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Article Summary: With the advent of steam power, Stephen Douglas foresaw the need for railroads to cross the continent. He envisioned the Platte Valley's potential to hold the Pacific railroad, and he campaigned for that part of Indian country to become the "Nebraska Territory."

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STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS

THE NEBRASKA QUESTION: A TEN-YEAR RECORD, 1844-1854

BY JAMES C. MALIN

THE PROBLEM

THE term "Nebraska Question" as used here involves a special definition and significance. Prior to 1844 the country west of the present Iowa-Missouri-Arkansas boundaries had no name except that it was designated in the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, for the purposes of that law, as "The Indian Country." In his first bill for organization of the country, Stephen A. Douglas renamed the portion included in that measure Nebraska Territory—only enough land to make a good state to support the grassland link of the Pacific railroad by way of the South Pass. But this bill gave a name to the core of the country which was to occupy so conspicuous a role in this decade of United States history. The northern and southern boundaries of Nebraska fluctuated from bill to bill and from proposal to proposal, but the Platte Valley route to the South Pass as the route of the Pacific railroad was henceforth central to all such planning.

Perspective upon this history of the Nebraska Question was distorted by subsequent events. After the enactment of the law of May 30, 1854, by which two territories, Nebraska and Kansas, were organized, the focus of public

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interest in the measure and in the country shifted to Kansas and the valley of the river of the same name. The original focus upon Nebraska, the Platte Valley, and the Pacific railroad, was lost in the controversy over slavery—a major example of how fanatical minorities of the extreme left and right may involve whole peoples in controversies that neither extremist party can demonstrate were necessary.

In consequence of the long and bitter campaign of vilification of Stephen A. Douglas, initiated by the extremists among the antislavery and abolition elements in the free states, the motives of Douglas in securing the enactment of the Nebraska-Kansas Bill have been confused. Douglas himself was reputed to be a man destitute of moral principles, intent only upon satisfying personal ambition, with the Presidency as his goal. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was represented as the price he paid for southern support for the satisfaction of ambition, along with the division of Nebraska into two territories in order to deliver Kansas to the southern slavocracy as a slave state. Nothing could have been farther from the facts, but that was nevertheless the version that was imposed upon United States history by the intolerance of these self-styled liberals. Through the influence of the slavery issue, in the parlance of show business, Kansas stole the show. Thus a narrow "frame of reference" interpretation was imposed upon the history of the United States—a gross distortion that has only been partially remedied during the ensuing century.

The centennial of the organization of these twin territories is an appropriate time to restate briefly something of the original perspective upon the decade chosen for this paper. Nebraska, rather than Kansas, is necessary therefore as the theme of this article on the decade 1844-1854, because there was no Kansas as applied to a territory prior to May 30, 1854, and scarcely anything of the sort, official or unofficial, was even in prospect prior to January 23, 1854, when Douglas reported his revised bill for the two territories, Nebraska and Kansas. Futhermore, during the interim between January 23 and May 30, if the name Kansas was used in connection with the bill, Nebraska usually

came first. Even in May, at the time the name of the bill was changed officially on the Senate records, the title was changed from the Nebraska Bill to the Nebraska and Kansas Bill, the first eighteen sections applying to Nebraska, the second eighteen, identical with the first eighteen except for name and boundaries, applying to Kansas.

The major pioneer work in the re-evaluation of this middle period of United States history was done by F. H. Hodder (1860-1935), professor of history at the University of Kansas. He was unable to finish his biography of Douglas, however, and the full implication of his work has not been appreciated. The scope of the reinterpretation suggested here, however, goes much beyond what Hodder had done. The more comprehensive the restudy of this period becomes, both in depth and perspective, the more formidable the task appears. Yet the only way to accomplish some measure of achievement is to make a sound start toward such a goal and keep at it.

THE DOUGLAS RECORD

The assertion is usually made that Douglas left no personal record of his motives in the enactment of the Nebraska-Kansas Act. That position can no longer be defended. Two items in documentation of his own interpretation of his purpose are presented here. One of them is his Illinois State Fair speech at Springfield, October 3, 1854. In this he was sufficiently specific for most purposes, had not the hostile stereotype been so firmly imposed under the emotional stresses of the slavery controversy. Captivity to a myth had become so complete as to suspend virtually all logical processes of reasoning from facts. At that time Douglas pointed out that "Ten years ago I was called upon to legislate upon this proposition [the organization of Nebraska] ... Should not this Indian barrier be broken down? ... [or] are our railroads and highways to the Pacific there to end?"[1]

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[1]Leavenworth *Kansas Weekly Herald*, October 13, 1854, reprinted from the St. Louis *Republican*.

