On the Brink: The Pre-Wounded Knee Army Deployment of 1890

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Article Summary: The government responded to the Ghost Dance with a massive military buildup. This was the largest deployment west of the Mississippi since the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877.

Cataloging Information:

Names: Nelson Appleton Miles, John M Schofield, John R Brooke, Daniel Royer, Short Bull, Red Cloud, Jack Red Cloud, Little Wound

South Dakota and Nebraska Place Names: Great Sioux Reservation, Pine Ridge Agency, Rosebud Reservation

Keywords: Lakota Sioux, Brulés, Ghost Dance, Nelson Appleton Miles, John R Brooke

Photographs / Images: Short Bull and Kicking Bear; map of the Sioux Reservation, 1890, drawn by Robert G Pilk; Oglala camps adjoining Pine Ridge Agency, 1890; Troop B, Seventh Cavalry at Pine Ridge Agency, 1890; Buffalo Soldiers and officers of Troop K, Ninth Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, 1890; soldiers of Battery E, First Artillery, with Lakota and Northern Cheyenne scouts; General Miles and officers having breakfast at Pine Ridge Agency, 1891
In 1890 the Lakota Sioux Indians faced a traumatic period in their history. Major land losses and restrictions stemming from the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the taking of the Black Hills in 1877, and the final culminating division of their remaining reservation lands in 1889, by which they surrendered some 9,000,000 more acres to augment white settlement, brought desolation both materially and spiritually to the people. Compounding all was Congress’s decision to cut their already meager rations. Added to drought and resulting crop losses, as well as inroads by influenza, whooping cough, and measles that killed many of their children, the Lakotas faced straitened conditions. As with many peoples in similarly afflicted societies, many of the Sioux sought relief in supernatural intervention, and in their trial turned to the Ghost Dance, a remedial ceremonial practice then sweeping through other tribes in the West, as they tried to escape a seemingly bleak future of cataclysmic proportion.

In the late fall of 1890, as the dances gained momentum on the several Lakota reservations created by the 1889 act that dismantled the Great Sioux Reservation, white residents in the surrounding vicinity took alarm. They believed the dances—in fact, largely peaceful attempts by Lakota people to deal with their circumstances—instead forecast

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BY JEROME A. GREENE

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Short Bull, left, Brulé from Rosebud Reservation, and Kicking Bear, Oglala from Cheyenne River Reservation, purveyors of the Lakota form of the Ghost Dance in 1890. National Archives and Records Administration
Sioux Reservations, 1890

Drawn by Robert G. Pilk

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war. In November, Agent Daniel Royer at the Pine Ridge Reservation, increasingly apprehensive that trouble was in the offing, telegraphed his superiors in Washington, D.C., that “Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy,” and pleaded for military protection. “Nothing short of one thousand soldiers will settle this dancing,” said Royer. The agent further called for the arrest and confinement of the Ghost Dance leaders. In days, there was rampant excitement at Pine Ridge and at Rosebud Agency farther to the east, as well as in the white communities surrounding the reservations, where growing numbers of citizens clamored for military protection.

On November 13, President Benjamin Harrison concluded the situation was serious and that the authority and discipline of the agents must be maintained and an outbreak prevented. He ordered the secretary of war to ensure that sufficient military forces be prepared to take the field if required, “and that any movement is supported by a body of troops sufficiently large to be impressive, and, in case of resistance, quickly and thoroughly efficient.” By his action in ordering such deployment, the president instituted a constitutionally authorized civil function to use the army to protect a state (South Dakota) against domestic violence, and also, following initiation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, empowered the War Department to manage the Lakotas on their reservations.1

