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Article Summary: At UNL news of the Kent State shootings led to a sit-in at the ROTC Building and then to a brief student strike. The level of unrest on campus was typical for a public institution of UNL's size.

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Photographs / Images: Joseph Soshnik, students leaving ROTC building, Steve Tiwald addressing students in Coliseum, Stephen L Rosman with Durward Varner during a student sit-in

## UNL Student Reaction to the Cambodian Incursion and the Kent State Shootings, May 1970 By Stephen Witte

On April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon announced that United States and South Vietnamese ground forces had entered Cambodia in order to attack Viet Cong bases. Almost immediately significant student protests against Nixon's decision broke out on college and university campuses, and in less than a week, scores of campuses were experiencing student strikes and other forms of protest. On May 4, four students died at Kent State University in Ohio from National Guard gunfire during a confrontation between protesting students and guardsmen. In the following days, hundreds of American college and university campuses were either shut down or significantly affected by protest activity.2

The Vietnam War was extremely unpopular with many of the nation's college students in 1970. An individual's opposition to the war could be based upon moral objections to war in general, moral objections to the Vietnam conflict specifically, fear of being drafted to fight, fear that one's friends or family members might be drafted, or any combination of these reasons. Whatever the source of antiwar sentiment, the Cambodian "incursion" represented an extension of a war that in the opinion of many young Americans had already gone on too long. The events at Kent State raised the appalling prospect of widespread domestic violence perpetrated by either a repressive government or by dangerous student radicals—depending on the observer's point of view.

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The University of Nebraska-Lincoln was not immune to the waves of dissent sweeping the country's institutions of higher learning in the spring of 1970. News of Kent State sparked a sequence of events on the UNL campus that climaxed with a sit-in at the Military and Naval Science Building followed by a student strike. UNL was not to be another Kent State or Jackson State, for there was little violence, no serious injuries or deaths, and no use of the National Guard. By May 8 Governor Norbert Tiemann said that he hoped to be able to tell President Nixon that college campuses in Nebraska were "like a garden" compared to those in other states.3 However, the absence of violence had not been guaranteed, and there were to be consequences of the unrest for the university.

In contrast to campuses such as Princeton University and Oberlin College, the University of Nebraska's Lincoln campuses did not experience any large-scale student protests of the Cambodian incursion prior to May 4.4There had been antiwar sentiment among some students since at least the 1965-66 academic year, when UNL graduate student Carl Davidson founded a UNL chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). which sponsored antiwar "teach-ins." Antiwar students felt betrayed by Nixon's decision to send American troops into Cambodia and considered it an unjustified expansion of the war. At the same time, a number of students on campus supported Nixon's decision, and would later oppose both the sit-in at the Military and Naval Science (or ROTC) Building, and the Associated Students of the University of Nebraska (ASUN) strike. 6 Student

reaction to the Cambodian situation consisted largely of informal discussion among small groups from April 30 to May 3.<sup>7</sup>

The student government at UNL reacted quickly to Nixon's April 30 announcement. Newly elected ASUN President Steve Tiwald accepted an invitation to attend a special National Student Association (NSA) meeting in Washington, D.C., scheduled for May 1. The meeting considered possible responses to the Cambodian incursion. Tiwald's trip was financed by NSA funds, and he returned to Lincoln on May 2.8 The NSA called for a nationwide student protest of the presence of American troops in Cambodia for the weekend May 1-3, and a National Student Strike Information Center was established at Brandeis University.9

The commission appointed by the University of Nebraska Regents to investigate the campus unrest at UNL later alleged that Tiwald and other ASUN officials planned for a student strike upon his return from Washington. <sup>10</sup> Tiwald denied that ASUN had made any plans for a strike prior to the Kent State shootings. <sup>11</sup> It is likely, however, that ASUN officers discussed the possibility of staging a student strike. This hypothesis is supported by Tiwald's attempt to discourage the occupation of the ROTC Building on May 4 by offering a strike as a counterproposal. <sup>12</sup>

The main student newspaper on campus, the *Daily Nebraskan*, did not react to the Cambodian situation until Monday, May 4, partly because it did not publish on weekends. The May 4 *Daily Nebraskan* was a year-end parody edition with serious news limited to the front page, where an editorial by editor Jim Pedersen urged

UNL students to protest "this most recent of many intolerable acts by our government in Southeast Asia." Pedersen went on to suggest that UNL students take some action to demonstrate opposition to the war such as organizing a march, wearing black armbands, or joining a national student strike. Portions of his comments were reprinted in the May 4 *Lincoln Evening Journal*, which might have led some readers to believe that the student newspaper had agitated for disruptive protests. <sup>14</sup>

In addition to Pedersen's editorial, the Monday morning campus paper carried a short notice of a protest rally to be held north of the student union building at 1:30 that afternoon. <sup>15</sup> The rally was organized by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, a student organization registered with the university's Office of Student Activities. The committee chairman, Mike Shonsey of Omaha, had requested and received permission to hold the rally through normal university channels. <sup>16</sup>

By the time the rally was scheduled to begin, news of the shootings at Kent State University had reached the UNL campus. 17 The news was to trigger large-scale student protest at UNL of a kind not seen before, beginning with the afternoon rally at the student union. Lincoln Campuses President Joseph Soshnik was not concerned about possible student unrest until he was informed of Kent State and the march on the Lancaster County draft board, which followed the student union rally on May 4.18

The week from May 4 to May 11 was the high point of protest at UNL against the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State shootings. Many antiwar students were convinced by the events at Kent State that the time had come for action in the form of rallies, a protest march on the local draft board, an occupation of the Military and Naval Science Building, and finally a student strike against classes at the university.<sup>19</sup>

Phil Medcalf, from Ainsworth, Nebraska, was perhaps the first student to take direct action. Medcalf was a scheduled speaker at the May 4 rally, but when his turn came to speak, he announced that he was going to the Lancaster County draft board offices and invited audience members to accompany him. Although it is probable that Medcalf had decided earlier in the day to make this announcement, there had been no organized group planning a march on the draft board.<sup>20</sup>



**President of Lincoln Campuses Joseph Soshnik.** Courtesy of University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Medcalf and a group of 50 to 150 protesters walked from the student union at Fourteenth and R streets to the Terminal Building at Tenth and O streets, which then housed the Lancaster County Selective Service offices on the ninth floor. 21 Two Lincoln police officers were present and attempted to prevent the full group from entering the Selective Service office. Three to four persons were permitted to enter the office and speak with draft board workers. Two of the protesters allowed inside were Dan Ladely and Stephen Rozman, a student and assistant professor of political science respectively,

who would later play important roles in the occupation of the ROTC Building.<sup>22</sup>

