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## Article Title: A Question of Alternatives: Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and America's Intervention in World War I

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Article Summary: Bryan would agree to use force to defend his country only if it were attacked. He was willing to give up some of America's sovereign rights to avoid war. Robert Lansing, the Bryan adviser who became secretary of state when Bryan resigned, thought that the national interest was paramount.

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Photographs / Images: Bryan and Wilson at Fairview, Bryan's Lincoln home, during the 1912 presidential campaign; Wilson and his cabinet; Bryan about 1914; cartoon depicting Bryan's resignation as secretary of state (*Philadelphia Evening Ledger*); Robert Lansing; 1915 cartoon showing Bryan and Wilson (*Chicago Tribune*)

# A Question of Alternatives: Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and America's Intervention in World War I

BY PAOLO E. COLETTA

William Jennings Bryan believed that armed preparedness was a causative rather than curative agent of war and that war could be exorcised by making moral principles as binding upon nations as upon individuals. To those who saw foreign policy in terms of force, as did his second counselor, Robert Lansing, he was impractical, for a policy of peace may not support the national interest. Moreover, force is good when used for the sanction of law and defense, evil only when used for aggression.

Bryan would use force to defend his country only if it were attacked. Fully backed by Woodrow Wilson, he won agreement to 30 conciliation treaties.<sup>1</sup> The Entente Powers were signatories but Germany and Austria-Hungary accepted them only in principle, for, as the kaiser told Colonel Edward M. House in June, 1914, a cooling-off period would allow other states to mobilize their forces and reduce Germany's greatest advantage—her huge standing army ready for sudden assault.<sup>2</sup>

Bryan wanted Wilson to offer himself as a mediator in the war, for the longer the war went on the more difficult it would be to make peace. Wilson made the offer.<sup>3</sup> Although each belligerent denied responsibility for starting the war and rejected his proposal, Bryan suggested that he use the negative replies as an opening to resume mediation efforts. Wilson rebuffed him until he learned early in September 1914 that the Kaiser would consider favorable his offer of mediation if the other belligerents did.<sup>4</sup> Rather than offering to mediate, Bryan asked the belligerents to state their war aims and on what terms they would make peace. Again each belligerent blamed the war upon his enemy. Walter Hines Page, American ambassador to Great Britain, wanted the United States to join the

Allies. House, too, objected to Bryan's making such an offer because like Page he held German militarism responsible for the war and believed that a victorious Germany would menace the United States. He feared that Bryan would jeopardize Wilson's objective of avoiding entering the war and of negotiating a settlement favorable to the Allies. Wilson told Bryan to stop offering peace proposals but sent House to Europe for confidential negotiations with the belligerents.<sup>5</sup>

United States support for its neutrality, like a pendulum, swung first against the Allies, then against Germany because of the U-boat.

Bryan saw no difference between German use of radio and British use of cable. On Lansing's advice, however, Wilson forbade Germany to send unneutral messages, thus freeing the Allies to forward their unneutral news by cable. Nor did Bryan succeed in getting the Allies to stop their nondelivery of mail addressed to belligerents and neutrals or searching of American mails. The British persisted in these practices because, they said, the U-boat made the inspection of mail impossible and because contraband concealed in packages was reaching Germany via neutral countries.<sup>6</sup> When Lansing became secretary of state he declined to protest seriously against the illegal British practices because as a possible ally of Britain against Germany the United States might wish to use some of the same practices.

The mining of international waters raised even more important questions. At the outbreak of war several European neutrals mined their territorial waters, as they had the right to do. When Bryan inquired if the British had also done so, they replied that they had, but that by mining the North Sea, Germany had rendered it dangerous to all shipping. In consequence, they felt free to retaliate in "self-defense."<sup>7</sup> In October 1914 they mined the North Sea and suggested safe routes for American ships in the English Channel. Finally, on November 3 they designated the entire North Sea a military area, closed it to merchant shipping, and indicated that all American traffic must pass through the Channel. On the advice of Lansing, Bryan declined to join other neutrals in protest. Here both Lansing and Bryan were culpable, for they permitted a belligerent to usurp control of an area free to neutrals as well as belligerents, funneled neutral shipping into British hands

for examination and possible detention and seizure, and provoked Germany to retaliate with unrestricted submarine warfare.<sup>8</sup>

Long opposed to the lending of money by neutrals to belligerents, Bryan nevertheless asked Lansing for his opinion. Government loans were of course illegal, but Lansing knew of no legal objection to private loans.<sup>9</sup> Bryan asked Wilson that private loans be discouraged because "money is the worst of all contrabands because it commands everything else." Wilson agreed.<sup>10</sup> Upon returning from stumping in the campaign of 1914, however, Bryan found his moral scruples disregarded. While loans could not be made, the administration would neither approve nor disapprove the extension of credits, which Lansing got Wilson to distinguish from loans.<sup>11</sup> American credits worked almost wholly to the benefit of the Allies.

Lansing was also responsible in Bryan's absence for approbation given to Charles Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company, to send to Britain submarines built of American parts but assembled in Canada.<sup>12</sup>

International law was not perfectly clear on the wartime use of interned belligerent merchant ships. Lansing held that bona fide transfers under a law of 1912 were legal.<sup>13</sup> The Allies would give safe passage only to those government-owned ships that did not touch Germany, Germany only to those which carried her trade. Under these circumstances Wilson tried but failed to obtain a federally owned merchant fleet. Lacking ships, the United States must rely upon the British, who used their advantage to control American trade with Europe.

Although a contrary opinion has often been expressed by historians, Bryan did not demand an American arms embargo. Rather, he opposed attempts to obtain one by pro-German congressmen. Lansing and Wilson fully supported him, and even Germany admitted the legality of the munitions traffic.<sup>14</sup> By opposing an embargo on munitions the administration helped insure America's economic prosperity but lost an excellent weapon with which to bludgeon the Allies into respecting America's neutral rights.

