crime in all armies, desertion was an act punishable by death under certain circumstances. The conditions were set forth in the Articles of War, the army's military code. Adopted in 1806, the pertinent section read that "all officers and soldiers who have received pay or have been duly enlisted in the service of the United States and shall be convicted of having deserted the same, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as by sentence of a court-martial shall be inflicted." The act of May 29, 1830, limited the death penalty to times of war, and the army later qualified its execution in a variety of ways, requiring, for example, a two-thirds vote of the members of a general court-martial before it could be carried out.

During the nation's wars the army did exercise its prerogative. During the War of 1812 the army executed 205 for desertion. In the Mexican War a number of deserters fought as a group against U.S. troops at Cherubusco, and when captured were summarily hanged. During the Civil War the question of making an example to quell desertion was seriously debated at a cabinet meeting on February 3, 1863, and thereafter commanders began to take action. Scarcely a week passed during the winter of 1863-64 without the execution of at least one offender. In February 1864 President Abraham Lincoln opted for clemency, changing the sentence of those deserters condemned to death to imprisonment for the duration of the war at Dry Tortugas, Florida. He also gave commanding generals power "to return to duty deserters whose restoration would, in their judgment, benefit the service." The climax came in May 1864, when Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ordered all deserters from the Army of the Potomac brought before a drumhead court-martial and, if found guilty, executed.

Other punishments authorized for desertion in the nineteenth century included imprisonment, imprisonment on bread and water, solitary confinement, hard labor, forfeiture of pay and allowances, discharge from the service, reprimands, and, in the case of noncommissioned officers, reduction to the ranks. As time passed, prison sentences for desertion decreased in length. For example, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, deserters Gideon Ellis, Bowden Eldridge, and Russell Harrington were sentenced to hard labor with ball and chain for ten years. By mid-century only a few men received prison terms as long as five years, and the average was from one to two years. A rule of thumb was to make the prison term equal to the time of the enlistment left unfilled by desertion. Throughout, however, the courts-martial acted with inconsistency.

Corporal punishments were also permitted. These varied from decade to decade, and in the early years were especially harsh, painful, and sometimes disabling. Principal among them was flogging, which could cause death. On April 10, 1806, to curtail abuse Congress limited punishment to no more than fifty lashes, to be administered only as a sentence of a court-martial, and on May 16, 1812, prohibited the practice altogether. However, on March 22, 1833, Congress re instituted flogging as a penalty for an enlisted man found guilty of desertion. Finally, on August 5, 1861, the Congress acted again to prohibit the punishment, this time abolishing it for good.

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Standard army punishment of deserters and others included ritual humiliations, in this case, wearing a wooden barrel. Courtesy of Stanley J. Morrow Collection, W. H. Over State Museum, Vermillion, South Dakota

Other corporal punishments in the early nineteenth century included being tied to a tree for a day, carrying a knapsack filled with shot, standing on a stump for long periods, riding a fence post with a musket swinging from each foot, straddling a wooden horse, "cobbling" (paddling with a board or strip), wearing a ball and chain, ducking, and shaving the eyebrows and head. Even more brutal were picketing (being forced to stand on a sharpened stick), cutting or cropping of the ears, and branding on the cheek, forehead, or hip with the letter "D." From 1865 to 1870 tattooing was a legal substitute. By a congressional act of June 6, 1872, branding and indelibly marking were prohibited.

Sometimes the court-martial simply sentenced the deserter to be drummed or bugled out of the service, which according to one observer, "amounts to gratifying his desire to leave, and he is tendered in addition the gratuitous ovation of a parting serenade." To begin, the whole command gathered at parade. Guards brought the prisoner front and center, where all his buttons and insignia were cut off and the order read. Drums and fifes played the "Rogue's March," the words to which were:

Poor old soldier, poor old soldier,
Tarred and feathered and sent to hell,
Because he would not soldier well.

Troops then escorted the unfortunate to the edge of the military reservation, where he was free to depart.