The president’s directive set in motion the military occupation of the Sioux reservations. On Friday, November 14, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding general of the army in Washington, forwarded Harrison’s order to Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles at the Chicago headquarters of the Division of the Missouri, an administrative domain including the states of Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and thus the entirety of the troubled reservations. While calling for Miles’s views on the Sioux matter, in his own accompanying directive Schofield reiterated the purpose for the action: “First to prevent an outbreak on the part of the Indians which shall endanger the lives and property of the people in the neighboring country, and second to bring to bear upon the disaffected Indians such military force as will compel prompt submission to the authority of the Government.” On November 17, Miles ordered troops to Pine Ridge and Rosebud, the reservations most immediately affected by the Ghost Dances, a decision with which Schofield concurred. Schofield told Miles that cavalry and artillery troops at Fort Riley, Kansas, would also be available for his command, should the emergency require them.2

The advent of Maj. Gen. Nelson Appleton Miles into the surging Lakota crisis seemed at the least a fortuitous stroke, for he shared a long and discordant history with Indian people in many parts of the country. He knew the Sioux people well and many of their leaders personally, for he had rigorously...
Men of Troop B, Seventh Cavalry, garbed in field dress soon after their arrival at Pine Ridge Agency in late November 1890, approximately one month before Wounded Knee. Indian – Battle – Wounded Knee Photo File, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming.
medical, ordnance, and engineer departments supplied the troops with necessary food, supplies, weaponry, and all other services. All told, it was this broad collective from which Miles would draw to initiate operations in South Dakota.4

While Miles prepared to send troops to the Lakota reservations to curb the Ghost Dance and maintain order, the major military posts encircling the concerned reservations were forts Niobrara, Robinson, Meade, Yates, Bennett, Sully, and Randall, incorporating in all some fourteen cavalry troops and twenty-five infantry companies, all below optimum designated strength. To deal with arising exigencies at Pine Ridge and Rosebud, Miles immediately dispatched troops from the Department of the Platte, commanded by Brig. Gen. John R. Brooke in Omaha. Brooke directed troops into the Pine Ridge and Rosebud agencies from forts Omaha, Niobrara, and Robinson, Nebraska, which by their proximity were most immediately accessible.5

Thus, in a relatively short time span, Agent Royer’s persistent dispatches to his superiors in Washington had set in motion a military response to quell the Lakota Ghost Dance and, based on rumors then circulating, avert trouble at both Pine Ridge and Rosebud reservations.

Brooke reached Rushville on November 19 as sensationality ridiculous reports of battles swept the region precipitating the scramble of more settlers for safety. Preceding him from Fort Omaha were four companies of the Second Infantry. Three troops of the Ninth Cavalry (the all-black “Buffalo Soldiers”) and one company of the Eighth Infantry joined next day from Fort Robinson fitted out with horses, mules, wagons, supplies, and campaign gear. Meantime, more infantrymen at Fort Omaha readied themselves to head west over the Fremont, Elkhorn, and Missouri Valley Railroad.

With the companies of the Second Infantry, Brooke late on the nineteenth took the road for Pine Ridge, twenty-six miles distant, with nearly five hundred soldiers plus a Gatling gun, a Hotchkiss gun, and related equipment. It was a chilly night and most of the men lacked overcoats; smoking was not allowed or talking above a whisper. The soldiers reached the agency at 7 a.m. Thursday and began laying out their camp, unpacking and arranging baggage, digging latrines and so forth in accordance with army protocol.

Meanwhile, in relative concert with Brooke’s advance, at 3 a.m. on November 21 Lt. Col. Alfred T. Smith with two troops of the Ninth Cavalry and three companies of the Eighth Infantry, besides a Hotchkiss gun and a Gatling gun, reached Rosebud Agency, eighty miles east of Pine Ridge Agency, where they began raising earthworks atop the surrounding hills.6