When the British objected to the conversion of German merchant ships to armed vessels, Bryan said that the ships were being detained. The British added that their ships were armed only for defense, hence could not be interned. Lansing,


with Wilson's approval, then conceded in favor of Britain on the almost metaphysical point that armaments are offensive or defensive depending upon their intended use. Bryan repudiated this interpretation, saying that arms were carried for use and that an armed ship precluded visit and search by enemy warships and invited attack.<sup>15</sup> The question was soon raised whether Allied merchantmen could use arms against U-boats but U-boats could not attack armed Allied merchantmen when they had Americans as passengers. If the latter were the case, Germany's naval leaders believed that Germany either must remain the inferior sea power and invite defeat or retaliate with unrestricted submarine warfare.

Paralleling the armed merchant ship question were protracted debates over international law on contraband and blockades. On August 6, 1914, Bryan asked the belligerents if they would agree to a *modus vivendi* by adopting the laws on naval warfare laid down in the Declaration of London of 1909. The Central Powers agreed, the Allies did not. By an Order in Council of August 20, 1914, the British violated the rights of neutrals by bringing neutral ships into port merely on suspicion, by applying the doctrine of continuous voyage to conditional contraband, and by making foodstuffs conditional contraband.<sup>16</sup> Bryan wisely retreated to the customs, usages, and traditions of international law and prepared a protest against Britain's violations of that law. On House's advice, however, Wilson directed Lansing to soften the tenor of his objections. Rather than demanding respect for neutral rights, Lansing requested that the Order in Council be modified so as to avoid an adverse effect on American public opinion.<sup>17</sup> By throwing away Bryan's good legal case, Lansing admitted a major defeat. The United States had the clearest right to trade in noncontraband and conditional contraband with German citizens. Moreover, it was unlikely that Britain would make war upon her major source of munitions. If Britain were free to strangle neutral commerce, Germany was equally free to combat her methods, by use of submarines if necessary. Wilson had the alternatives of forcing the British to abandon their practices through the use of naval power and an economic embargo or of acquiescing in them and by so doing indirectly to cooperate with them. Unwilling to use these means, he chose the latter course, thereby alerting Britain that

he would not seriously oppose her violation of neutral rights.

While Bryan avidly sought a "working agreement" on how a neutral's trade might fairly be conducted, he also prepared a vigorous public protest to the harshness of the British procedures. Again Wilson ordered the strong note softened, with the result that it contained no threats, let alone an ultimatum. Unfortunately, it barred British interference with a neutral's trade "unless interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety."<sup>18</sup> By letting the British judge "imperative necessity," he gave his case away. Moreover, his continued protesting to Britain was blunted by Germany's announcement, on February 4, 1915, of an unrestricted submarine campaign beginning February 18 in a war zone in the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland. Neutral vessels exposed themselves to danger therein because since January 31, 1915, the British government had permitted the use by its ships of neutral flags and advocated the ramming of U-boats. Bryan was incredulous; the Germans must be "bluffing."<sup>19</sup> During his absence from Washington, Wilson asked Lansing to reply to the German note. Bryan signed the reply "in the hope that the menace conveyed might be averted by some sort of compromise,"<sup>20</sup> for the German counterblockade of Britain posed for the Wilson administration the choice of agreeing to it, as it had to Britain's maritime system, or, by opposing it, of making war with Germany probable.

Unable to win an arms embargo or to get the United States to mitigate the severity of the British maritime system, Germany would use the U-boat both to stop American exports to the Allies and to break the Allied blockade. But her counterblockade, because based upon retaliation, was unacceptable in international law. So far had technology outstripped social adaptation that international law had not yet been adapted to the use of the submarine as a tool of war. And the use of the submarine changed the whole nature of the controversy over commerce. Britain's violations of neutral rights provoked delay and argument, but claims for damages could eventually be settled peacefully; Germany's procedure presented a threat to important economic interests and also threatened life itself, a matter not subject to amicable arbitration. Bryan had the alternatives of demanding that Germany



*Bryan and Woodrow Wilson at Fairview, Bryan's Lincoln home, during the 1912 presidential campaign. . . .(Below) Wilson (left) and his Cabinet. Bryan is at right, forefront.*



rescind its decree or say nothing as long as no American's life was lost. In either case he would be contending for a freedom of the seas that would benefit the Allies. In the meantime Wilson had revised a draft note provided by Lansing which went out under Bryan's signature on February 10, at the same time as a note of protest to Britain about her use of neutral flags. The latter, incidentally, contained a loophole that permitted "occasional" use of neutral flags.<sup>21</sup>

The note to Germany was ambiguous on whether Germany was to spare neutral ships or all ships carrying American passengers. More important, its strong words barred later compromise, for it held Germany to "strict accountability" for its U-boat warfare.<sup>22</sup> Bryan now advised warning American citizens to stay off belligerent ships; Wilson and Lansing declined to surrender what they believed to be a component of national sovereignty.

Two days after the German submarine order became effective, Bryan and Lansing offered a compromise in which Britain would permit the Germans to import foodstuffs to be distributed exclusively for civilian use under American supervision, Germany would agree not to sow floating mines or use submarines to sink merchant ships except according to the rules of cruiser warfare, and both belligerents would promise that their merchant vessels would not use neutral flags.<sup>23</sup> The Allies rejected it, stating that the German "torpedo on sight" order violated the established rules for cruiser warfare, was inhumane, and encompassed neutrals as well as belligerents. They then framed retaliatory measures which prevented commodities of *any* kind from reaching or leaving Germany. Three days later Germany also rejected Bryan's proposal.<sup>24</sup> The death of this compromise plan had momentous results, for continued submarine warfare ultimately led to American intervention in the war.

In their Order in Council of March 11, 1915, the British sought reprisal against the U-boat in a pseudo-blockade of Germany. Powerless to position ships before her ports, she would use roving ships that would blockade the ports of Europe's neutrals as well. Even Page admitted that the British were "legally wrong," but Wilson changed the protests of Bryan and Lansing to mere questions.<sup>25</sup> The note was sent on March 30. The British did not bother to answer until June.