Most treatment of desertion in the U.S. Army in Indian war histories deal with the rate or frequency. The rate is often presented in different ways, which serve to confuse the novice. The first is to compare the number of desertions to the aggregate strength of the army, the second is to compare it to the number of enlisted men in the service, and the third is to compare it to the number of enlistments during the period. The first method will yield the lowest percentage and the third the highest. The second computation is probably the fairest and most indicative, since the first counts officers, who had much better ways of leaving the service than desertion, and the third does not take into account many nonrecruits who remained steadfast.

The army usually presented its figures as percentages of the aggregate. Thus, in Fred T. Wilson's *Laws, Rulings, and Decisions Governing the Military Crime of Desertion*, during the Mexican War of the 47,150 troops engaged, 6,375, or 14 percent, deserted. Later during the Civil War the army estimated that 508,494 men out of more than two million deserted, or more than 25 percent. For the later period, 1865–91, the *Army and Navy Journal* reported the desertion rate as 14 percent. Contemporary historians tend to report the third method of computing. For example, in Gregory J. W. Urwin, *The United States Cavalry: An Illustrated History*, "of the 255,712 men who enlisted between 1867 and 1891, 88,475—practically a third—deserted." None of these methods takes into account the fact that one man may have enlisted and deserted more than once, which was often the case. During the Civil War generous bounties given to volunteer troops provided powerful inducements to desert and reenlist. At the beginning of the war the government offered a bounty of $100, payable upon honorable discharge. But by July 1862 it
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A soldier at Fort Bridger, Wyoming, grimly rides the wooden horse as his punishment, about 1866. NSHS-R539:4-8

had modified the agreement to pay one-fourth of the amount in advance. After May 1, 1864, the army offered $300 incentives to enlist, with an additional payment of $100 to veterans. Cities and counties also paid bounties, New York County leading the way with $300 in cash. Consequently those who wished to take the chance of deserting and reenlisting could make a great deal of money, and there were significant numbers who were willing to take the risk. Among fugitives finally brought to justice was one who had deserted seventeen times and another who admitted to thirteen desertions. As one disgusted observer put it, "The thief and deserter of to-day becomes the sentinel of to-morrow." Desertion also often meant loss of equipment and the expense of recruiting a replacement. One commentator estimated that in 1883 it cost the government $214 to replace a deserter, and in 1889 Commanding Gen. John M. Schofield estimated the losses due to desertions reached several million dollars per year.

The one least likely to desert was the officer, simply because if he wanted to leave the service, all he had to do was resign his commission. It is not surprising then to learn that between 1870 and 1891 only twenty-one officers deserted. Among them were some distinguished veterans; twelve had served on the Union side during the Civil War, and all had been promoted for gallant or meritorious service. The reasons for the actions of the twenty-one are not known in every case, but one can surmise that anonymity was important and haste essential. First Lt. Benjamin Samuel Weyer, First U.S. Infantry, the last of the deserters, left the army to elope with a woman from his post. Another officer fled to escape "a rasping domestic infelicity." Several were gamblers. One of the deserters was the chief clerk at army headquarters in Washington. His debts caused him to leave the army without ceremony. He later became the manager of a New York theater. Another officer, a son of a clergyman, obtained money under false pretences and left suddenly. Another cashed his pay accounts several times over and fled to England.

Desertions sometimes occurred in groups, guards even leading their prisoners. One mass exodus occurred on August 29, 1864, when three to four hundred men left forts investing Washington. They continued in a body under arms until they had obtained civilian clothing, after which they scattered in every direction. There was also one case of mass desertion following the end of the Civil War that amounted to the decimation of a regiment. In June 1865 the fear of an Indian outbreak resulted in an order sending the First Michigan Cavalry, a unit with an exemplary fighting record, to New Mexico. Upon reaching Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, two hundred enlisted men deserted in a body and went home, stating that the war was over and that the government had no right to send them against Indians. In 1879 when a bill for their relief was introduced in the U.S. Senate, the attorney general ruled that New Mexico had been a legal assignment, that purpose had been valid, and that the men were still deserters.