The protesters asked the draft board to cease operations for the rest of the day, but this request was refused. All available Lincoln police officers in the downtown area were called to the scene, and the police then declared the demonstration to be an unlawful assembly and ordered the group to disperse. Most of the protesters did so, but others refused to leave and thirteen people were arrested. After the arrests, a group of about 150 students assembled across the street from the Terminal Building and continued the protest. The demonstration broke up by 3:30 P.M.<sup>23</sup>

Once informed of the events at Kent State and the march on the Terminal Building, President Soshnik became concerned about the possibility of trouble on the downtown Lincoln campus. He cancelled a trip to South Sioux City in order to remain in Lincoln to monitor the situation.<sup>24</sup>

Soshnik was not alone in anticipating further student protest activity that evening. The May 4 *Lincoln Evening Journal* quoted ASUN President Steve Tiwald and Vietnam Moratorium Committee Chairman Mike Shonsey as saying that a student strike was now a real possibility. The *Journal* further reported that a "strategy meeting" would be held that evening at the United Ministries for Higher Education (UMHE) Building.<sup>25</sup>

Prior to the main student meeting at UMHE, a small, ad hoc group of students including Dan Ladely, Alan Siporin, and others met to discuss occupying the Military and Naval Science Building, The main meeting started about 7:30 P.M. with approximately two hundred students in attendance. Observers from the Office of Student Affairs were also present, as were faculty members Ivan Volgyes, Philip Scribner, and Stephen Rozman. Professor Paul Olson was present for at least part of the meeting. Alan Siporin spoke in favor of occupying the ROTC Building, but Steve Tiwald suggested a student strike instead. Many students at the meeting were convinced that they had not yet done enough to protest the Cambodian situation and the shootings at Kent State, and some believed that a strike would not be a sufficiently strong statement. Siporin announced that he was going to the ROTC Building, and from fifty to one hundred students left the meeting and went to the Military and Naval Science Building.<sup>26</sup>

Rumors of a possible march on the ROTC Building had reached Vice-Chancellor and Executive Dean of Student Affairs G. Robert Ross, who had convened a meeting of the military science department heads late that afternoon. Ross and the military science faculty were still conferring when the first students from the UMHE meeting arrived. Three or four campus police officers, including Captain (and department chief) Gail Gade were present as well, and briefly attempted to prevent the students from entering the building.27 It is unclear whether the doors to the building were locked when the students arrived (approximately 8 P.M.). Gade would later maintain that the doors had been locked, while Ross believed they had not been locked. Dan Ladely, one of the first students to arrive, saw a policeman holding a door shut and concluded that the door was not locked.28 The official report of the Regents' investigating commission indicated that the doors had been locked and therefore the student group had forced its way into the building. Nevertheless, the campus police made little effort to interfere with the occupation once the initial group had entered. As word of the occupation circulated, more students came to the building, many of whom were merely curious to see what was going on. The peak crowd was approximately 1,800 people.29

The core group of demonstrators that had initiated the sit-in soon selected spokesmen and began considering demands to present to the administration. Siporin and Ladely were chosen to speak for the group in subsequent negotiations. A list of six demands was drawn up that included: amnesty for those arrested at the Terminal Building and those who might be arrested at the ROTC Building; the university administration's backing for

the National Student Association strike; the suspension of ROTC at UNL until the United States withdrew from Indochina; the disarming of campus police; public meetings of the university's Board of Regents; and academic credit of one hour for Free University classes. The demands were presented to President Soshnik upon his arrival at the building to negotiate with the demonstrators.<sup>30</sup>

Soshnik, Dean of Faculties C. Peter Magrath, ASUN President Tiwald, Police Captain Gade, Dean Ross, and others assembled at campus police headquarters about 9 P.M. to discuss the situation, while members of the University Senate's Faculty Liaison Committee went to the occupied building. <sup>31</sup> Approximately an hour later Soshnik, Ross, and Magrath went to the ROTC Building to begin discussions with the student protesters. <sup>32</sup>

The initial negotiating session between the administration and the student spokesmen lasted for about three hours. Soshnik's main goals were to convince the students that their action was not going to change U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and to arrange for some honorable way for them to leave the building. He was determined not to use force if at all possible and to follow closely the university's policy on disruptive actions. That policy called for the use of persuasion before other means to end the disruption and for discussion of issues with the protesters so long as discussion was not carried out "under condition of duress."33

The student representatives believed that Soshnik was negotiating in good faith, but often the two sides would be near an agreement only to see it fail. According to Soshnik, one major obstacle was the insistence by the student spokesmen that the demands presented to the administration reflected the will of the entire group, while the spokesmen maintained that they could not guarantee that the group would accept any concessions they might make to the administration. Another problem from the administration's viewpoint was the presence of Dr. Stephen Rozman, who allegedly counseled student leaders

not to compromise when agreements seemed close.<sup>34</sup> Rozman's actions that night became a major source of controversy, culminating in his dismissal in 1971.<sup>35</sup>

At approximately 1 A.M. Soshnik and the other administrators went back to the campus police station to prepare a response to the protesters' demands. The party returned to the occupied building for further discussions about 3 A.M., with Soshnik reading a prepared statement to the students around 3:30. The statement called for a special faculty meeting at noon on May 5 in the Nebraska Union ballroom, at which the students' requests for support of the NSA strike, the suspension of ROTC, and academic credit for Free University courses would be acted upon by the faculty. Student representatives would be permitted to speak at both the faculty meeting and at a later alluniversity meeting in the Coliseum at 2 P.M. Soshnik pledged to relay the students' demand for open meetings to the Board of Regents and to open discussions with student representatives on whether the campus police would continue to carry firearms. He added that the administration was not aware of any conduct that warranted university disciplinary action, including the actions of those arrested at the draft board on the afternoon of May 4. The statement ended with a request that the students help ensure that the campus remain free of violence. Soshnik and the administrative team left the building after reading the statement, which was applauded by the roughly five hundred students remaining in the building.36

The demonstrators' spokesmen believed that the administration had agreed to permit the protesters to remain in the building overnight on condition that the students remain peaceful and not disrupt morning ROTC classes. Student leaders attempted to police the actions of people in the building and requested demonstrators to remain in the lower level "pit" area.<sup>37</sup>

Before Soshnik read his statement to the assembled students, Ross telephoned Lincoln attorney Flavel Wright and told Wright that the administration might seek a court order directing the students to leave the ROTC Building. Wright replied that any action would have to wait for later in the morning. At 5 A.M. Soshnik asked Wright to obtain an injunction against the demonstrators from the Lancaster County District Court, and Wright began work on the injunction petition soon afterward. Soshnik did not think that it would be possible to hold classes as long as demonstrators remained in the building, and wanted any enforcement action against the students to be mandated by some authority external to the university in order to avoid dividing the campus community.38

Ross returned to the ROTC Building at about 5:30 A.M. and asked the demonstrators, who then numbered about two hundred, to reduce their numbers to a token few and to permit janitorial workers to clean the building. The protesters agreed only to the latter. Before he left the building, Ross made a statement that the students interpreted as meaning that they could remain in the pit area as long as they were peaceful.<sup>39</sup> This statement, along with the belief that Soshnik had agreed to permit peaceful students to remain, explains the surprise of many of the demonstrators over the announcement later that morning that the university was seeking an injunction.