Meanwhile private arrangements that compromised American neutrality were made whereby Americans could trade profitably with Britain; House proposed that the belligerents recognize the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, thereby exempting private property from capture--a proposal they declined; and the death of Americans aboard belligerent ships sunk by U-boats drove the United States to the verge of war.

The death of an American, Leon C. Thrasher, on March 28, 1915, on the torpedoed British unarmed passenger ship *Falaba*, drove home the danger that threatened Americans on belligerent ships. The *Falaba* case was doubly important because it would serve as a precedent if similar torpedoings occurred and drove Wilson, Bryan, and Lansing to restudy at length their position on the U-boat. Bryan's reasons for resigning were forged in the fire of argument over this case, not over the sinking of the *Lusitania* five weeks later.

As Lansing saw it, by warning its citizens against traveling on belligerent ships the United States would give up its right as a neutral to protect them on the high seas and in effect give up its wartime trade with the Allies in favor of Germany, or the United States could insist upon the right of Americans to travel, subject to the normal rules of visit and search, thereby guaranteeing the Allied trade and risking war with Germany. He chose the second course.<sup>26</sup> By permitting Americans to act as shields for trade with the Allies, Lansing was extending the strict accountability doctrine to cover any ships which had an American aboard.

Bryan vigorously objected. He told Wilson that an American knowing of the submarine danger who took passage upon a British ship was guilty of contributory negligence and denied that U-boat warfare could be condemned as illegally improper.<sup>27</sup> Undecided between Lansing and Bryan, Wilson asked Lansing for an opinion. Lansing saw the sinking of the *Falaba* was a "wanton act . . . in direct violation of the principles of humanity as well as of the law of the nations." He would ask Germany to "disavow the act . . . punish the perpetrator . . . make just reparation for the death of Leon C. Thrasher," and take steps to avoid future incidents.<sup>28</sup>

Bryan disagreed. Did not the arming of British merchantmen justify U-boat attacks? Why not enter a claim against Germany without *announcing* the American position on sub-

marine warfare? Moreover, he would deny to a single individual, by taking passage on a belligerent merchantman, the right to involve the entire nation in difficulty.<sup>29</sup> Here was material for a compromise solution: if Americans could be kept off British ships, and if the British would agree to disarm their merchantmen, submarine warfare would cease to be a formidable threat to American neutrality. Furthermore, was not Britain's starving of an entire nation worse than the drowning of a few people? Did not Britain use neutral flags? After hinting that the continued export of arms was likely to get the United States into trouble, he suggested that Wilson urge the Allies to consent to a conference at which peace terms would be discussed, adding with clouded reference to House's efforts that secret proposals would not suffice, that a public appeal should be made in order that other neutrals could endorse it and so might end the war.<sup>30</sup> Wilson demurred, saying that Germany's procedures were "contrary to laws based, not on mere interest or convenience, but on humanity, fair play, and a necessary respect for the right of neutrals." Germany could not unilaterally alter the understandings of nations in international law and could not use the U-boat in accordance with "any rules that the world is likely to accept." He never considered that by closing American harbors to defensively armed belligerent merchantmen he would have driven the British to disarm theirs, in which case Germany would not have had to sink enemy passenger ships on sight.

Knowing that neither belligerent would accept the peace terms offered by the other, Wilson rebuffed Bryan,<sup>31</sup> but successive German air and submarine attacks on American ships in late April and early May, 1915,<sup>32</sup> made an American statement of policy imperative. Lansing stuck to his position, adding that the German publication of notices to American citizens not to take passage on British ships traversing the German war zone was a "formal threat" to those who would exercise their "just rights" on the high seas and an "insolent" procedure which usurped the prerogative of the State Department.<sup>33</sup> He would answer additional U-boat attacks with armed force. Bryan instead saw Germany as wishing to avoid the raising of embarrassing questions and held to his doctrine of contributory negligence.<sup>34</sup> Wilson broke the impasse by saying that he would postpone final settlement of claims arising

out of the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, and *Gulflight* incidents until after the war "in case present efforts fail." He temporarily rejected Lansing's "strict accountability" doctrine and reduced Bryan's fear of war with Germany by accepting his suggestion that he "make a protest against the holding up of our trade with neutrals at the same time we protest against the submarines."<sup>35</sup> But then any good will Germany may have gained by offering full recompense for torpedo damage to the *Gulflight* vanished when 124 Americans were among the 1,198 persons lost on the *Lusitania*.

Bryan charged that Britain had been using Americans to protect her munitions on the *Lusitania* and asserted that "to maintain strict neutrality we must send a note to England protesting against her interference with our shipping—as well as one to Germany for destroying the *Lusitania*."<sup>36</sup> But House believed that the United States must force Germany to give assurances that she would not sink passenger ships if she did not voluntarily do so; Page demanded war with Germany lest the United States forfeit respect with the Allies; Lansing concluded that Germany was culpable regardless of the fact that the *Lusitania* carried contraband; and Wilson hesitated to arouse the hackles of the Allies with a protest as long as the submarine problem remained unsettled.<sup>37</sup> Bryan was alone in demanding what he called a "Real Neutrality," one which gave equal treatment to both sides; that the interests of America, not those of any belligerent, be placed "first"; that the *Lusitania* affair be settled by peaceful means; and that the right of a neutral to travel was not more sacred than that of a neutral to trade.<sup>38</sup> In the end Wilson, saying that his arguments seemed to be unanswerable, adopted Lansing's position and wrote a note in which he completely upheld the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Rather than severing diplomatic relations as Lansing wished, however, he would give Germany an opportunity to alter her submarine methods.<sup>39</sup>