From almost the beginning the army offered cash payments to those who apprehended defectors. A general order issued in August 1818 promised a re-
ward of $30 for capture of a deserter. In September 1861 apparently believing that those enlisting to fight in the Civil War would do their duty, authorities reduced the amount of the reward to $5. By July 16, 1863, they had determined themselves mistaken and raised the amount to $10. Two months later they restored the original stipend of $30. The army also paid $25 for the recovery of a deserter's horse.27

Clemency was another way of approaching the problem, and presidents Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant issued blanket pardons for troops during their administrations. On March 10, 1863, pursuant to an act of Congress of the week preceding, President Lincoln issued a proclamation permitting soldiers absent from their regiments without leave to return to duty before April 1 without punishment. However, they did have to forfeit pay and allowances that had accrued during their absences. Authorities estimated that between 12,000 and 15,000 took advantage of amnesty. On March 11, 1865, Lincoln issued a second proclamation, requiring deserters to report on or before May 10, 1865. In this case offenders had to serve the remainder of their enlistments, plus the time equal to that lost by desertion. The number of men who returned under this proclamation was 1,755. On July 13, 1866, the Johnson Administration offered to restore deserters from the regular army to duty without trial or punishment if they reported by August 15. No statistics are available on how many troops took advantage of the offer. Grant followed suit, allowing a pardon to all deserters who "joined their colors" before January 1, 1874. The number of men who returned under this proclamation was 2,007.28

One of the incentives for desertion was that apprehension was difficult. Scattered over a vast country the army had a Herculean task, and it did not always vigorously pursue defectors.29 In the early years efforts centered in the office of the adjutant general. In 1857 the army ran descriptive information in the Police Gazette.30 On September 24, 1862, general orders created the office of provost marshall, charging it with arresting all deserters as one of its seven duties. The army also offered special inducements to soldiers who stopped men attempting to desert, including furloughs with expenses defrayed and recommendations for promotion. The new emphasis on capturing deserters bore fruit. The number of deserters arrested and returned to the army from April 1, 1863, until the end of the war was 75,909. Authorities estimated the total number of arrests and returns for the duration of the war at 81,000.31 In 1866–67, a Desertion Division in the office of adjutant general conducted correspondence with the field, informing post commanders that particular deserters might be in their area and giving descriptions and other pertinent information.32

A few case studies in apprehension are illuminating. On the evening of his intended marriage on March 13, 1887, Ernest Von Dieselski, alias Ernest Shanfauser, was arrested for desertion on information provided by his mother. It seemed that she opposed his proposed postnuptial employment as a bartender. In 1884 deserter John Kennedy's wife turned him in for the reward, which she spent in high living in Boston; he later murdered her. During the same year

![Image](https://example.com/image.jpg)
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Andrew H. Hannaford, who had deserted from Company K of the Second U.S. Cavalry in 1873, unsuccessfully attempted to take custody of his three-year-old child from his estranged wife; his brother-in-law turned him in. In 1880 a man who had been his friend for many years turned in deserter George Stokes of Vancouver Barracks, Washington Territory, after an argument at the office. On September 23, 1867, demonstrating a high degree of acculturation, a large party of Crow Indians arrived at Fort C. F. Smith, Montana Territory, with four deserters in tow. Commanding officer Luther P. Bradley paid them the reward, which amounted to $120.33 In 1889 the Army and Navy Register reported that of the 40,391 who deserted between 1873 and the present, 8,050, or 20 percent, had surrendered or been arrested, probably a respectable figure in view of all the inherent difficulties.34

One of the great quests of the period was to search for the causes of desertion. Most agreed with Lt. Archibald A. Cabaniss that “[i]t is useless to attempt to assign a cause for desertion for it is not due to one, two or three causes, but a combination of many.” Some ascribed its persistence to human nature. According to Col. Thomas M. Anderson, “So long as boys play hookey and young men are subject to feminine fascinations, so long as men drink, gamble, and make debts, so long will soldiers and sailors desert.” Some simply said that Americans did not make good soldiers because of the national independent temperament. In the opinion of Englishman Charles A. Murray, “[T]he American peasant, though a brave and hardy man, and expert in the use of the rifle and musket, is naturally the worst soldier in the world, as regards obedience and discipline. He has been brought up to believe himself equal to the officers who commands him, and never forgets that when his three years of enlistment are over he will again be his equal.”