Soshnik and Ross became concerned that violence might break out between demonstrators and ROTC students arriving for morning classes. Soshnik doubted that the leaders of the occupying students could guarantee that there would be no interference with classes. The administration asked the ROTC faculty for input on whether ROTC classes could be held.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile, the student leaders continued to assume that they would be permitted to remain in the building. Shortly after 7 A.M. Alan Siporin reminded the demonstrators to remain in the pit and to permit ROTC students to enter the building for their 7:30 classes. Some ROTC students did arrive for class, only to find that their instructors were not in the classrooms. A military science instructor talked with some ROTC students in a nearby parking

lot and informed them that he was awaiting word from Soshnik as to whether ROTC classes would go on as scheduled. No violence was reported between the cadets and the demonstrators.<sup>41</sup>

At approximately 9 A.M., Soshnik returned to the Military and Naval Science Building and announced that the administration had determined the occupation to be "disruptive or potentially disruptive conduct."42 He directed the students to leave the building within fifteen minutes and informed them that they would be subject to penalties in accordance with university policy if they refused, starting with probation and proceeding to suspension after an hour. He also announced that the university was seeking a court order and offered transportation to those students wishing to attend the hearing. Most of the demonstrators remained where they were. Fifteen minutes later, Soshnik announced that any student remaining after five minutes would be put on probation. After another fifteen-minute interval, or at about 9:34 A.M., according to one report, Soshnik announced that the remaining students were now on probation and that suspension would follow in an hour.43

The mood among the demonstrators became a combination of concern that force might be used against them and a sense that the administration had broken its word or that Soshnik had been pressured by Chancellor Durward Varner or the Regents to clear the building. <sup>44</sup> The perception that force might be used was heightened when some students who went to the City-County Building for the injunction hearing saw a sizable group of Lincoln police officers getting into cars, and concluded that the police would soon be coming to enforce a court order. <sup>45</sup>

Professor Paul Olson provided a suggestion that may have prevented further confrontation between the administration and the student demonstrators. Olson asked Ladely if the students would leave the building to attend a meeting where they could discuss events with the faculty. Ladely replied that he thought they would

do so. Olson then discussed the idea with Richard Gilbert, the chair of the University Senate Liaison Committee. The available members of the committee decided to move the previously announced special faculty meeting to 10 A.M. Olson told Ladely of this, and Ladely relayed the news to the other students. When contacted by a member of the committee. Soshnik approved the idea immediately.<sup>46</sup> At 10 A.M., the students left the Military and Naval Science Building and went to the student union ballroom to attend the faculty meeting. The group thought it had made its statement and was relieved to end the occupation under circumstances that avoided police action yet kept discussion of the issues open. Because the administration had made no effort to take the names of the students involved in the sit-in, none faced any university disciplinary action once the building was cleared.47

The court hearing on the injunction petition was in progress at the time the protesters departed from the ROTC Building. The judge had arrived late that morning, and there were cases on the docket ahead of the injunction petition. When word reached the court that the ROTC Building had been cleared, the petition was dropped.<sup>48</sup>

The protesters worried that if the injunction had been granted, the police, the National Guard, or both might have been used to remove them from the building. It was true that local law enforcement agencies had prepared for possible action. During the early morning hours of May 5 the Lincoln police, the Lancaster County sheriff's office, and the Nebraska state patrol had assembled a joint riot-control force of 145 men at the Lincoln National Guard Armory, just a few blocks from the campus. This was at the request of university officials in case it was decided that force was needed to implement a court order. The force remained on standby until the morning of May 6.49 President Soshnik did not want to use force unless absolutely necessary, and Lincoln police chief Joe Carroll said police would wait for a request from the university before



Students leaving ROTC building. Courtesy of Omaha World-Herald.

entering the campus. Although the police team used the National Guard armory as a base, no guard personnel were alerted or activated <sup>50</sup>

Nebraska Governor Norbert Tiemann reacted negatively to the student occupation of the ROTC Building. In a statement released by his office while he was campaigning in North Platte on May 5, Tiemann said that he would not tolerate "lawlessness in Nebraska" and that he considered the occupation of university buildings to be lawlessness. The governor stated his belief that unlawful forms of protest jeopardized the right of peaceful assembly. He went on to say that state law enforcement officers stood ready to assist

city and university officials. Tiemann said that he had no intention of using the guard at the moment, but he "would not hesitate to do so" if necessary.51 During his campaign appearances, Tiemann suggested that if students rioted, both the rioters and any "professors who incite the riots" should be asked to leave the university.52 Despite the governor's apparent willingness to use the National Guard if necessary, guard officers indicated that Tiemann had given no order to mobilize. The governor did keep a close eye on campus events, cancelling a campaign trip to Omaha on May 6 in order to remain in Lincoln. On Friday, May 8, Tiemann repeated that he would use the

guard if he thought it necessary, adding that in that event the guardsmen would carry live ammunition.<sup>53</sup>

The possibility exists that Governor Tiemann felt it necessary to take a tough stance on student unrest due to his difficult battle with conservative challenger Clifton Batchelder in the 1970 Republican gubernatorial primary. However, the governor's correspondence with concerned citizens indicated that he always considered the use of the National Guard to be a last resort, and that while he supported President Nixon's decision to send troops into Cambodia, he also firmly supported the right of students to disagree with that decision.54 Tiemann's position on student unrest and the use of the National Guard during the 1970 general election campaign against Democratic nominee J.J. Exon was essentially the same as that contained in his May statements. Exon's position on this issue was not far from Tiemann's, so it would appear that the campus unrest issue was not a major factor in Exon's general election victory.55 The consistency of Tiemann's public statements on this issue throughout the primary and general election campaigns would indicate that his position was not chosen simply to help deal with Batchelder's primary challenge.