During the next two weeks Bryan reiterated a four-part plan: use conciliatory means with Germany; warn Americans from traveling on belligerent ships; postpone settlement of the *Lusitania* case until after the war; and send guilty Britain a note.<sup>40</sup> Wilson declined his advice on all points except on the note about Allied violations of neutrality. Yet he preferred to

revive the old *modus vivendi* in which the British would lift their food blockade of Germany and Germany cease U-boat warfare, and in the end vetoed even the note to Britain lest it be thought he was making a concession to Germany.<sup>41</sup> Germany rejected the *modus vivendi* except on terms that would prove unacceptable to Britain and in her reply to the *Lusitania* note presented a legalistic defense of the sinking of the ship and concluded that U-boats could not follow the rules of cruiser warfare because Allied merchant ships were armed.<sup>42</sup>

Bryan charged the cabinet was being pro-Ally, was rebuked by Wilson, and hinted that he would resign if the *Lusitania* case was not solved peaceably. Wilson asked him to submit new suggestions on a course of action. Bryan repeated his four-part plan; he had no further ideas. He had done all he could to advise Wilson, he concluded, and could do no more.<sup>43</sup> Wilson pondered Bryan's plan but chose Lansing's policy of "strict accountability."

Had American ships and citizens been barred from the danger zone as Bryan suggested, a clash with Germany might have been avoided because no Americans would have been on ships sunk by U-boats. Unrestricted submarine warfare would then concern only the Allies. However, Wilson's compounding of national honor, international law, morality, emotional sympathy with the Entente powers, and the safeguarding of the important trade with the Allies led to a policy of inflexibility on the submarine issue. Since he could not compel Wilson to adopt his views, Bryan's only alternative was to resign, which he did on June 8. Wilson then sent his note. Germany must follow the rules of cruiser warfare and also give assurances that American lives and ships would be safeguarded.<sup>44</sup>

Bryan's saying that he had resigned because of disagreement with Wilson in method but not in objective was mystifying, for the *Lusitania* note was less harsh than the strict accountability note of February. If he was out of the administration he was in no sense out of the picture, however, and he obtained both a hearing and a following.

In replying to Wilson's second note, on July 8, Germany stated that the character of the *Lusitania* warranted her being sunk but that U-boat commanders would respect all legitimate American shipping and safeguard lives on neutral vessels. Saying that the words "legitimate" and "neutral" made

Germany's assurances worthless, Lansing, now secretary of state, rejected them.<sup>45</sup>

The third American note, published on July 24, reasserted the immutable rights of neutrals to uncontested freedom of the seas. Germany would submit to arbitration the extent, if any, of the indemnity she should pay for the death of Americans on the *Lusitania* but not whether submarine warfare was justified according to international law, thus leaving the *Lusitania* case in limbo for many more months.

The British liner *Arabic*, carrying no contraband, was the next torpedo victim in which Americans lost their lives. Lansing threatened Bernstorff with war if Germany would not stop attacking not just passenger ships but all merchant ships, while Bryan won much support for his demand to keep Americans off British ships.<sup>46</sup> On September 1 the entire American position seemed to be guaranteed when Bernstorff told Lansing: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

Bryan congratulated Wilson on the settlement of the submarine controversy but also restated his demand that arms be kept off belligerent ships carrying passengers. His congratulations were premature. Germany had not conceded the illegality of submarine warfare, and Bernstorff's pledge was kept only until September 4, when a U-boat sank the British liner *Hesperian*. In the meantime, pressed by Lansing, Bernstorff had disavowed the attack on the *Arabic* and prepared to pay an indemnity for the two Americans lost. The United States had reached the brink of war, when Germany promised that all enemy passenger ships would be spared from U-boat attacks without warning. Germany would also accept liability for the loss of American lives on the *Lusitania* but until January, 1916, would not admit Lansing's logic that submarine warfare, because based upon retaliation, was illegal. When she finally did so admit, she verged upon renewing her unrestricted submarine campaign against armed merchant ships. By this time both Wilson and Lansing deemed her assurances worthless.

Meanwhile, Wilson swung the pendulum against Britain by sternly demanding that she live within the rules with respect



*William Jennings Bryan, about 1914.*

to neutral shipping. Britain firmly rejected his contentions. Wilson continued the dialogue but took no action to support American neutral rights.<sup>47</sup>

Perhaps because the *Lusitania* sinking showed Wilson that he could not risk the defense of America to an Allied victory over Germany, he sought congressional approval for increased armaments. Bryan countered him, noting that 20 years of preparation had not prevented war in Europe.<sup>48</sup> In addition he demanded two laws: (1) deny belligerents carrying American passengers use of American harbors; (2) deny American passenger ships use of American ports if they carried contraband as well.<sup>49</sup> Wilson defeated him on both counts when Congress adopted a "reasonable" preparedness program and defeated the Gore-McLemore resolutions, which embodied Bryan's proposals to insulate the nation against war.

While Wilson let the British know that he was ready to try to bring peace to Europe by engaging in mediation with the Allies along the lines of the House-Grey Memorandum, an offer the Allies failed to grasp, he accepted Lansing's suggestion to avoid the dread results of the renewal of submarine warfare by offering a *modus vivendi* in which the Allies would disarm their merchantmen and U-boats would follow the rules of cruiser warfare—the same solution Bryan had offered in February 1915 and Wilson had rejected at Lansing's behest! The Allies were horrified, the Germans agreeable. On February 15 Lansing dropped the project.<sup>50</sup> When Germany announced that after March 1 it would regard armed ships as ships of war, Wilson said that U-boat attacks upon resisting merchantmen with loss of American lives would breach both international law and the assurances given by Germany.