Some saw desertion common where enlistment was voluntary. Others pointed to general life in the service. One ex-soldier described the enlisted man’s life as a “hang-dog, demoralizing life, unfitting a man for any respectable civil position, destroying all self-respect, sinking all that makes a man a man.” Many felt like Pvt. Charles Lester of Company H, Fourth U.S. Infantry, who wrote his sister in April 1867: “I have sixteen months to serve yet and when it is up they can go to the devil; they wont get this chile again.”

Most who wrote about the subject pointed to work as common laborers as the greatest cause of discontent. In 1879 a correspondent of the Omaha Herald succinctly described the situation:

The regular soldier on the frontiers is no more nor less than a beast of burden, and what is still worse, he is treated as such. He is exposed to continual hardships and fatigue, he has to work in the sun and in the rain. From sunrise to sunset it is work, building houses, stables, etc. The finishing of one building here is the beginning of another. Strangers and visitors from the East, often take them for convicts.
One observer believed that soldiers on the frontier were doing the work of three times their number. What was so frustrating to many was the fact that they were not learning any new skills that would equip them to make a future success of themselves.

Another source of displeasure was the army ration both in terms of its quantity and quality. In 1872 an officer who interviewed over a hundred inmates at Alcatraz Island heard that the primary cause for their desertion was the want of sufficient food. The literature of the period is filled with complaints about skimpy rations and the lack of vegetables in the army diet. The monotony of the daily fare prompted this jingle, much repeated in the mess-halls of the day:

Of hash that’s young, of hash that’s old, Of hash that’s hot, of hash that’s cold Of hash that’s tender, of hash that’s tough, I swear to God, I’ve had enough.

Furthermore, the food was sometimes of inferior quality and poorly prepared. Lt. William A. Campbell declared that he had “seen men go into the mess-hall at meal-time, and, upon, seeing what was placed before them, turn away and leave the room in disgust.”

One recruit at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, in 1887 declared that the decayed salt pork he had received for dinner was so vile it would have nauseated a hungry dog. Two years later another recruit at Jefferson Barracks stated that he gave the meat from his plate to a hungry dog, who chewed it a little but declined to swallow.

The quarters at some posts were the subject of complaint. Some mentioned the discomfort of twenty to forty men in a single room and from two to four in one bunk. One soldier at Camp Grant, Arizona Territory, described his quarters in 1871 as,

poor, very poor; the roofs (dirt) are leaking; the cracks in the walls (uprights of timber) so large that one walking outside in the evening notices by candlelight all that is going on inside. After all one’s scouting, escorting, saddling up of a sudden, coming home, and looking worse than an Indian, a man has nothing to please his eye and make him wish to be at home, because the first rainy day covers him with dust in his quarters, just as well as on the road, or the first rainy day wets him just as well in his quarters as if he were in the saddle, and drives him out of his so-called mess-room, if he is lucky enough to possess such an institution.

Clothing was another source of dissatisfaction. Garments seldom if ever fit, and recruits had to have company tailors to have them altered.

More of a problem was the army pay system. Recruits in particular suffered because payment for clothing and alterations came out of their first year’s stipend, leaving them very little to purchase any other goods or soldier comforts, such as tobacco or liquor. Nor did many soldiers receive their pay on time due to frontier conditions. Troops at Montana posts in 1867 were not paid for ten months. When troops did receive their pay, they might receive a great deal, enough to tempt them to find other means of livelihood. In fact, most desertions occurred just after payday.

The pay itself could be a reason for desertion, depending on economic conditions. In the 1850s army pay for enlisted men varied from five to ten dollars per month. In 1861 the amount rose to eleven dollars. During and after the Civil War the rate of pay was sixteen dollars per month. From 1871 to 1891 compensation was set at thirteen dollars for thirty days’ service. This was sufficient pay during some periods and poor pay during others. Ultimately the desertion rate was a barometer for measuring the employment market. As one soldier put it, “If desertions are low, army pay is good; if the rate is high, it is not competing.” It was not competitive in 1889, for example, when a private made sixty-seven cents per day, while a laborer in civilian life made between $1.50 and $2 for the same work.