True, the Douglas campaign for the organization of Nebraska and for a line of communications to the Pacific had indeed begun in 1844. In accord with the recommendation of that year by William Wilkins, Secretary of War, Douglas had introduced into the House of Representatives two bills: one for organization and one for the establishment of a line of military posts to protect travel on the road to Oregon. In 1845, in opposition to Asa Whitney's Pacific railroad project, Douglas wrote a letter, printed as a pamphlet and dated October 15, 1845, in which he reviewed his ideas: the organization of a strip of territory "sufficiently wide to make a good state", "a continuous line of settlements from the Mississippi to the Pacific", and a chain of railroads to the Pacific constructed with the aid of federal land grants to the territories.[2]

The reason that Douglas did not pursue the matter actively from this date is to be found in the fact that the legislature of Illinois instructed the state's delegation in Congress to support the Whitney plan and route, rather than the Douglas plan. But in 1849, when Douglas was asked to represent Chicago in the St. Louis railroad convention, he asked his Chicago constituents to act explicitly in releasing him from those instructions. This was done, and henceforth Douglas was again free to become active in furtherance of his railroad and territorial organization plans.[3]

THE KANSAS LEDGER

An intensive study of local western border agitation for the decade 1844-1854 as a whole has not yet been done. The present author, however, has investigated the few northwestern Missouri newspapers that have survived, and they have yielded some significant information about the thinking of the border men concerning these matters. The story of "General" Thomas Jefferson Sutherland and

[2]"Atlantic and Pacific Railroad:A letter from Hon. S. A. Douglas, to A. Whitney, Esq., N. Y." Dated, Quincy, Illinois, October 15, 1845. Typed copy in the *F. H. Hodder Papers*, University of Kansas Library, Lawrence.

[3]F. H. Hodder, "The railroad background of the Kansas-Nebraska Act," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII (June, 1925), 5-6.

his "perambulation" of Nebraska and plans for settlement has been told in an earlier article. In the fall of 1851 the *Ledger,* a newspaper published at the town of Kansas, Missouri (present Kansas City), printed a long editorial which found sufficient response among its neighboring editors to be reprinted by at least two of them. Apparently the original date of publication was sometime in September, 1851.[4] The editorial follows:

> As the season is advancing when the representatives of the people will again assemble at our national metropolis for the purpose of looking after the general welfare of the country, we deem it not amiss to direct their attention as well as the attention of the people themselves, to the importance of trying early measures for bringing into market much, if not all, of the beautiful and fertile lands lying within the Territory of Nebraska. To forward this project as speedily as its great importance demands, Congress should, at an early day at the next session, authorize a treaty to be held with the various Indian tribes inhabiting this territory, with a view to the extinguishment of Indian titles, etc.
>
> There may be many good and cogent arguments adduced, showing that the immediate consummation of this measure is loudly called for by public interest and safety. We have not time to either detail or recapitulate them at present, but shall soon discuss the subject more at length.
>
> We may as well now mention one or two facts, however, in connection with this subject; and we do so, as well to arouse the attention of Congress to their importance, as to invoke the aid of the press in pushing the project through.
>
> Of course it is universally known that there is an extensive scope of country intervening between the western frontier of the State of Missouri and the eastern frontier of our newly acquired Territory of New Mexico, almost wholly inhabited by Indians—some of whom are civilized and friendly, but by far the greater portion savage, thievish and hostile. Some of the atrocities, murders and robberies committed by the Arapohoes, Eutaws, Apaches, and other marauding tribes, are of too recent dates to have fled the memory of the public; and when we state that Indian murders and robberies are by no means uncommon occurrences on our great "Plains," and that scarcely a "train" passes to or from New Mexico that does not encounter bands of murderous or thievish Indians, and suffer more or less loss, in life or property, in consequence, it is to be presumed that any feasible plan for immediately

[4]St. Joseph, Missouri *Gazette,* September 24, 1851, without credit to the *Ledger;* Liberty, Missouri *Tribune,* October 3, 1851, credited to the *Ledger.*

and effectually arresting these depredations, would be eagerly seized upon by the Government.