The torpedoing without warning of the French unarmed English Channel steamer *Sussex* with Americans aboard gave added point to Bryan's demand that Americans be prohibited from sailing on belligerent ships. Page, House, and Lansing would have Wilson break diplomatic relations with Germany. Determined that the United States remain neutral so that he could serve as a mediator in the war, Wilson nevertheless issued an ultimatum: If Germany did not cease its submarine warfare against passenger and cargo ships, he would have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations.<sup>51</sup> Bryan rushed to

Washington with two alternative proposals: (1) submit the dispute to an international tribunal for investigation and report; (2) postpone the dispute until the war was over.<sup>52</sup> Germany, too, faced alternatives: give up unrestricted submarine warfare or suffer a rupture with the United States. In the end her surrender of the use of the submarine except under the rules of cruiser warfare was accepted by Wilson, but he rejected the condition attached in the *Sussex* note—that if he could not get the Allies to follow the laws of humanity, i.e., remove the Allied strangulation blockade, Germany could regain her freedom of action.<sup>53</sup> Wilson had gained nothing, for the initiative in deciding upon peace or war rested with Germany. Hence, the growing appeal to Wilson of agreement upon peace terms, for peace alone, it now seemed, could preclude American intervention in the war.

The war shadow lifted, Bryan said he would support Wilson for reelection and suggested that he make another peace offer. This Wilson did, only to be rebuffed by both sides.<sup>54</sup> Wilson now pondered two alternatives: another offer of peace, including a postwar organization that would prevent war; and Bryan's ideas for winning respect from Britain as well as from Germany for America's neutral rights.<sup>55</sup> Incensed with Britain's rejection of his peace offer, scrapping what little there was left of the Declaration of London, and blacklisting of American firms trading with the Central Powers, he seriously considered asking Congress to authorize him to prohibit loans and restrict exports to the Allies. Congress authorized him to use retaliatory legislation in the form of an embargo on loans and supplies but did not require its imposition. Perhaps with the War of 1812 in mind, or because he was unwilling to jeopardize his position as a mediator, he declined to use the retaliatory power,<sup>56</sup> thereby leaving undisturbed both the British blockade and the profits being made by an expanding American commerce. On the other hand he approved of legislation which would give him a Navy capable of challenging Britain's mastery of the seas.

On May 27, 1916, Wilson had made the revolutionary proposal that the United States join an association of nations that would use moral, economic, and even physical means to preserve a permanent world peace. Collective security did not appeal to Bryan, who stated that by joining such a league the


United States would become a partner with other nations in waging war, throw overboard the noninterventionist teachings of Washington and Jefferson, and surrender its independence. By following a policy of "America First," the United States would not only conserve the interests of its people and of the Monroe Doctrine but be in position to mediate and to assist the belligerents to obtain permanent peace.<sup>57</sup> The first prominent political figure in any party to dissent from Wilson's doctrine of internationalism, Bryan had voiced the isolationist and pacifist objections to the League of Nations so often heard in 1919 and 1920.

At the Democratic National Convention of 1916, Bryan unabashedly wept with emotion during the demonstration that followed Martin H. Glynn's demanding of strict adherence to Wilson's policy of neutrality as the traditional American policy and of America's use of amicable methods for settling disputes. By supporting Wilson he kept the faith and was restored to the respect of his party; by stumping for Wilson in the West and South he insured his reelection.

The elections over, Bryan told Wilson that he would actively oppose his breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany and learned that Wilson meant to ask the belligerents to state their war aims. But Wilson moved too late. Germany's asking him on December 12 to tell the Allies of her willingness to discuss peace made it appear that he was collaborating with her.

At any rate, on December 18, as Bryan had urged since the beginning of the war, Wilson not only asked the belligerents to state their war objectives but asked for the cooperation of the neutral powers and proposed a league to preserve world peace, a request that angered noninterventionist senators. Germany's failure to voice terms killed the hope of peace negotiations and the Allies' rejection of Wilson's invitation buried it. Neither camp would talk peace at Wilson's behest or on any terms but those that would bring a victor's peace.<sup>58</sup>

Mistakenly assuming that the chief end sought by the belligerents was a just and durable peace, Wilson stated his peace terms over the heads of governments to the peoples of the belligerent nations on January 22, 1917, in his "peace without victory" speech to the Senate, in which he also suggested a new policy for the world in some form of collective



*The Philadelphia Evening Ledger cartoonist made this comment on Bryan's resignation as secretary of state.*



*Robert Lansing, counselor of the State Department.*

security system which the United States could join. While Bryan cheered Wilson's peace terms, various senators, including Republicans, prepared resolutions favoring abstention from entangling alliances. Although these were laid on the table, it was clear that the opposition to Wilson's idea of a league of nations had become a partisan issue. Moreover, both the Allies and the Germans rejected his terms. On February 1 Germany recovered the freedom of action mentioned in the *Sussex* pledge, sought to compel Britain to ask for terms by resuming unrestricted submarine warfare, and also severely limited American merchant ship sailings to England. Wilson thereupon said quietly to his personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty, "This means war."<sup>59</sup> On February 2 in New York City, Bryan aroused much pacifist enthusiasm by declaring that there was no justification for the United States being drawn into war.<sup>60</sup> On February 3 Wilson ordered Bernstorff home but told Congress that only "overt acts" would cause him to break his friendship with Germany, but he hinted that Congress should authorize him to protect the rights of Americans to sail the high seas, told House that Germany must either give up submarine warfare or propose acceptable peace terms, and prepared to break relations with Austria. While Lansing prodded him to go to war with Germany because of the U-boat, Bryan countered with a public demand for conciliation or for the postwar settlement of disputes, to which he now added the holding of a popular referendum prior to going to war.<sup>61</sup> In senators like Robert La Follette, the peace organizations, Socialists, and German-Americans he found support, but he could not prevent the approval of Wilson's course by Congress.<sup>62</sup>