While the National Guard did not mobilize to suppress student protest at UNL, the student government mobilized to facilitate protest. During the occupation of the Military and Naval Science Building on the evening of May 4, the ASUN Senate met and passed a number of resolutions supporting a student strike, calling for an all-university "town-hall meeting" at the Coliseum to discuss "alternatives available to students concerned about the Indo-China War and the problem of ROTC on campus," condemning violent forms of antiwar protest, and calling for discussions among student and law enforcement representatives. The student government did not endorse the sit-in at the ROTC Building.56

At 10 A.M. on Tuesday morning, May 4, the special faculty meeting originally called for noon began. The protesters who had just left the ROTC Building attended, as did a significant number of other students. The approximately 350 faculty members at the meeting passed a resolution that endorsed a voluntary faculty/student strike. The resolution recommended no punitive action be taken against those students and faculty members who chose to strike, while affirming the right of those who did not wish to strike to continue their normal activities.<sup>57</sup>

Several students and faculty members addressed the meeting, giving their impressions of the previous night's events at the Military and Naval Science Building. ASUN President Tiwald read the affidavit submitted by the university to the court in support of its injunction petition. The affidavit alleged threats against ROTC students by demonstrators and carried the signature of G. Robert Ross. Some of those in attendance insisted that the charge was false. Professor June Levine of the English department stated that she had been present during the negotiations between the demonstrators and the administration. and she recalled that the student demonstrators had agreed not to interfere with ROTC students.58 At the 2 P.M. all-university meeting at the Coliseum, philosophy professor Phil Scribner suggested the allegation was made because the Regents had ordered the administration to get the demonstrators out of the building.<sup>59</sup>

The 10 A.M. faculty meeting had shown that there was some support among the faculty for a strike. At the 2 P.M. meeting in the Coliseum, students were to decide whether to proceed with a strike. Some estimates indicated that approximately one half of UNL's 18,800 students attended.60 The meeting adopted a resolution that supported a three-day strike on classes, with the proviso that those who wished to continue attending classes could do so. Special "strike classes" were organized, in which instructors were to moderate discussion of the Cambodian incursion and related topics. Students were asked to participate in a canvassing effort to spread antiwar information. Plans for a rally on Saturday, May 9, were announced. Another meeting for the purpose of deciding whether to continue the strike was scheduled for Sunday, May 10.61

While the supporters of a strike were able to carry their motion at the Coliseum meeting, it was evident that at least a substantial minority of students opposed the strike. Several students spoke against the strike, and a number of strike opponents

left the meeting after the initial strike motion was approved. <sup>62</sup> During the "strike week," the UNL chapter of the Young Americans for Freedom and the newly organized Committee for Undisrupted Education opposed the strike. <sup>63</sup>

The university administration, while not endorsing the student/faculty strike, did not attempt to overrule the faculty meeting's recommendation that strikers not be punished. President Soshnik considered the strike "counterproductive" because students were losing class time without achieving their desire of getting U.S. forces out of Cambodia. However, he considered the decision on how to handle students who missed class to belong to the faculty, not to the administration. Soshnik did say that striking faculty members should make arrangements for their students to obtain the information they would have covered in class.64

ASUN quickly assumed management of strike activities, which included a letter-writing campaign in which students sent some 2,700 letters on the war to their congressional representatives by the afternoon of May 6. Canvassing efforts, in which students would visit and speak with local residents about the Cambodia issue, were organized in Lincoln, Omaha, and



ASUN President Steve Tiwald addresses students in Coliseum. Courtesy of Omaha World-Herald.

Grand Island. Students were encouraged to sign an antiwar petition to Congress.<sup>65</sup> "Strike classes" were held in the student union and in the English department library, and participation in these discussions was not limited to antiwar speakers.<sup>66</sup> ASUN President Tiwald appointed a "Strike Coordination Committee" to oversee strike activities.<sup>67</sup>

The strike's effectiveness was mixed. Students in certain colleges and majors were more likely to strike than others. The English department was perhaps the academic department most affected by the strike, while the dentistry, law, and engineering programs reported little effect. Dean of Faculties Magrath reported to the Regents that only 4.7 percent of scheduled classes in the entire university failed to meet during the strike week, with the most cancelled classes in the English department. Student attendance in classes was lower in the College of Arts and Sciences than in most other colleges, but even there, attendance remained at about 80-85 percent of normal.68

The last major protest activity during the strike was a peace rally held on Saturday, May 9, on a field behind the women's physical education building. The rally took place on the same day as the 1970 spring intrasquad football game, and more people attended the game than the rally. Although some authorities had been worried about violence, the *Daily Nebraskan* reported that "[t]he only violence on the University of Nebraska campus Saturday occurred in Memorial Stadium."<sup>69</sup>

On Sunday, May 10, the "town meeting" scheduled by the May 5 resolutions to reconsider the strike assembled. The Sunday meeting was characterized by extended discussion of parliamentary procedures instead of the strike issue. Finally, a secret ballot was taken on the question of continuing the strike with the results to be announced at another meeting the next day. <sup>70</sup>

On Monday, May 11, it was announced that the vote had been 1,357 to 1,030 against continuing the strike. The May 11 meeting then passed a resolution calling

for a "new University of Nebraska," and requesting that students be able to take a grade of "P" (pass) or "incomplete" for their academic work. A two-week recess before the November 1970 congressional elections in lieu of Thanksgiving break was also requested so that students could concentrate on political activity.<sup>71</sup>

With the end of the student strike on May 11, major antiwar protest activity on campus came to an end. An informal "College of Life" was set up with the permission of the administration in three tents near Love Library, and some of its "classes" were focused on discussion of the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia. But the emphasis there was on educational reform, and the "college" did not last beyond the final exam week.72 The faculty rejected the student proposal for an election recess, suggesting instead that students arrange excused absences with their professors and make up any work they would miss while absent for election activities. Students made no large-scale protest of the faculty's decision and organized no further major protest of the Cambodian incursion, largely because the end of the semester had come and many students were going home.73 On May 13 the student union was firebombed, but damage was relatively minor and the incident was found to be the work of one or two individuals acting alone. On June 10 a fire at the ROTC Building caused about \$15,000 in damage, but no evidence was found linking the incident to the unrest in May. 74 Little if any protest activity occurred during the 1970 summer sessions, and campus life was clearly back to normal when the fall 1970 semester began.75

The May 1970 protests had a number of consequences at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The Board of Regents commissioned a panel to investigate the events. Public perceptions of the university were probably affected by the unrest. There is a strong possibility that it affected the November 1970 elections for the Board of Regents; and the protests definitely affected the career of Dr. Stephen Rozman, who was dismissed by the Regents for alleged improper activities.