A large portion of the citizens of Western Missouri gain a livelihood by either trafficking in merchandise, etc., which they convey to various sections of New Mexico, or by "freighting out" for Santa Fe and other traders. Robberies, by the Indians, of either money, stock or goods, to a very large amount—not less, probably than $200,000 to $300,000—occur annually, to say nothing of the many butcheries of traders, voyagers, and emigrants.

This state of things should no longer be permitted to exist—especially as Government could, and therefore should obviate it, without compromising or affecting the interests of any portion of the country. By extinguishing the Indian title to the whole, or, for the present, a part of these lands—the greater proportion of which are very desirable—and bringing them into the market, immigration would soon do the work which armies have essayed but failed to do—furnish ample protection to trade; for hundreds and thousands of brave hearts and strong arms would flock to the country and adopt it as their home. This would supersede the present necessity and onorous expense of keeping up forts and quartering large bodies of troops in this territory, as well as prove a profitable investment to Uncle Sam—inasmuch as these lands would be immediately settled.

Another fact, bearing more directly upon the practicability of this project, however, is this:— Several of the civilized tribes, residing within Nebraska Territory—that is to say, a vast majority of the members of these tribes respectively—are not only writing [willing], but anxious to sell out to the Government—desiring to become *citizens*, and wishing to reserve only such quantities of their lands as they may need for agricultural purposes. By purchasing of these tribes of their lands, and placing them in the occupancy of the sturdy white man, the distance which the trader and emigrant is now compelled to traverse without protection, would be much shortened, and the dangers of the trip to Santa Fe robbed of many of its dangers and terrors; and the more remote and hostile and thievish tribes, finding their field of operations circumscribed by the onward march of the "star of empire," would ultimately abandon it and fly in fear of the rifles of the pioneers. In this way would an easy and safe communication with New Mexico and our possessions on the Pacific coast—Oregon and California—be opened; whilst the practicability of Railroad connexion by the Atlantic and Middle States of the Union with the Pacific, could no longer be considered a problem.

We do not, however, as we have remarked, propose to discuss this subject now; but shall recur to it when our leisure shall permit. Will not our brethren of the press properly analyze this matter and heartily unite in placing it in a conspicuous light before Congress and the country?

We desire particularly to call the attention of the President of the United States and the Hon. Secretary of the Interior, at Washington, to it, fully satisfied that they will properly appreciate its importance, and recommend its consideration.

THE PARKVILLE PETITION

About nine months later and Parkville, only a few miles above Kansas on the Missouri River, provide the time and place for a public meeting, resolutions, and a petition to Congress for the organization of Nebraska:[5]

The citizens and inhabitants of Parkville, in the county of Platte and State of Missouri, convened in public meeting in that town on the 17th day of June 1852, for the purpose of considering the propriety of petitioning Congress for the passage of a law providing for the organization of the Territory of Nebraska—and for the immediate settlement of the lands lying therein from which the Indian title has been extinguished.

The meeting having been called to order by Thomas H. Starnes, Esq., Col. Wm. H. Summers was called to the Chair, and Dr. Milton G. Young appointed Secretary.

Thereupon, The following preamble and resolutions were introduced, and after they had been freely discussed they were unanimously adopted as expressive of the sense of the meeting:

Whereas, The limits of the United States have been extended to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and Oregon, California, Utah and New Mexico have been considered a part of this Union; and

Whereas, That the Territory of Nebraska has been made the connecting section, and left us an open space between the two flanks of civilization, it has become the true policy of the Government of the United States that this space should be closed up; and *Whereas,* That the Territory of Nebraska is now being annually traversed by many thousands of citizens of the United States who emigrate from the States of the Atlantic to the Pacific shores—and the roads of the emigrants leading through the Territory are over lands of great fertility—and which are well suited for settlement and cultivation, but which, under existing circumstances, are withheld from settlement and cultivation, and allowed to present to the emigrants who wend their way through them, only the face of dreariness and waste—a country that produces nothing for the support of men; and *Whereas,* That the roads of the emigrants stretch over the uncultivated lands of the Territory of Nebraska for the distance of five or six hundred miles, which they are compelled to traverse, with no laws to protect their persons or property from aggressions—no inns or taverns to afford them shelter or food—no persons to furnish them with forage or provisions—no physicians to prescribe for them when attacked with disease—while

[5] *Tribune,* July 2, 1852.

they are subject to enormous exactions for the ferriage of streams of water and bridge tolls; and *Whereas,* That the Territory of Nebraska has ceased to be an available hunting ground for the Indians of the tribes and bands claiming lands therein.