Regional variations were also important. At western posts the high prices paid by citizens to teamsters, farm laborers, and steamboat hands were difficult to resist. And, of course, gold strikes, like magnets, drew the dross from the army. For example, in 1848-49 soldiers stationed in northern California deserted in droves to search for precious metal. For those who wanted to leave, location was definitely a factor. Fort Pembina, Dakota Territory, had a high desertion rate because it stood a few miles from the Canadian border. A court of inquiry looking into conditions at Jefferson Barracks in 1889 reported that the location of the depot near the city of St. Louis made it easy for deserters to hide themselves in the large populace.

Many enlisted men named abusive treatment from superiors as the cause of desertion. In an 1867 letter to the Army and Navy Journal a deserter from the Corps of Engineers blamed ignorant, low-bred, and degraded noncommissioned officers for abusive and degrading treatment of privates. One correspondent, calling himself “Old Soldier,” surmised that half of all desertions were the result of the petty tyranny of sergeants. Most of the one hundred prisoners interviewed at Alcatraz in 1872 claimed cruelty at the hands of their overseers.

Conversely officers and noncommissioned officers defended their actions, citing the necessity of harsh discipline due to the presence in the ranks of habitual drunkards, imbeciles, discharged convicts, and ignorant emigrants. Foreign observers also found American recruits lacking. In the early 1840s English traveler Charles J. Latrobe described the army’s enlisted men as “either of the scum of the population of the older States,” or “worthless German, English, or Irish emigrants.” As one observer put it, “Military service . . . is too frequently the dernier ressort of the impoverished, the discontented, and the vicious.” Because of the bad example of some of these men the populace generally considered enlisted men to be of low social class.

Enlisted men often were caught in problems of their own making. Observers cited consumption of alcohol and gambling debts as factors. Desertions were common before the commence-
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$50.00 REWARD
FOR THE ARREST AND DELIVERY OF
CHRISTOPHER ZIGLER,
CHARGED WITH BEING A
DESERTER FROM THE ARMY.

CHRISTOPHER ZIGLER, private, Company D, 18th Infantry, who was enlisted October 16, 1900, is reported to have deserted at Fort Douglas, Salt Lake City, Utah, March 19, 1909. At enlistment he gave his residence as Falls City, Neb., and the name and address of person to be notified in case of emergency as Mrs. Sarah Zigler (mother), Whitehall, Mont. He designated George Zigler (brother), Whitehall, Mont., as his beneficiary in case of death.

DESCRIPTIONS (at date of enlistment): White; born in Falls City, Neb.; age, 21½ years; complexion, fair; eyes, brown; hair, dark brown; complexion, dark; height, 5 feet 6½ inches; weight, 125 pounds. Prominent scars and marks: Front view—two scars on center of chin; scar on left thumb, left index finger, and left thumb. Back view—scar on left side of neck near center; two scars on left hand; mole on left shoulder.

A REWARD OF $50.00 is payable for the apprehension of this man, and for his delivery to the military authorities, at any time within five years from the date of his enlistment. The reward is payable at any United States Army post to any civil officer or other citizen who delivers the man to the charge of the military authority of the General Government. Any information that may be secured as to the whereabouts of this man should be communicated to

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1909.

161441

A 1909 wanted poster illustrated the use of photographs in apprehending twentieth-century deserters. NSHS Museum Collections-9663-77-18

ment of an anticipated hard Indian campaign. Lt. William H. Bisbee stated that many recruits in the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry deserted in the fall of 1865 because they were afraid to go west to fight Indians, their fears having been much increased by wild stories from straggling volunteers returning from the frontier. Timidity or cowardice in battle were other reasons for desertion. Whatever the reason, cavalrymen were more likely to desert than those in other branches of the service. In 1880, for example, the Sixth U. S. Cavalry and Second Cavalry led the list with 116 and 111 desertions respectively. Authorities named the ability for quick departure by horse as a reason and mentioned the greater expense for clothing endemic to service in the cavalry. 