The entry of occupation forces at Pine Ridge and Rosebud for the first time since the Great Sioux
Reservation had been created in 1868 caused instant consternation among the native people, many of whom believed that they were about to be attacked. At Pine Ridge Agency, Oglala schoolchildren pointed out the rising dust in the distance and told their teacher "soldiers are coming." At Rosebud, panicked tribesmen under the Ghost Dance leader, Short Bull, perhaps as many as six hundred warriors plus women and children, surged west in mass exodus toward Pine Ridge. When they gained the Pine Ridge boundary and realized that the soldiers were present there, too, they fled north away from the agency, continuing toward White River and the edge of the Badlands. En route north, the Brulés killed and butchered cattle, wrecked cabins and destroyed other possessions of Indians and mixed-bloods. Near the confluence of Wounded Knee Creek with White River, they resumed dancing. "They are very defiant," reported General Brooke.7

The soldiers who arrived on November 20 and 21 were not the only ones bound for Pine Ridge and Rosebud, because Miles would clearly avail himself of the carte blanche offered by his superiors to go beyond the geographical limits of his division in assembling his field command. Owing to an increase of connecting railroads during the 1880s that permitted rapid transport of troops and their animals and truck almost anywhere across the West, Troop D of the Ninth Cavalry besides the regimental pack train would reach Pine Ridge via Rushville from Wyoming on the twenty-fourth along with Maj. Guy V. Henry, legendary Indian fighter and squadron commander of the Ninth, while two more companies of the Second Infantry would likewise join from Fort Omaha on the twenty-fifth. And late in the month, four companies of the Twenty-first Infantry from Fort Sidney, Nebraska, under Lt. Col. John S. Poland would join at Rosebud to augment that station. Within days additional troops would follow. Of special note would be the arrival at Pine Ridge on Thanksgiving Day of headquarters and eight troops of the Seventh Cavalry of Little Bighorn fame, then stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, under command of Col. James W. Forsyth, who would also bring Light Battery E of the First Artillery. Of the buildup, an infantryman mused to his sweetheart back at Fort Robinson: "I think after all them troops get here, it will about scare the Indians and they will all surrender."

Over the following weeks more reinforcements arrived in the principal zone of operations, some from far afield, indeed. In early December, nine troops of the Sixth Cavalry, in all numbering nearly five hundred soldiers besides as many horses and the unit’s equipment, would join from stations in New Mexico and Colorado, arriving in Rapid City on the ninth and tenth of December for service along the Cheyenne River. The unit’s grizzled commander, Col. Eugene A. Carr, had campaigned through western Dakota fourteen years earlier in pursuit of many of these same Lakotas. A veteran of numerous clashes with Indians since the 1860s, Carr now reckoned how best to accustom his men to wintry climes. (Among the officers of the Sixth under Carr’s command was 2nd Lt. John J. Pershing, who would rise to become General and commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I.)9

Later that month seven companies of the Seventeenth Infantry arrived near the Cheyenne River from Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming. Other units that would factor either prominently or subordinately in the winter campaign as events dictated included two companies of the Third Infantry, also posted in the field near the Cheyenne; five companies of the Seventh Infantry that rode Pullman cars from Denver to Pierre to bolster the garrison of Fort Sully, where another joined from Fort Leavenworth; four more companies of the Twenty-first Infantry summoned from Utah to garrison Fort Robinson; four companies of the Sixteenth Infantry from Utah; and a platoon of the Fourth Artillery dispatched from Kansas to Fort Meade. Units already assigned to posts in the region included the Eighth Cavalry, with five troops located at Fort Meade, and two at Fort Yates at Standing Rock. Men of the Twelfth Infantry garrisoned Fort Bennett at the Cheyenne River Agency, as well as Fort Sully downstream on the Missouri, while soldiers of the Fifteenth Infantry occupied Fort Randall, below Sully. Through December and later, too, elements of the First, Second, and Fifth Cavalry regiments, and the First Infantry Regiment from Angel Island, California, would operate guard posts in the vicinity of Pine Ridge and Rosebud agencies. To the west, other commands would advance from Montana to be nearer the Sioux reservations if needed as operations played out.10