Therefore Resolved, That the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States be and they are hereby petitioned to provide by law for the immediate organization of the Territory of *Nebraska,* and for domiciling the Indians of the several tribes and bands which claim lands lying therein, upon small parcels of land to be assigned to them for cultivation—and also for the immediate settlement of the lands of the Territory from which the Indian title has been extinguished by American citizens who may desire to emigrate and become inhabitants of said Territory.

Resolved, That a record of the proceedings of this meeting be signed by the Chairman and Secretary and forwarded to the President of the United States, and that copies of the like record be sent to the Hon. David R. Atchison of the United States Senate, and the Hon. Willard P. Hall, of the United States House of Representatives, with a request to each that the said records of these proceedings be laid before their respective bodies of Congress.

Resolved, That the record of the proceedings of this meeting be forwarded to the editor of each of the several newspapers printed in the counties of Platte and Clay with a request that the same be published in their respective Journals.

Wm. H. Summers, Chairman.
Milton G. Young, Secretary.

Certain aspects of the argument are of particular interest: the Mexican War annexations extended the political frontiers of the United States to the Pacific Ocean; Nebraska was the connecting section and was open space, empty, should be occupied; the country no longer provided adequate support for Indians; it was fertile and should be cultivated. The Pacific railroad was not mentioned. But one aspect of the petition would probably be overlooked unless it is called explicitly to the attention of the reader. The resolutions did call for the extinguishment of Indian titles to land in Nebraska, which was only the usual preliminary to settlement. A clause in both the preamble and the last whereas, however, with only a slight variation in wording, called for authorization of "the immediate settlement of the lands lying therein [of the Territory] from which the Indian title has been extinguished." The verb is in the past, not the future, tense. Is this interpretation of the wording correct, and if so, where did such lands

lie? An answer to a part of the question had been given already by Sutherland, and further definition was soon to be forthcoming.

As instructed by the Parkville meeting, the secretary forwarded the petition to Senator Atchison who presented it in the Senate, without comment, on July 7, 1852.[6]

These appear here only as isolated incidents, because no files of the newspapers nor of manuscript collections for these places seem to have survived. No record appears to indicate what led up to these documents nor what flowed from them. But, nevertheless, they stand as established facts in the pattern of agitation for the organization of the Indian country—its settlement as the essential preliminary to the Pacific railroad as well as to the fulfillment of the hopes of the occupants of these geographical sites as commercial points and centers of power.

Douglas' Nebraska Convention letter

By 1852 the Nebraska agitation was becoming more general and active along the Iowa and Missouri border. That story cannot be told here, but the Nebraska bill introduced into Congress during the winter of 1852-1853, was passed by the House of Representatives although defeated in the Senate. It received the active support of the border area. The defeat of the bill precipitated an intensive campaign of agitation in northwestern Missouri and southwestern Iowa, as well as among men who claimed to be residents of Nebraska. This led to the meeting of a Nebraska Delegate Convention at St. Joseph, Missouri, January 9-10, 1854, representatives gathering there from all three of these areas. The committee in charge had invited distinguished men of national reputation to speak or to write letters expressing their views. Among those invited was Douglas, who wrote a letter to the convention, dated December 17, 1853, a document of the utmost importance to a reinterpretation of the "Nebraska Question."[7]

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[6]*Congressional Globe*, 32 Congress, 1 Session, p. 1666.

[7]Printed in the St. Joseph *Gazette*. See Malin, "The Motives of Stephen A. Douglas in the Organization of Nebraska Territory: A Letter Dated December 17, 1853," *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, XIX (November, 1951), 321-353.

At the time Douglas wrote this letter, the Dodge bill to organize Nebraska had been introduced and referred to the Committee on Territories of which Douglas was chairman. This fact must not be overlooked because it makes certain that Douglas was fully cognizant of all the aspects of the problem and their combined effect upon a complex situation. It was only proper for him to call attention to his ten-year record on Nebraska. In fact, he pointed out that the credit was due him for naming the country Nebraska, that label being used in his first bill of 1844 proposing to organize the Indian country. It was then also, he told the convention, that he had challenged the erection of the Indian barrier of emigrant tribes from the East being relocated along the Iowa-Missouri-Arkansas border. Douglas had larger plans for the United States that he insisted must not be blocked by an Indian barrier to expansion westward. But his own words are worth quoting:

> It was obvious to the plainest understanding that if this policy should be carried out and the treaty stipulations observed in good faith it was worse than folly to wrangle with Great Britain about our right to the whole of Oregon—much less to cherish the vain hope of ever making this an Ocean-bound Republic.