On May 18, 1970, the Board of Regents issued a statement about the protests, in which the Regents stated their determination that educational programs should continue uninterrupted. The Regents also directed Chancellor Varner to proceed with an inquiry into the unrest with the assistance of legal counsel. Varner said that the Regents were investigating the incidents largely in response to pressure from constituents. Later, the investigation was entrusted to a commission of private citizens with Richard E. Spelts, Jr., as chairman and Duane L. Nelson as staff counsel. The commission delivered its report to the Regents on August 18, 1970.76The report generally commended students, faculty, and administrators for their success in avoiding violence and large-scale interruption of educational programs, and attributed the unrest to the "disruptive actions of a few individuals." The commission specifically labeled Stephen Rozman's actions as "highly inappropriate for a teacher."77

Public opinion of the student unrest at UNL appears to have been negative. The Lincoln Evening Journal conducted a poll in early May in which 48 percent of respondents indicated that their respect for students had declined due to the events on campus, while only 19 percent reported their opinion of students had improved. The same poll showed 49 percent approval and 43 percent disapproval of President Nixon's use of troops in Cambodia.78 The editor of the Scottsbluff Star-Herald wrote that "taxpayers are indeed sick and tired of shelling out for those who would use the campus for revolutionary purposes," a sentiment shared by the executive committee of the American Legion of Nebraska, which suggested that students at the university "for purposes other than obtaining an education" be asked to leave.79

If the actions of Nebraska legislators are assumed to be representative of public opinion, the proposition that the public's reaction was negative gains strength. On May 14, Vice-Chancellor and Dean of Student Affairs G. Robert Ross appeared before the Nebraska Legislature's

executive board to request approval for a dormitory renovation project. He was greeted with numerous questions and negative comments about the student protests. Senator C. W. Holmquist wanted a list of instructors involved in the unrest, while Senator Henry Pedersen couldn't "understand why some punk kids are burning and looting in the name of academic freedom." 80 Several days earlier, Senator Terry Carpenter had hinted that the university might encounter difficulties in its future budget requests.

Senator Holmquist proposed that the executive board investigate the student unrest, but later agreed to drop the idea when the Regents announced their own inquiry. BI U.S. Senator Carl Curtis of Nebraska expressed his displeasure with student unrest nationwide by suggesting that federal aid to those colleges which closed down due to student strikes be reduced in proportion to the time lost. BI

Chancellor Varner thought that the university was paying a price for the unrest in terms of public opinion, and he was likely correct. Two Regents also paid a price, that of defeat for re-election in November 1970. Regents B. N. Greenberg and Richard Adkins were the only incumbents running in 1970, and both were defeated. All four successful candidates for the Board of Regents that fall said that voters were concerned about the protests in May. Robert Prokop, who defeated incumbent Regent Greenberg, had been particularly vocal in his criticism of the board's handling of the situation. During the campaign Prokop had suggested that all of the student protesters at the ROTC Building should have been prosecuted and that the Spelts Commission investigation was a "whitewash."83

In addition to Regents Adkins and Greenberg, one UNL faculty member lost his job because of the May protests. That was untenured assistant professor of political science Stephen Rozman, who was notified in February 1971 that his contract would not be renewed for the 1971-72 school year. 84 Rozman had been present at both the draft board demonstration and the ROTC Building sit-in on May 4. The



The Daily Nebraskan of February 11, 1971, published this photo of Dr. Stephen L. Rozman (standing at right) with Chancellor Durward B. Varner during an encounter outside Varner's office. Nearby students are holding a sit-in to protest the Regents' decision not to renew Rozman's contract. Courtesy of University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Archives & Special Collections.

chief accusations against Rozman were that he had undermined the UNL administration's position in the negotiations between the administration and the student group occupying the ROTC Building and that he had refused to leave the building when President Soshnik ordered the demonstrators to leave on the morning of May 5. He was also accused of being disrespectful to President Soshnik

after the occupation and of saying that the affidavit submitted to the court by Vice-Chancellor Ross in support of the injunction petition contained lies about him and the other demonstrators.<sup>85</sup>

If all of the accusations against Rozman were true, the Regents would have had a strong case for his dismissal. However, some of the charges against him were refuted by the special faculty committee appointed to look into the matter. The committee concluded that although Rozman did speak "vigorously," he was not "abusive." The committee further found that Rozman did not attempt to persuade students not to leave the building, and that there was no proof that Rozman had refused Soshnik's order to leave the building. The committee's general conclusion was that "Dr. Rozman was not guilty of inappropriate actions during the week of May 4."8

The Board of Regents apparently did not agree with either the faculty committee's assessment of Rozman's actions, or with the committee's definition of "inappropriate" action by a faculty member. This is a plausible explanation of the Regents' dismissal of Rozman. The Regents were not academic professionals. and there is no reason to suppose that they would have the same opinion of what constituted professional misconduct as professors would. Because five of the eight Regents who fired Rozman were new to the university, this interpretation seems strong.87 Another possibility is that the Regents felt the need for a scapegoat because of hostile public opinion toward the student unrest. This explanation is supported mainly by the emphasis on the unrest during the Regents' election campaign. However, because half of the board had just won their seats and would not run for reelection for several years, it seems unlikely that a majority of the board would be so motivated.

The Rozman case was not finally resolved until October 16, 1972, when a federal appeals court ruled on a suit Rozman filed against the university. The court ruled that the Regents did have the authority to dismiss Rozman, and Rozman

decided not to pursue the case further.88

Another lasting consequence of the student unrest was passage of LB 445, a bill introduced in the 1971 Nebraska Legislature by Senator C. W. Holmquist. The bill provided for dismissal of faculty and expulsion of students "engaging in certain activities disruptive of any public institution of higher education," and contained the emergency clause, which put it into immediate effect once the bill was made law. Holmquist said his bill was a direct result of the events on the UNL campus in May 1970.89

Nine years after the sit-in at the ROTC Building, UNL Police Chief Gail Gade said that the situation at the Lincoln campuses in 1970 was a "cakewalk" compared to events at Berkeley, California, and Kent, Ohio.<sup>90</sup>

That is an accurate comparison because there were no deaths or injuries at UNL as there had been at Kent, and Nebraska Governor Norbert Tiemann had not followed the example of California Governor Ronald Reagan and ordered the university to close.<sup>91</sup>

But that comparison does not answer the question of whether the reaction of UNL students to the twin shocks of Cambodia and Kent State was "typical" of students nationwide, for Kent and Berkeley were exceptional cases.

In 1971 Richard E. Peterson and John A. Bilorusky published a report on the May 1970 unrest on college campuses around the country. The report included the results of a survey of 1,856 college presidents on the intensity of dissent at their campuses. A brief examination of the results seems to indicate that the response at UNL to the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State shootings was typical for a public institution of its size.