The enlisted men assigned to duty on and around the Sioux reservations in 1890 represented the mix of backgrounds, preparedness, and efficiency that often marked soldiers through all periods of history. It was these soldiers, often foreign-born, undereducated, and/or out of work who signed up for five-year hitches at a base rate of thirteen dollars per month to do the government’s bidding and to lay their lives on the line if necessary in the performance of that duty. Their commissioned officers represented another varied
lot. Many were capable men, others not, some with diverse backgrounds and education, others who had risen from the ranks, and many others seasoned with decades of experience in the lower grades of lieutenant and captain. Some were immigrants. The schism between officers and enlisted men was ever present, and as rumors coursed through the ranks at the outset of every campaign, senior leaders imparted little pertinent information. As with the enlisted men, many officers took to heavy drinking, and alcohol was a constant bane throughout the military establishment. On the eve of starting from Fort Robinson, Pvt. August Hettinger of the Eighth Infantry recalled a “jollification” at the post canteen, wherein the troops stole liquor stored by the officers for their private use. The regimental quartermaster told Hettinger to care for a single filled gallon jug, and, said the enterprising soldier, “I managed to get [it] . . . to the Rosebud Agency by putting it in a nosebag and filling it to the top with oats.”

Besides the introduction of formal troops to the scene at Pine Ridge and Rosebud agencies and all around the other reservations, the army resolved to raise as many as five hundred Indian scouts to augment the regular forces and serve as potential insurance for success. On November 22 General Miles received authority for such recruitment, and three days later a body of applicants, including forty-four Northern Cheyennes living at the agency, were selected by 1st Lt. Charles Taylor, an experienced officer of the Ninth Cavalry. About 110 of the chosen recruits accompanied Taylor to Fort Robinson for enlistment. They furnished their own mounts and at the post received uniforms, weapons and other equipment, and training before returning to Pine Ridge as Company A, Indian Scouts.

Visitors to Pine Ridge Agency in late November described as well as photographed the hundreds of Sioux tipis belonging to progressive Lakotas (now called “friendlies”) stretched out in the vicinity of White Clay Creek west and south of the agency buildings along both sides of the road from Chadron. Nearby stood the conical white Sibley tents of the cavalry and infantry where the soldiers “piled in, nine to eleven to each tent,” as one doughboy remembered. “Two or three would pool their blankets, place their feet towards the stove and try to keep warm,” he said.

The presence of the troops transformed things. Almost immediately, the road from Rushville became an alternating dusty and muddy umbilical
for government and contract wagons hauling commissary and quartermaster goods from the railroad. At Pine Ridge, General Brooke took over Agent Royer's quarters and began a time-consuming correspondence with his department offices in Omaha via telephone and telegraph at the Rushville station. His pressing objective was to insure protection of lives and property at the agency. In fact, the soldiers' arrival spooked the Indian children in the government school and many had tried to run away. All white people employed at the agency assembled at the agent's office and received instructions to arm themselves.14

While reporters nearby predicted an immediate advance to disrupt and disarm the Ghost Dancers, Brooke cautiously awaited direction from Washington and Chicago. He postponed interfering with such activities at the tribal communities along Wounded Knee, Medicine Root, and Porcupine creeks, northeast of the agency, where inflated reports told of dancers with "rifles strapped on their backs" making threats against the soldiers. Other information indicated that as yet there was no blatant hostility toward whites, and some, in fact, continued to witness the dances without resistance.15

The troops remained on alert through subsequent nights. Brooke directed the picket line advanced well beyond the bivouac area and incorporated the local Indian police force, now increased to one hundred men. On Friday, on orders from Miles, Brooke undertook to separate progressive Sioux and nonprogressive Sioux, a problematic task at best because of the difficulty in differentiating among all the tribesmen present. On Brooke's direction, Royer sent the police and several scouts far afield to summon all friendly tribesmen to assemble at the agency, as well as to notify settlers of a potential outbreak. By the time that task was completed, it was anticipated reinforcements would be at hand and that serious consultation with the belligerent males might begin, to include arrests of those who refused to stop dancing. At the same time, news of that sudden rush of several thousand Indians from Rosebud reached Pine Ridge, causing great alarm. As the Rosebud people redirected north toward White River, some of the Oglalas furtively took flight and joined them near the mouth of Wounded Knee Creek not far from the Badlands.16