Later in the letter Douglas elaborated:

> Continuous lines of settlement with civil, political and religious institutions all under the protection of law, are imperiously demanded by the highest national considerations. These are essential, but they are not sufficient. No man can keep up with the spirit of this age who travels on anything slower than the locomotive, and fails to receive intelligence by lightning [telegraph]. We must therefore have Rail Roads and Telegraphs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, through our own territory. Not one line only, but many lines, for the valley of the Mississippi will require as many Rail Roads to the Pacific as to the Atlantic, and will not venture to limit the number. The removal of the Indian barrier and the extension of the laws of the United States in the form of territorial governments are the first steps toward the accomplishment of each and all of those objects.

Again emphasizing the ten-year campaign he had been waging, Douglas stressed that all that he was saying was not hindsight or a rationalization of a position after the

event. He pointed to his Whitney letter of October 15, 1845, published as a pamphlet,

> in which I proposed, so soon as the territory should be established to make out the line of a rail road to the mouth of the Columbia River, "or to the Bay of San Francisco in the event California should be annexed in time," and then to have the public lands, on each side of the line surveyed into quarter sections, and to set apart the alternate tracts to the actual settler. The object of all these measures was to form a line of continuous settlements from the Mississippi to the Pacific, with a view of securing and enlarging our interests on that coast.

Two factors intervened to disorganize the Douglas plan as he interpreted history: the Mexican War and the subsequent controversy over the status of slavery in the Mexican cession, thus "diverting public attention from the importance of our old territory [Nebraska] and concentrating the hopes and anxieties of all upon our new possessions." He closed by expressing the hope that the organization of Nebraska could at long last be completed, "and that so far as the slavery question is concerned, all will be willing to sanction and affirm the principle established by the Compromise measures of 1850."

MECHANIZATION AND LANDMASS: AN INTERPRETATION

These views of Douglas appear crystal clear, and they have been in print for a century. Why should historians have failed to find them and to evaluate them upon their merits? Largely the answer lies in the captivity of the American mind to the slavery interpretation imposed upon United States history by the antislavery-abolition crusade and the American Civil War. Now that these views have been isolated, and their structure and interrelations set forth in the atmosphere and in the language of the time, and for Douglas in his own words, it is proper to give them an interpretation in a century of historical perspective.

The first and overruling fact of the mid-nineteenth century Western culture, whether of Europe or of America, was the mechanization of modern society, at that time under

the influence of the first instruments of mechanical power, steam and electricity. The most insistent aspect of those new forms of power was their application to communications.

This mechanically-powered communications revolution exercised its most startling and significant influence upon communications over large land areas not served by the traditional water communications. The United States was on the verge of becoming a full-fledged continental land-mass nation and was the only one at the moment ready to seize upon and benefit fully from this innovation. Thus to no country in the world were the locomotive and the telegraph more momentous than to the United States.

In this perspective, a survey of the history of the western world calls attention to the unique role of water communications in the expansion of the intellectual powers of man and in their application to the history of human culture. The seas, lakes, rivers, and after the fifteenth century in particular, the oceans, had served as the highways of travel and transport. The penetration by man into the continental interiors had always been water-based, where water was available. Where waterways were wanting, animal power was too expensive in expenditure of energy to permit any but the most limited exploitation of such areas or transit across them. The cost of transport of bulk commodities was prohibitive.