Nearly 90 percent of institutions with 12,000 or more students (124 out of 138 responding schools in this size class) reported "significant impact" upon campus operations. 94 A building occupation and a student strike such as occurred at UNL would seem to fit within the category of "significant impact." Almost 75 percent of the large schools reported peaceful dem-

onstrations by students (such as the rallies on the UNL campus). Over 68 percent of the schools reported student efforts to communicate their concerns with area residents. The UNL student canvassing effort appears to fit that description. Over 66 percent of schools in UNL's size class had special seminars, workshops, or projects related to the issues at hand similar to the "strike classes" and "College of Life" at UNL, Unlike UNL and a majority of schools, a minority (46.4 percent) of these schools experienced a shutdown of one day or more. UNL again fits the majority profile, because there was no suspension of operations. Twenty-nine percent of the large schools reported "general student/ staff strikes." Whether the voluntary, marginally effective strike at UNL can be called "general" is debatable, as is the question of whether the single Molotov cocktail thrown at the Nebraska Union puts UNL into the category of having experienced a "destructive demonstration" along with 29.7 percent of the large schools.95 The very mildness of the latter two activities at UNL tends to reinforce the image of UNL campus reaction being typical for a large state university

Peterson and Bilorusky's data also show that reaction to the Cambodia/Kent State events was in general much milder in small, private colleges than at the large state universities. The smaller colleges in Nebraska were reported to be largely undisturbed,96 while there was campus turmoil at UNL, by far the largest educational institution in Nebraska and the state's "flagship" school. It is easy to see why the citizens of Nebraska were so concerned about unrest on the Lincoln campus, for nothing quite like it was happening anywhere else in the state. Despite that concern, UNL students were no more "dangerous" than their colleagues at other large public universities, and in many cases were less so.

## Notes

- <sup>3</sup> At the same time, Tiemann announced that if the Nebraska National Guard had to be called out to handle civil disturbances, the guard would be armed. "Guardsmen Will Be Armed For Any Major Disturbance," *Lincoln Star*, May 9, 1970, 4.
- <sup>4</sup> Report of the President's Commission, 17; Dr. Joseph Soshnik (president of the Lincoln Campuses and Outstate Activities in 1970), interview by author, Omaha, Nebr., Nov. 20, 1992.
- <sup>5</sup> Lincoln Evening Journal, June 16, 1968, 3A. Carl Davidson eventually left Lincoln to become an SDS national leader. A capsule biography of Davidson with photo appears above the story "SDS Plans Spreading Revolutionary Movement Off Campus."
- <sup>6</sup> Dan Ladely (current director of the Sheldon Art Gallery Film Series and a student at UNL in 1970 who was a spokesman for the group that occupied the Military and Naval Science Building on the night of May 4, 1970), interview by author, Lincoln, Nebr., Nov. 12, 1992; Dr. Robert Stock (UNL English professor and former faculty advisor of the UNL chapter of the Young Americans for Freedom), interview by author, Lincoln, Nebr., Nov. 16, 1992.

7Ladely, interview by author.

- <sup>8</sup> Report of Commission of Inquiry on Disruptive Actions on the University of Nebraska Campus, Lincoln, April 30-June 10, 1970, 1. Report to University of Nebraska Board of Regents, Aug. 18, 1970. Copy in Stephen Rozman file, box 228, University of Nebraska Biographical/Bibliographical files, University Archives, Love Memorial Library, Lincoln. Hereafter cited as Spelts Commission Report after the commission's chairman, Richard E. Spelts, Jr.
- <sup>9</sup>Richard E. Peterson and John A. Bilorusky, *May* 1970: The Campus Aftermath of Cambodia and Kent State (Berkeley: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1971), 5.
  - 10 Spelts Commission Report, 2.
- "Summary Minutes" of a meeting held to respond to the Spelts Commission Report, Sept. 21, 1970. Spelts Commission file, box 89, Centralized files of Chancellors, University Archives. Present at this meeting were Lincoln Campuses President Joseph Soshnik, Dean of Faculties C. Peter Magrath, Executive Dean of Student Affairs G. Robert Ross, ASUN President Tiwald, and other student and faculty representatives.
- <sup>12</sup> Tiwald made this suggestion at a meeting at the United Ministries for Higher Education Building (the present UNL Culture Center) on the evening of May 4. Spelts Commission Report, 3.
- <sup>13</sup> Jim Pedersen, editorial, *Daily Nebraskan*, May 4, 1970, 1. The paper's staff had planned to cease publication with the May 4 edition, but due to the occupation of the ROTC Building and subsequent student strike, publication continued until May 22.
- <sup>14</sup> The paper's full title in 1970 was the *Lincoln Evening Journal and Nebraska State Journal*.

  Pedersen's editorial was noted in the article entitled "Students Protest at Draft Board," I.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970), 17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 17-18.

- 15 Daily Nebraskan, May 4, 1970, 1.
- 16 Spelts Commission Report, 2.
- <sup>17</sup> The summary of events at Kent State given in the *Report of the President's Commission* indicates that the shootings occurred at "approximately 12:25 P.M." (p. 273). Since Ohio is in the eastern time zone, the time in Lincoln would have been about 11:25 A.M., or approximately two hours before the scheduled rally. Dan Ladely recalls that news of Kent State had reached campus by the time of the rally. Ladely, interview by author.
- <sup>18</sup> Joseph Soshnik, interview by author, Omaha, Nebr., Nov. 20, 1992. In 1970 the chief officer of each University of Nebraska campus held the title of "president," while the chief of the system's central administration held the title of "chancellor." This is the exact opposite of the present situation in which chancellors oversee individual campuses and report to a single university-wide president.
  - 19 Ladely, interview by author.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid. The Spelts Commission Report on p. 2 also identifies Medcalf as the original leader of the march, but does not mention that Medcalf had been a scheduled speaker; Dr. Paul Olson (UNL professor of English and former chair of the Faculty Senate Human Rights Committee), interview by author, Lincoln, Nebr., Nov. 12, 1992. Olson had seen Medcalf earlier in the day and had been told of his intentions. Olson knew of no student group planning the march. Dan Ladely, who participated, remembers that most of the people who followed Medcalf to the draft board decided to do so on the spot. Ladely, interview by author.
- <sup>21</sup> Estimates of the crowd vary. The *Daily Nebraskan* estimated 50. See John Dvorak, "Peace March Ends With Thirteen Arrests," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 5, 1970, 1. The Spelts Commission estimated 75 to 150. *Spelts Commission Report*, 2. Dan Ladely estimated 75. Ladely, interview by George S. Round, Nov. 4, 1976, transcript, box 17, Agricultural Communications Oral Histories, University Archives.
- <sup>22</sup> Spelts Commission Report, 2; Ladely, interview by author. The Spelts Commission Report confirms Rozman's presence.
- <sup>23</sup> Dvorak, "Peace March Ends," 1. Eleven people were charged with disturbing the peace and refusing an order to disperse, one was charged with destruction of property for breaking a window, and one was charged with using "obscene or indecent language." Most of the cases were later dismissed. Spelts Commission Report, 13; "Students Protest at Draft Board," Lincoln Evening Journal, May 4, 1970, 1, 8.
- <sup>24</sup> Soshnik, interview by author.
- <sup>25</sup> "Students Protest at Draft Board," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 4, 1970, 1, 8.
- <sup>26</sup> Ladely, interview by author; *Spelts Commission Report*, 3, 6; *Daily Nebraskan*'s estimate of the initial wave of protesters was fifty. "ROTC Building Occupied," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 5, 1970, 2.