For three subsequent weeks the "overt acts" Wilson awaited did not occur, and his waiting another five weeks before asking for war showed how tenaciously he held to the prospect of continued peace. Meanwhile, Congress passed the largest naval appropriation bill in history, the neutral governments of Europe rejected Wilson's invitation to break diplomatic relations with Germany, and Wilson asked Congress to authorize the arming of American merchant ships as a step short of war which might yet support American interests. While the "little group of willful men" filibustered armed neutrality to death, Wilson authorized Lansing to publish the Zimmerman Abte,

which showed him that rather than seeking peace Germany had been planning to “dominate the world by a crushing victory.”<sup>63</sup> Then Russia revolted and the Czar abdicated, enabling Wilson to state that all of the Allies had democratic governments. Meanwhile, acting upon existing powers, on March 12 he ordered that merchant ships be armed and that their Navy armed guard crews shoot on sight. Three U-boat sinkings of American ships on March 18 and 19 further inflamed the public demand for war. Wilson, now determined for war, advanced the meeting of Congress from April 16 to April 2. Bryan ascribed economic reasons for his decision for war, writing to his brother, Charles, that “It looks as though the Eastern financiers are going to force this country into war in order to make their investments in the war loans of the Allies profitable. I hope some way may yet be found to prevent saddling that war debt on this country, but the outlook is not bright unless the people of Germany follow the example of the people of Russia and overthrow their ruler.”<sup>64</sup> In desperation on March 28, he asked every congressman by letter not to listen to Wilson’s appeal, to fall back upon his conciliation treaties and thus delay hostilities for one year, and to hold a popular referendum on going to war.<sup>65</sup> He also asked Wilson not to declare war because conditions did not warrant a change in the armed neutrality policy announced on March 4. Wilson replied that he did not see it that way.<sup>66</sup> Distrusting Lansing, he did not seek his advice on whether he should go to



—Chicago Tribune  
c. 1915

war. However, it has long been believed that on April 1 he told Frank I. Cobb of the *New York World* of his horror of war, adding that he had "tried every way he knew to avoid war" and crying, "If there is an alternative, for God's sake let's take it."<sup>67</sup> The one positive step he had taken was to suggest in the House-Grey Memorandum that the United States cooperate with the Allies to end the war and to build an international organization for world peace. He overlooked Bryan's way. Had he refused to let America sell goods or lend money to a belligerent and proscribed travel on belligerent ships, the Allies could not have irritated with their blockade and U-boats could not have taken American lives. This is not to say that the plan would have worked but that Bryan had provided him with an alternative and that he rejected it in favor of intervention.

In his war message Wilson stated that U-boat warfare was "warfare against mankind. It is war against all nations." On April 3 Bryan made a last frantic attempt to avoid war by urging George Sylvester Viereck, sometime editor of *The Fatherland*, to hold a simultaneous "silent parade" in America's cities as a protest against entering the war.<sup>68</sup> Even if the pro-Germans had been organized for a nationwide parade, it was too late. On April 4 the Senate approved of a war resolution by 82 to 6. Those opposed agreed in whole or in part with Bryan.<sup>69</sup> They objected to being drawn into a war to save investments by the masters of American capital in the Allied cause, to protect American war trade with the Allies, to insure profits to munitions makers, or in order to protect British civilization from a German militarism that did not threaten the security of the United States—or had heavy German populations in their states, or were conscientious pacifists. On April 5 the House approved by 373 to 50. Wilson signed the joint resolution declaring war shortly after noon on April 6. "Now the blood of our young men is on [Congress]," Bryan told his wife. "My hands are clean."<sup>70</sup>

Bryan had resigned as secretary of state because he believed that Wilson's pressing of Germany on the issue of submarine warfare would lead to war. Almost two years passed before his prediction came true. But he had misjudged the popular temper. Prosperity was based largely on Allied military orders; popular sympathy was overwhelmingly for the Allies; and the

defeat of the Allies meant the upsetting of a European balance of power upon which American security had rested for a century. On the Gore-McLemore resolutions, which he thought would preclude America's involvement in war, he was defeated by Wilson, who defeated him again on the question of preparedness. It was simply impossible for him as for Congress, to challenge the supremacy of the President in the field of foreign affairs. Economic considerations no doubt entered Wilson's overruling of Bryan's moral ban on loans, and the public was not ready to take the profit out of war by the government ownership of munitions plants. Bryan's failure to have the principles of his conciliation treaties applied to the war rests squarely with Germany, while the rejection of his repeated insistence upon mediation and of his noninterventionist policies rests as squarely upon Wilson as his "realistic" and "internationalist" advisers, House and Lansing.

Bryan would avoid war by giving up some of America's sovereign rights. Lansing and Wilson found no alternatives to supporting the national interest except through the use of "realistic" methods. It is thus paradoxical that the Wilson-Lansing policy of "strict accountability" toward the U-boat was based upon grounds of human rights and morality, upon "sentiment," rather than upon accepted international law or even on self interest.

Although he was merely a private citizen after June, 1915, Bryan's ideas on avoiding war barely failed of adoption by Congress early in 1916. In 1917 war seemed to vindicate his position, as did the subsequent revelation of the secret treaties by which the Allies would divide the spoils. The neutrality laws of the 1930s enshrined him in an honorable niche in American history with noninterventionists and isolationists; and his opposition to entering the war has provided grist for the revisionists.<sup>71</sup>

## NOTES

1. The history of these treaties may be followed in W. J. Bryan to Harry Walker, January 20, 1915, Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1925), 383-393; Editorial comment, *American Journal of International Law* (July, 1913): 566-570, "Mr. Bryan's Peace Treaties," *ibid.*, 7 (October, 1913): 823-829, and "Secretary Bryan's Peace Plan," *ibid.*, 8 (July, 1914): 565-571.

2. Arthur D. Howden Smith, *Mr. House of Texas* (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1940), 104-105; Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926-1928), 1: 256; James W. Gerard, *My First Eighty Years: The Memoirs of James W. Gerard* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1951), 187.

3. Bryan speech at the New York Prayer Day Exercises, Sunday, October 4, 1914, copy in Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Edward Grey (viscount of Fallodon), *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916*, 2 vols. (New York: A. Stokes, 1925), 1:305-11, 2:161-64. That Wilson was pessimistic and half-hearted is revealed in his writing to House: "I hope you do not disapprove my little attempt at mediation. . . . All I wanted to do was to let them know that I was at their service. (Letter of August 6, 1914, Wilson Papers.)"