Meantime, the venerable Chief Red Cloud, who had previously straddled on the issue of the dances, and whose son Jack had become a proponent of them, came out squarely against the movement, no doubt with hope of stemming confusion over where he stood on the matter and maintaining peace at Pine Ridge. Next day Royer received a letter from Chief Little Wound, at odds with Red Cloud and fulminating against the presence of the soldiers. "Our dance is a religious one, and we are going to dance until spring. If we find then that the new Christ does not appear we will stop dancing, but in the meantime troops or no troops we are going to start our dance." Royer interpreted the message as meaning that the warriors intended to fight. On November 23 throngs of the summoned friendly tribesmen arrived from more than thirty miles away, hundreds of families with teams and wagons raising volumes of dust all along the roads from the north and east. Estimates placed the number at 3,500-4,000 people.17

On this day, too, Jack Red Cloud told reporters that the people down White Clay Creek had discontinued the dancing and were also coming to the agency. He said he saw no harm in the dancing, that it was a religious matter similar to those of the white people. He denied reports that guns had been brandished during the dances and averred that all forms of metal were proscribed. In the confusion of the moment, gossip flew among press representatives that the Rosebud Indians were en route to kill Brooke, which would signal an attack on all the soldiers at Pine Ridge. Other reports forecast the imminent arrival of progressive leaders He Dog and Big Road, who were now also among the dancers. But the real reason for the influx was that ration day was at hand. Brooke grew alarmed as the agency soon swarmed with the people, friends as well as non-friends, as his force was too small to risk arresting leaders for fear of instigating an uprising. To him Miles on November 18 had telegraphed confidential instructions: "One thing should be impressed upon all officers, never to allow their command to be mixed up with the Indians or taken at a disadvantage." On the twenty-third he repeated this maxim: "Do not allow your command to become mixed up with Indians, friendly or otherwise. Hold them all at a safe distance from your command. Guard against surprise or treachery."18

On November 24, the first reinforcements appeared—two much-anticipated infantry companies from Omaha and the cavalry troop under Major Henry from Wyoming, who brought word of the Seventh Cavalry's approach. Three days later, the arrival of Custer's old regiment along with Light Battery E, First Artillery, required realigning of the soldier camp, now by virtue of rank to be commanded by Colonel Forsyth. With the Seventh's
appearance, the press correspondents made much of the troopers being in the land of their old victors, some suggesting a vengeance motive among them, though few of the officers and men had been at the Little Bighorn in 1876. The additions brought the total force at the agency to twelve troops of cavalry, six companies of infantry, and a battery of light artillery with four rifled Hotchkiss cannon and one Gatling gun.  

The expanding army camp created an unsettling influence for many of the Sioux. When one of the chiefs complained of Brooke's howitzers being trained on his people, the general refused to redirect them. Throughout these early discussions, perhaps the greatest threat to all the chiefs was the loss of freedom that the army might impose on them by taking their guns and ponies—i.e., disarming and dismounting them—and by Sunday, November 30, many of the Pine Ridge progressives had made their minds up to join the dancers. When Royer and others awoke that Sabbath they discovered that perhaps 2,000 of the people—fully two-thirds of the Oglalas at the agency—had drifted north toward the Badlands, ostensibly to join Short Bull's Brulés far and away from the army presence.  