- <sup>27</sup> G. Robert Ross, interview by George S. Round, June 16, 1976, transcript, box 21, Agricultural Communications Oral Histories, University Archives; Spelts Commission Report, 3.
- <sup>28</sup> Gail Gade and Ken Markle (UNL police lieutenant in 1970, later a captain), interview by George S. Round, Aug. 7, 1979, transcript, Agricultural Communications Oral Histories, Markle was also present that night and concurred with Gade's testimony; Ross, interview by Round; Ladely, interview by Round. Ladely reaffirmed this testimony in an interview with the author on Nov. 12, 1992.
  - <sup>29</sup> Spelts Commission Report, 3, 4.
- <sup>30</sup> Ladely, interview by author. "ASUN Supports Strike," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 5, 1970, 2. The Free University was an informal student-faculty forum for discussion and experimental education. Olson, interview by author.
- <sup>31</sup> Soshnik thought it would be useful for the liaison committee to observe the sit-in, act as a communication link with the faculty as a whole, and perhaps offer suggestions on how to handle the situation. Richard Gilbert and Norman Rosenberg were among the committee members present that night. Soshnik, interview by author, Nov. 20, 1992. Paul Olson, although not a member of the committee, was also in the building during much of the night. Olson, interview by author.
- 32 Spelts Commission Report, 4.
- <sup>33</sup> Soshnik, interview by author; *Spelts Commission Report*, 17.
- <sup>34</sup> Ladely, interview by author, Soshnik, interview by author. Ladely recalls that Rozman did advise student negotiators, but denies that Rozman was able to prevent an agreement. Ladely, interview by author.
- 35 Rozman's case will be more fully discussed later.
- <sup>36</sup> Spelts Commission Report, 5. The full text of the statement appears as "Exhibit A," following p. 26 of the Spelts Commission Report. The provision that no disciplinary action would be taken against those arrested at the Terminal Building was not really a concession to the sit-in, as Soshnik had intended all along to leave the matter in the hands of municipal authorities. Soshnik, interview by author, Nov. 20, 1909
- <sup>37</sup> Ladely recalls a specific instance in which he found someone rifling desk drawers in an office and asked the person to leave. Ladely, interview by author.
- $^{38}\,\textit{Spelts}$  Commission Report, 5-6; Soshnik, interview by author.
- 39 Spelts Commission Report, 6.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. It should also be mentioned that Ross was aware of threats by ROTC students against the demonstrators as well. See Ken Neundorf, "Soshnik, Ross Deny Pressure," *Lincoln Star*, May 9, 1970, I; Soshnik, interview by author.

- <sup>41</sup> Bill Smitherman, "M & N Incidents Recapped," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 6, 1970, 2.
- <sup>42</sup> From the text of Soshnik's 9 A.M. statement, *Spelts Commission Report*, 6.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., 6-8; Smitherman, "M & N Incidents Recapped," 2.
- <sup>44</sup> Ladely, interview by author and interview by Round. Paul Olson recalls that some students were worried that the National Guard might be used against them. Olson, interview by author. Soshnik has consistently denied that Varner or the Regents pressed him to seek an injunction and clear the building (see, for example, Neundorf, "Soshnik, Ross Deny Pressure," *Lincoln Star*, May 9, 1970, 1. He repeated that denial in an interview with the author on Nov. 20. 1992.
  - 45 Soshnik, interview by author.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.; Olson, interview by author; *Spelts Commission Report*, 8.
- <sup>47</sup> Ladely, interview by author; *Spelts Commission Report*, 17.
  - 48Spelts Commission Report, 8.
- <sup>49</sup> Harold Simmons, "150 Law Officers Placed On Standby at Armory," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 5, 1970, I; "Law Officers Have Disbanded," ibid., May 6, 1970, 21.
- <sup>50</sup> Soshnik, interview by author; "Tiemann: No Plan to Call Guard," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 5, 1970, 6; Simmons, "Law Officers On Standby," l.
- <sup>51</sup> "Tiemann Says Lawless Acts Undermine Dissent," *North Platte Telegraph*, May 5, 1970, 1; "Tiemann: No Plan to Call Guard," 6. Paul Olson and Joseph Soshnik both recall that they were surprised that Tiemann was so quick to publicly mention possible use of the National Guard, especially since there had been no significant violence on campus yet. Olson, interview by author and Soshnik, interview by author.
- <sup>52</sup> Marie Shannon, "Governor Covers Many Topics in Talk," *North Platte Telegraph*, May 6, 1970, 6.
- 53 "Tiemann: No Plan to Call Guard," 6; "Tiemann is On the Alert," Grand Island Independent, May 6, 1970, 1; "Guardsmen Will Be Armed For Any Major Disturbance," Lincoln Star, May 9, 1970, 4. This statement worried organizers of a peace rally scheduled for Saturday, May 9, as well as university officials. Soshnik and Olson each contacted the governor and asked him not to use the guard. Soshnik, interview by author, and Olson, interview by author.
- <sup>54</sup> For example: Tiemann to Randy Reeves, Lincoln, May 19, 1970; and Tiemann to Edward Hart, Lincoln, May 14, 1970; "University of Nebraska Strike" file, RG1, SG 39, box 95, Norbert Tiemann Papers, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln.
- <sup>55</sup> See for example "NU Students Hear Exon, Tiemann," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, Oct. 22, 1970, 9.
- <sup>56</sup> "ASUN Supports Strike," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 5, 1970, I. ASUN President Tiwald expressed his oppo-

sition to an occupation of the building before it even happened.