4. Bryan to Wilson, Aug. 4, 1914, Wilson Papers; The secretary of state to the ambassador in Germany (Gerard), September 7, 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement* (Washington: GPO, 1922), 98-99; The ambassador in Great Britain (Page), to the secretary of state, Sept. 7, 1914, *ibid.*, 99; Stephen Gwynn, ed., *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record*, 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1929), 2:221-222; Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, 68-69; Oscar Strauss, *Under Four Administrations* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), 332-335, 378-386.

5. Bernstorff to Jagow, September 7, 1914, cited in Ernest R. May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 74; The ambassador in France (Herrick) to the secretary of state, September 9, 1914, *F.R., 1914, Supp.*, 100-01; George Macauley Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon: The Life and Letters of Sir Edward Grey, Afterwards Viscount of Fallodon*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937), 2: 119-120, 121-122, 133-34; Page to House, September 10, 1914, in Burton J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, 3 vols. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1924-1925), 1:410-411; House to Wilson, September 18, 19, 20, 22, 1914, Lansing to Wilson, September 18, 1914, Page to Wilson, September 22, 1914, Wilson Papers; Wilson to House, September 19, 1914, House Papers, Yale University; James Allen Beatson, "The Portion of the Peacemaker: Wilson, House, Lansing and the Quest for a Negotiated Peace, August, 1914-February 1917" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1952), 41-54.

6. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 435.

7. For the correspondence see *F. R. 1914, Supp.*, 453-55.

8. *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1914; Charles C. Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), 177.

9. Bryan, *Memoirs*, 375-376.

10. *ibid.*, 375; Bryan to Wilson, August 10, 1914, Wilson Papers.

11. Lansing to Wilson, October 23, 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, 2 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1939-1940), 1:437-440 (hereafter cited as *The Lansing Papers*); Memorandum by the acting secretary of state of a conversation with President Wilson, October 23, 1914, *ibid.*, 1:140-141; Charles A. Beard, "New Light on Bryan and War Policies," *The New*

*Republic*, 87 (June 17, 1936): 177-178; Richard Van Alstyne, "Private American Loans to the Allies, 1914-1916," *Pacific Historical Review* 2 (May, 1933): 180-193; Editorial, "War Credit Loans," *The Independent*, 82 (April 12, 1915), 88.

12. The subject is well covered in Gaddis Smith, *Britain's Clandestine Submarines, 1914-1915* (New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press, 1964).

13. Lansing to Wilson, August 24, 1914, Wilson Papers.

14. The German ambassador (Bernstorff) to the secretary of state, October 31, 1914, *F. R.*, 1914, *Supp.*, 575-576; Bryan to Wilson, October 10, 1914, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:113, and December 24, 1914, *ibid.*, 1:115-116; Wilson to Bryan, October 13, 1914, *ibid.*, 1:113, and December 26, 1914, and January 7, 1915, *ibid.*, 1:116; Lansing to Bryan, August 16, 1915, *ibid.*, 1:128.

15. Page to Bryan, August 6, 1914, Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 18, 1914, Wilson Papers; correspondence in *F. R.*, 1914, *Supp.*, 593-612; Lansing to Bryan, September 13, 1914, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:157-159.

16. Bailey, *Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals*, 381-382; Trevelyan, *Grey*, 2:105-106; Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United States Regarding the Declaration of London at the Outbreak of the Great War," *Journal of Modern History*, 7 (December, 1935): 434-447.

17. The acting secretary of state to the ambassador in Great Britain (Page), September 26, 1914, *F. R.*, 1914, *Supp.*, 225-232; Memorandum by the acting secretary of state, September 29, 1914, *ibid.*, 223-224; House to Page, October 3, 1914, Hendrick, *Page*, 1:378.

18. Correspondence in *F. R.*, 1914, *Supp.*, 353-405; Bryan to Wilson, December 17, 1914, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:253-258, Wilson to Bryan, December 26, 1914, *ibid.*, 1:258; Bryan to Wilson, December 24, 1914, Washington: National Archives, State Department Papers.

19. Johann von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 131-132.

20. Anonymous [Joseph V. Fuller], "William Jennings Bryan, S. F. Bemis, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, 10 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1927-1929), 10:35.

21. The secretary of state to the ambassador in Germany (Gerard), February 10, 1915, *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 98-100; The secretary of state to the ambassador in Great Britain (Page), February 10, 1915, *ibid.*, 100-101.

22. Lansing to Floyd Clarke, February 16, 1915, Lansing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Chandler P. Anderson, *Diary*, entries for January 4-February 13, 1915, Anderson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, 132.

23. Bryan to Wilson, February 15, 1915, Wilson Papers.

24. Correspondence in *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 122-130; *New York Times*, Mar. 2, 1915.

25. Correspondence in *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 143-156, and in *The Lansing Papers*, 1:285-294; *New York Times*, March 17, 20, 1915; Daniel M. Smith, *Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917* (Berkeley, California, and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), 53-55.

26. Lansing to Bryan, April 2, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:365-366, Memorandum by the Counselor . . . on Relations with Germany and Possibilities, February 15, 1915, but not sent to Bryan until April 2, 1915, *ibid.*, 1:367-368.

27. Bryan to Wilson, April 2, 1915, Bryan Papers.

28. Lansing to Bryan, April 5, 1915, with enclosure, Wilson Papers.

29. Bryan to Wilson, April 6, 1915, *ibid.*

30. Bryan to Wilson, April 7, 8, 15, 1915, *ibid.*

31. Wilson to Bryan, April 22, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:377-378; Wilson to Bryan, April 28, 1915, Bryan Papers.