Meanwhile, at Rosebud Agency the ration issue proceeded without disturbance. Any trouble from the remaining Brulés, noted a correspondent, "seems out of the question, as they have no rations on hand and no place to leave their wives and children." Of more significance as things played out, intelligence of Short Bull's location following the flight on November 20-21 firmly placed him and several hundred warriors and their families along White River, thirty miles north of the agency at the edge of the Badlands. With him were Crow Dog and Two Strike, and other leaders. They reportedly were looting, stealing horses and cattle, burning some property, all the time diligently seeking recruits from Pine Ridge and the other agencies.  

When, on November 29, Brooke wrote his wife, "there is no more danger [here at Pine Ridge] now than there is in Omaha," he was reassuring her, for uncertainty indeed existed. With the military deployment, the immediate government response to the Ghost Dance was enacted and a semblance of federal authority initiated for the relief of apprehensive citizens in the area of the reservations. With the massive buildup, the targeted reservations containing approximately 20,000 Sioux people were thus seized and surrounded, and by the time the
enterprise was complete it would constitute the biggest troop deployment west of the Mississippi River since the Great Sioux War of 1876-77. In the weeks preceding Wounded Knee, it occupied nearly a quarter of the fighting strength of the U.S. Army—well over five thousand officers and men—thereby comprising the nation’s largest military mobilization between the close of the Civil War in 1865 and the outbreak of the Spanish American War in 1898.22

NOTES


2 Schofield to Miles, Nov. 14, 1890, in Arms in Possession of Certain Indians, 5 (quotes); ibid., Nov. 19, 24, 1890, 7, 9.

3 New York Weekly World, Dec. 10, 1890 (quote). For Miles’s background, see Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), passim; and Jerome A. Greene, Yellowstone Command: Colonel Nelson A. Miles and the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), passim.


6 Regimental Return of the Ninth Cavalry, November 1890, National Archives (hereafter, NA) Microcopy No. 744, Roll 90; Regimental Return of the Second Infantry, November 1890, NA Microcopy No. 665, Roll 23; Regimental Return of the Eighth Infantry, November 1890, NA Microcopy 665, Roll 95; Chadron Advocate, Nov. 21, 1890; Black Hills Journal, Nov. 21, 1890.

7 Thisba Hutson Morgan, “Reminiscences of My Days in the Land of the Ogalala Sioux,” South Dakota Historical Collections, 29 (1958), 50-51 (first quote); Chadron Advocate, Nov. 21, 1890; Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 26, 1890; Omaha Bee, Dec. 3, 1890 (second quote).


15 Omaha Bee, Nov. 21, 1890 (quote); Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 21, 1890.

16 Kelley, Pine Ridge 1890; 37, 40, 66; Allen, From Fort Laramie to Wounded Knee, 176; Perrig Diary, entry for Nov. 25, 1890; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 20, 22, 25, 28, 1890; Omaha Bee, Nov. 22, 1890; New York Times, Nov. 2, 1890; Eastman, “Ghost Dance War,” 33; William F. Kelley, “The Indian Troubles and the Battle of Wounded Knee,” in Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society, 4 (Lincoln: State Journal Company, Printers, 1892), 30.

17 Omaha Bee, Nov. 22, 24, 1890; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23 (quote); 25, 1890; New York Times, Nov. 23, 1890; Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 23, 1890.

18 Chicago Tribune, Nov. 25, 1890; Miles (through AG) to Brooke, Nov. 18, 23, 1890, NA Publication M983, “Sioux Campaign.” 1890-91, Roll 1 (second and third quotes), 190, 738.


20 Chadron Democrat, Dec. 11, 1890; Chicago Inter-Ocean, Nov. 29, 1890; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 29, 1890; Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 30, 1890; New York Times, Dec. 2, 1890; Kelley, Pine Ridge 1890, 45; Philip S. Hall, To Have This Land: The Nature of Indian/White Relations, South Dakota, 1888-1891 (Vermillion: University of South Dakota Press, 1991), 54-55, 57-58, 59, 66; McGillycuddy, McGillycuddy Agent, 259.

21 From Fort Laramie to Wounded Knee, 175; Hall, To Have This Land, 73.