In the history of the United States, settlement was controlled or influenced by water communications. The turnpike era had failed because of dependence upon animal power. Analysis of the details of the process of settlement of the United States reveals clearly that there was no continuous frontier line of occupance in the Turner tradition.[8] The interior of any large land area was penetrated by means of waterways. Portages connected waterways, and later canals were built or projected to provide interconnections between natural waterways. The steam railroad revo-

[8]From a quite different approach, Fulmer Mood has conclusively demonstrated this fact. His analysis did not recognize this technological approach. (Fulmer Mood, "Studies in the History of American Settled Areas and Frontier Lines: Settled Areas and Frontier Lines, 1625-1790," *Agricultural History*, XXVI (January, 1952), 16-34.)

lutionized all this, and as mechanical efficiency was achieved, the railroad was enabled to compete successfully with waterways even in the transport of bulk commodities and where there was no water competition, to transport all bulk commodities at a rate sufficiently cheap to make possible human occupance of the great land-mass west of the Mississippi River, the Grassland of North America from which Nebraska was being carved. Mechanically-powered communications affected all land areas, regardless of climate, water supply, and natural waterways; but for the Grassland in question, it afforded the one and only mode of communication requisite for that task as of the mid-nineteenth century.

That Douglas was thinking in something of these terms is clear from a reply he made to Webster in the Senate, March 13, 1850:

> I am gratified to find that there are those who appreciate the important truth, that there is a power in this nation greater than either the North or the South—a growing, increasing, swelling power, that will be able to speak the law to this nation, and to execute the law as spoken. That power is the country known as the great West—the Valley of the Mississippi, one and indivisible from the Gulf to the Great Lakes, and stretching, on the one side and the other, to the extreme sources of the Ohio and Missouri—from the Alleghanies to the Rocky Mountains. There, Sir, is the hope of this nation—the resting place of the power that is not only to control, but to save, the Union. We furnish the water that makes the Mississippi, and we intend to follow, navigate, and use it until it loses itself in the briny Ocean. So with the St. Lawrence. We intend to keep open and enjoy both of these great outlets to the ocean, and all between them we intend to take under our especial protection, and keep and preserve as one free, happy, and united people. This is the mission of the great Mississippi Valley, the heart and soul of the nation and the continent. We know the responsibilities that devolve upon us, and our people will show themselves equal to them. We indulge in no ultraisms—no sectional strifes—no crusades against the North or the South. Our aim will be to do justice to all, to all men, to every section. We are prepared to fulfill all our obligations under the Constitution as it is, and determined to maintain and preserve it inviolate in its letter and spirit. Such is the position, the destiny, and the purpose of the great Northwest.[9]

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[9]*Congressional Globe*, 31 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, p. 365.

This is not a fully rounded theoretical statement of the land-mass interpretation of history as formulated by Halford J. Mackinder in 1904, but it was a practical approximation of the major contention spoken more than a half-century earlier. Douglas looked upon the pivot area of the North American continent as the region where the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River meet as the effective center of power—"the heart and soul of the nation and the continent," and it was to be served primarily by railroads.[10]

That this is the logical outgrowth of the thinking of Douglas is evident when his major pronouncements are articulated and interpreted in perspective, and Douglas himself possessed a global perspective. That fact is attested by his Whitney letter of October 15, 1845 and by his St. Joseph Nebraska convention letter of December 17, 1853. At the time of the first of these letters, the dispute with Great Britain over Oregon had not been settled, and California was still the property of Mexico. Yet Douglas wrote at that time in terms of the United States as a two-front nation. Not only did he want the legal title to Oregon to be settled definitely, but he was assuming that the acquisition of California was virtually assured. His choice of a Pacific terminus for the Pacific railroad was San Francisco Bay, "if that country could be annexed in time." In his St. Joseph Nebraska convention letter he quoted this phrase to remind his readers of the durability of his ten-year view. At the time of the latter letter both objectives had been achieved. The United States had realized his ambition for it—"an Ocean-bound Republic," in possession of the three major natural harbor areas on the west coast of the North American continent. From these bases the United States could command the Eastern Pacific Area. Now, the obligation of the Congress of 1853-1854 was "to authorize and encourage a continuous line of settlements to the Pacific Ocean . . ." and for that purpose Nebraska Territory must be organized.

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[10]Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York, 1919, 1942); James C. Malin, "Space and History: Reflections on the Closed-Space Doctrines of Turner and Mackinder and the Challenge of Those Ideas by the Air Age," *Agricultural History*, XVIII (1944), 65-74, 107-126; *Essays on Historiography* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1946), chapters 1 and 2.

There are many other aspects of Douglas' thinking, and of the ideas of others, about the issues interrelated with the "Nebraska Question," but these just reviewed seem particularly pertinent to a centennial view of that question for the decade 1844-1854. They invest the "Nebraska Question" with a significance central to the history of the United States in its global aspect, as a major land-mass nation operating in the early phases of a mechanically-powered era in World history.