Suggestions were made to address many of the singular aspects of desertion identified by soldiers and observers. Often mentioned was the development of a personal identification system so that deserters could not reenlist. Proposals varied from reinstituting branding and tattooing to photographing or recording bodily marks, such as scars, blemishes, or "finger marks." Some advocated stiffer penalties. Some proposed to train recruits better, keeping them in depots for longer periods where they might learn military skills before being sent to regiments. Some suggested paying enlisted men additional wages for their time as laborers or recruiting a special soldier class to do the work. Also recommended were more frequent paydays and higher pay for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. Better food, professional cooks, better clothing, better quarters, and more recreational opportunities had their proponents. Many favored reducing the term of enlistment from five to three years or permitting a man to purchase his discharge. Also championed were recruiting by regiment, development of a better system of presenting grievances, and veteran's preference for government jobs after discharge. Many of these suggestions became law or practice in years to come.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the army enacted several reforms. The Soldier Desertion Act of March 2, 1889, made it possible for some deserters to clear their records upon application to the secretary of war. Perhaps the most significant concession was that men who had deserted and reenlisted within four months and served their time faithfully could have the charge of desertion expunged from their personnel files. An executive order of February 26, 1891, generally limited punishment for desertion to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for one to two and a half years. Legislation of the same year provided for the purchase of discharge. From the perspective of a century it appears that the problem of desertion had some deep-seated underpinnings. First was the repugnance of a republic to military measures that dated from colonial times. Citizens opposed a large standing army as a threat to freedom and kept a wary eye on the military's
between-war activities. Strange as it may seem, public sentiment rested more with those who left the service than with those who enforced discipline. According to Col. John Hamilton writing in the Army and Navy Register in 1888, some citizens even looked upon desertion as "a laudable, spirited action to cast off grinding military tyranny." In a strange inversion Brig. Gen. John Pope gave his stamp of approval to deserters when he wrote in 1872 that these men did have some value for society; they usually stayed in the far reaches where they had deserted and became useful pioneers. In the end, Pope surmised, the government lost perhaps nothing by bringing active, industrious men to the frontier country.

Nor was the oath of enlistment held in high regard by the public. Lt. Col. Alfred L. Hough noted in the September 1887 issue of The Public Service Review, "Men assume their uniforms of their own accord, and feel free to leave as they come." Saddled with a rooted aversion to strict discipline and constraint, the American soldier often saw obedience as a distasteful restriction of personal freedom. The subjugation of self was contrary to the American Way. As one soldier declared, even "[t]he best of them grow weary of a life of entire submission to the accustomed to democracy can never be submitted to the rigours of military affairs."

Never severe enough to threaten national security, the practice of desertion during peacetime was an embarrassment to the United States Army, but little else. In the period after the Civil War, when Congress repeatedly reduced the strength of the military, desertion was perhaps an efficacious way of getting rid of that part of the army which could most easily be done without—the criminal, the inebriated, the abused, and the idealistic. In fact, the government tolerated this phenomenon because it was not crucial in the conduct of military affairs. While irksome, it did not threaten the republic.

**Notes**


5 The penalty was later amended to include, in addition to imprisonment for the period of the war, discharge from the service of the United States together with forfeiture of pay and allowances. See Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966), 170.

6 Ibid., 181-82.


8 Hare, "Military Punishments," 23.

9 Ibid., 228-34; Abbot, "Recruiting and Desertion," 922.


11 Abbot, "Recruiting and Desertion," 922.


19 Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War*, 139-42.


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Hough, "Desertion from the Army," 276.


Fort Wadsworth, 372; Widder, Reveille Till Tops, 43, 45; Letter from John R. Myers, Co. F.

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For better recreational opportunities and leisure pursuits, see Holabird, "Some Considerations Respecting Desertion," 2; Abbot, "Recruiting and Desertion," 924.


"Colonel Hamilton on Desertions," 804.