32. A German seaplane bombed the *Cushing* in the North Sea but caused no loss of life. The tanker *Gulfight* was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on May 1, with the loss

of two crewmen. The captain died of a heart attack during the excitement.

33. Lansing to Bryan, May 1, 1915, with enclosure, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:381-382; *New York Times*, May 1, 1915; Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, 137-138.

34. Bryan to Wilson, May 1, 1915, Wilson Papers.

35. Bryan to Wilson, May 5, 1915, *ibid.*, Wilson to House, May 5, 1915, in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, 8 vols. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1927-1939), 5:327.

36. Mary Baird Bryan Journal, June 21, 1915, Mrs. Ruth Bryan Rhode Papers.

37. House to Wilson, May 9, 1915, Wilson Papers; The ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the secretary of state, August 8, 1915, *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 385, and August 11, 1915, *ibid.*, 385-386; Memorandum by the Counselor . . . on the Sinking of the Lusitania, May 10, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:389-92.

38. *Commoner* 15 (May, 1915), 1.

39. Wilson to Bryan, May 11, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:392.

40. Bryan to Wilson, May 12, 13, 16, 19, 1915, Wilson Papers; Bryan to Wilson, May 14, 1915, Rhode Papers; Bryan to Wilson, May 20, 1915, Bryan Papers.

41. Wilson to Bryan, May 12, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:401; Wilson to Bryan, May 13, 1915, Bryan Papers; Wilson to House, May 18, 1915, Wilson Papers.

42. The ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the secretary of state, May 25, 1915, *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 415, and May 29, 1915, with enclosure, *ibid.*, 419-421.

43. Mary B. Bryan Journal, June 21, 1915; Bryan to Wilson, June 2, 1915, "forenoon" June 3, 1915, "evening" June 3, 1915, June 5, 1915, Wilson Papers; David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, with a Personal Estimate of the President*, 2 vols. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1926), 1:132-139; Baker, *Wilson*, 5:350-352; Transill, *America Goes to War*, 52-55.

44. Bryan to Wilson, June 8, 1915, Wilson Papers; The secretary of state ad interim to the ambassador in Germany (Gerard), June 9, 1915, *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 436-438.

45. The ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the secretary of state, July 8, 1915, *F. R.*, 1915, *Supp.*, 464-466.

46. *New York Times*, August 20, 22-23, 1915; *New York World*, August 20, 1915; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), 566-585; "The Attack on the Arabic," *Literary Digest* 51 (August 28, 1915): 387-388; W. J. Bryan, "The Arabic Case," *Commoner* 15 (September 1915): 2.

47. Edward M. House Diary, House Papers, entries of November 24, December 15, 1915; Wilson to House, December 24, 1915, Ray S. Baker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; "Our Case Against Great Britain," *Literary Digest* 51 (November 2, 1915), 1141-1142; Beatson, "The Portion of the Peacemaker," 162-166.

48. W. J. Bryan, *The Causeless War* in *Commoner*, July, 1915, and published at various places and times in 1915 and 1916.

49. W. J. Bryan, "Time for Mediation," *Commoner* 15 (December, 1915): 2.

50. Lansing to Wilson, September 12, 1915, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:330-331, January 2, 1916, *ibid.* 1:332-333, January 7, 1916; *ibid.*, 1:334-335, and Memorandum by the Secretary of State on Armed Merchant Vessels and Submarine Warfare, January 7, 1916, *ibid.*, 1:334-335; Baker, *Wilson*, 6:159-162; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: Confusions and Crises* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 101-141; Charles Seymour, *American Diplomacy During the World War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), 161-172; "Mr. Lansing's Sea-Code," *Literary Digest*, 52 (February 12, 1916): 364-365.

51. The secretary of state to the American ambassador in Germany (Gerard), April 18, 1916, *F. R.*, 1916, *Supp.*, 232-234; "Our Final Word to Germany," *Literary Digest* 52 (April 29, 1916): 1201-1204.

52. *New York Times*, April 20, 1916.

53. The diplomatic correspondence may be found in *F. R.*, 1916, *Supp.*, 257-260. See also Baker, *Wilson*, 6:196-199; Gerard, *My First Eighty Years*, 234-239; Link,

- Confusions and Crises*, 256-279; Tansill, *America Goes to War*, 490-515.
54. W. J. Bryan, "The Young Man's Opportunity," *Commoner* 16 (February 1916), 7; Beatson, "The Portion of the Peacemaker," 203-213.
55. Johann von H. Bernstorff, *The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff*. Translated from the German by Eric Sutton (London: W. Heinemanns, 1936), 154; Beatson, "The Portion of the Peacemaker," 2-4-20.
56. Baker, *Wilson*, 6:312-322, 325-329; Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 218-22.
57. Bryan, *Memoirs*, 438. For Lansing's objections to the use of force in collective action see his letter to Wilson of May 25, 1916, *The Lansing Papers*, 1:16-18.
58. Bernstorff to Bryan, December 28, 1916, William E. Borah to Bryan, December 29, 1916, Bryan Papers; *New York Times*, December 19, 1916; Baker, *Wilson*, 6:396-400; Houston, *Eight Years*, 1:219-221; Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette, June 14, 1885-June 18, 1925*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 1:588; W. J. Bryan, "President Renders Invaluable Service," *Commoner* 17 (January 1917), 2, and "The President's Peace Note," *ibid.* 17 (January 1917), 3; Beatson, "The Portion of the Peacemaker," 235-269, 294-313.
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60. W. J. Bryan, *America and the European War: Address by William Jennings Bryan at Madison Square Garden, February 2, 1917* (New York, 1917).
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63. Baker, *Wilson*, 6:474; "The Alliance with Mexico and Japan Proposed by Germany," *Current History* 6 (April 1917): 65-71.
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65. W. J. Bryan, "To the Members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives," March 28, 1917, Bryan Papers.
66. Gilbert M. Hitchcock to Wilson, March 29, 1917, Wilson to Hitchcock, March 31, 1917, Wilson Papers.
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