- 57 Spelts Commission Report, 8.
- 58 "Students to Strike," Lincoln Star, May 6, 1970, 1.
- <sup>59</sup> Carol Anderson, "Students Call Strike," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 6, 1970, 1, 3. Al Siporin, one of the student sit-in leaders, agreed. See Lloyd MacDowell, "Faculty at NU Votes Sympathy, Provides for Voluntary Strike," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 5, 1970, 1.
- <sup>60</sup> Estimates of the number of people in attendance ranged from 4,000 to almost 10,000. The *Spelts Commission Report* estimated 4,000 to 9,000 students present at the Coliseum meeting on p. 9, while giving a total enrollment figure of "approximately 18,800" on p. 18. The *Lincoln Evening Journal* ran a photo of the crowd at the Coliseum on p. 48 of its May 6, 1970, edition. The caption accompanying the photo estimated the crowd at "nearly 10,000" students.
- <sup>61</sup> Lloyd MacDowell, "NU Students Crowd Coliseum to Vote for Voluntary Strike," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 6, 1970, 48.
- 62 Ibid. MacDowell estimated that about threefourths of those present voted for the strike. Opponents of the strike were later to claim that the meeting was not truly representative of the students, because only a minority of them were present. Stock, interview by author.
- 63 Spelts Commission Report, 11. The YAF was a national organization of politically conservative students, which had existed at least since 1968, while the CUE sprang up in May 1970 as a response to the strike. Many CUE members were not necessarily supportive of Nixon's Cambodia policy, but merely opposed shutting down the university. YAF members were more likely to support Nixon's decision. Stock, interview by author.
- 64 "4500 Students at Nebraska Vote to Adopt 3-Day Boycott," Omaha World-Herald, May 6, 1970, 8.
- 65 Marsha Bangert, "Coordinating Center," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 7, 1970, 1.
- <sup>66</sup> In fact, ROTC faculty participated, as did President Soshnik. *Spelts Commission Report*, 10.
- <sup>67</sup> Dan Ladely and Phil Medcalf were two of the committee's members. "Seven Students Head Strike Committee," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 7, 1970, 3.
- 68 Spelts Commission Report, 9.
- <sup>69</sup> The estimated rally attendance was four to six thousand, while fifteen thousand people watched the spring game. "More Fans Than Protestors," *Daily Nebraskan*, May 11, 1970, 3.
- Jan Parks, "University Meeting Monday," Daily Nebraskan, May 11, 1970, 1.
- 71 Spelts Commission Report, 10-11.
- 72 Olson, interview by author.
- <sup>73</sup> John Dvorak, "Faculty Nixes Recess Plans," Daily Nebraskan, May 22, 1970, I; Ladely, interview by author.

- <sup>74</sup> Spelts Commission Report, 11-12; Olson, interview by author.
  - 75 Soshnik, interview by author.
- 76 "'Inquiry Not a Threat'," Daily Nebraskan, May 21, 1970, 1. The Spelts Commission Report has been cited numerous times in this paper. The date of the report and the members of the commission are listed on the letter of transmittal from Spelts to the Regents, a copy of which is included with the copy of the report itself in the Rozman file.
  - 77 Spelts Commission Report, 1, 19.
- <sup>78</sup> "Majority Polled Here Approve Having Troops in Cambodia." *Lincoln Evening Journal*, May 7, 1970, 1.
- <sup>79</sup> "Tired of Riots," *Scottsbluff Star-Herald*, May 12, 1970, 2; "Nebraska Legionnaires Voice Views on Unrest," *Grand Island Independent*, May 16, 1970, 1.
- <sup>80</sup> Don Walton, "Several State Senators Express Displeasure Over NU Student Protests," *Lincoln Star*, May 15, 1970, 17.
- <sup>81</sup> David Tishendorf, "Angry Senator Says Students Face 'Paddle'," *Omaha World-Herald*, May 9, 1970, 17; "Holmquist Asks Probe by Board," *Grand Island Independent*, May 19, 1970, 5; "Board Decides to Skip Inquiry Into Dissent at NU," *Scottsbluff Star-Herald*, May 22, 1970, 22.
- 82 "'Lost Time' Deduction Proposed For Colleges," North Platte Telegraph, May 7, 1970, 1.
- <sup>83</sup> Tishendorf, "Angry Senator...," 17; Bob Nelson, "New Faces Will Occupy Four Spots On Expanded NU Board of Regents," *Lincoln Evening Journal*, Nov. 4, 1970, 40. As the article's title indicates, the board was expanded from six to eight members that year.
- <sup>84</sup> Resolution of the Board of Regents directing that Rozman's contract not be renewed, Information from Regents' Meeting of Feb. 6, 1971, Rozman file.
- <sup>85</sup> Regents' resolution of Feb. 6, 1971, 3, 6; "Report of Special Faculty Fact-finding Committee Re: Stephen Rozman Matter to the Board of Regents," Feb. 1, 1971, "Information from Regents' Meeting of Feb. 6, 1971," 16, Rozman file.
- 86 "Report of Fact-finding Committee," 17; Soshnik, interview by author, Nov. 20, 1992; statement from the "Special Faculty Fact-finding Committee Appointed in Connection With the Stephen Rozman Matter" to the Liaison Committee of the Faculty Senate concerning "The Regents' Resolution and Relevant Recommendations from the Committee" [February 1971], 5-6, Rozman file.
- 87 In addition to the four new Regents elected in November 1970, Kermit Hansen was appointed by Governor Tiemann to replace a regent who resigned to accept a position on the Republican National Committee. Soshnik, interview by author. It should be added that Dr. Soshnik merely provided a fact upon which the author's interpretation is partially based.
- 88 "Appeal Lost By Rozman," *Lincoln Star*, Oct. 17, 1972, 1.

- 89 The full text of LB 445 is attached to a memo from George Round, then UNL director of information, to President Soshnik, stating that the bill had been passed by a 41-0 vote. Round to Soshnik. memo, Apr. I, 1971. "Faculty Responsibility, Faculty Dismissal, and Non-Reappointment" file, box 62, Centralized files of Chancellors, University Archives. LB445 was still in force as of 1987. Revised Statutes of Nebraska (1987), sections 85-601 through 85-605. Bob Nelson, "Rozman, Regents Back Campus Disturbance Bill," Lincoln Evening Journal, Feb. 16, 1971, 5. Rozman favored the bill because in its original form it provided for "due process" for accused faculty and students. The bill as passed exempted faculty on "probationary" (non-tenured) appointments from this provision. See text of bill in Round memo to Soshnik, Apr. 1, 1971.
  - 90 Gade and Markle, interview by Round.
- <sup>91</sup> Reagan ordered the University of California campuses closed on Wednesday, May 6, 1970. Peterson and Bilorusky, *May 1970*, 104-5.
- 92 See note 10.
- <sup>93</sup> This number refers to the number of responses received by the researchers. Peterson and Bilorusky, *May 1970*, 10.
- <sup>94</sup> Eighty-six percent of the 138 large schools were public institutions. Peterson and Bilorusky, *May* 1970, 43.
- <sup>95</sup> I am indebted to Peterson and Bilorusky, May 1970, 42-45, for the data appearing in the preceding paragraph.
- <sup>96</sup> Tables in Peterson and Bilorusky, May 1970, 42-47; for examples of the small college scene in Nebraska, see "Small State Schools are Relatively Quiet," Lincoln Evening Journal, May 6, 1970, 21; and "Demonstrations Are Denounced by State Student Government Leader," Omaha World-Herald, May 6, 1970, 34.