

From

Sen. Styles Bridges
Room 145
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

For Release

To AMS, Monday, Aug. 22, 1949
To RADIO, 6pm (EST) Sunday,
August 21, 1949

BI-PARTISAN SENATE GROUP
CALLS WHITE PAPER 'ALIBI',
URGES MORE AID FOR CHINA

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- Immediate and adequate assistance for the free areas in China was urged today by four Senate leaders, both Republican and Democrat, in a statement attacking the State Department's recent White Paper on China as an attempt to whitewash a "wishful, do-nothing policy."

"It is inevitable that bureaucratic agencies, having taken a position, are reluctant to acknowledge that that position was wrong," the statement declared. "Better evidence of such a situation cannot be found than the White Paper."

The four Senators were Sen. Pat McCarran (D., Nev.), Sen. Styles Bridges (R., N.H.), Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry (R., Neb.), and Sen. William F. Knowland (R., Calif.). They called their statement a "memorandum" and emphasized that it was not intended as a complete, categorical reply to the 1054-page White Paper.

They called for "tangible assistance" to the free areas in China and cooperation with bordering countries, which, they said, were threatened if the Communists gained control of China.

(more)

"After one global war fought to protect our shores against invasion," the bi-partisan statement declared, "the State Department should have learned that no line of our defense can be left unguarded. The United States wisely adopts a military assistance program for Europe and joins a North Atlantic pact. But that does not justify neglecting China and the Far East nor brushing off the crisis there with a long apologia for State Department errors.

"The Communist crisis in China is not a domestic problem of China alone as, apparently, the White Paper assumes. If China should fall completely into the hands of the Communists, it would mean the eventual end of progress toward democracy in Asia. Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist commander, already has proclaimed his intention of joining the world revolution under the Soviet Union's banner."

One of the main contentions of the four Senators was that the State Department followed a mistaken do-nothing policy in hopes that the Chinese Communists would not take dictation from Soviet Russia. On the basis of this assumption, they said, the State Department tried to achieve a coalition between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists. This, they said, was Gen. George C. Marshall's mission.

Although the failure of that mission is now regarded generally as fortunate in the light of the Chinese Communists' declared loyalty to Russia and the Communist domination of coalition government which have arisen in Europe, the memorandum declared that

(more)

penalties were imposed on China's government for its refusal to meet Communist terms. The statement quoted the White Paper on the fact that General Marshall himself imposed an embargo on arms to the Chinese Government after his return from China.

A second major challenge to the White Paper was the Senators' charge that a misleadingly large figure was given for United States military aid. In a detailed breakdown, the memorandum cited the inclusion of purely civilian UNRRA funds in the over-all figure of aid to China and pointed out that these were dispensed to both Government and Communist-held areas. The Senators also charged that arms actually sent to the Chinese Government were over-valued and that some abandoned surplus material which was sold to China had no combat value.

Instead of recognizing past errors now, "while there yet may be time," the Senators charged, Secretary of State Dean Acheson erroneously declares that the cause in China is lost and invents a new set of reasons for persisting in a State Department policy which opposes the United States' historic "Open Door" in China. Actually, the memorandum said, the forces of the Chinese Government still hold a larger area than after the first year of war with Japan and have both the manpower and the will to fight. What they lack is munitions, it added.

"If our policy is to contain Communism the world over," the Senators replied to the White Paper, "then there can be no justification for the policy of our State Department in ignoring the plight

(more)

- 4 -

of China and discounting the relative importance of the Far East. We are spending millions to fight a cold war against Communists throughout the rest of the world and approximately one per cent in the important Pacific area. In China there is a hot war. The Chinese Government must have immediate and adequate military aid."

- 0 -

(FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED)

From

Sen. Styles Bridges
Room 145
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

For Release

AMS, Monday, Aug. 22, 1949
Radio, 6pm (EST) Sunday,
August 21, 1949

MEMORANDUM ON

THE WHITE PAPER ON

U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Sen. Pat McCarran
Sen. Styles Bridges
Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry
Sen. William F. Knowland

THE BIG ALIBI

The State Department's White Paper on United States Relations with China is to a large extent a 1054-page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest with its ultimate threat to the peace of the world and our own national security.

It is an attempt to whitewash a policy which, in sum effect, has meant the desertion of China and has conveniently served Communist purposes. William Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party in the country, appealed to American Communists in 1945 to prevent United States intervention in China. "The war in China is the key to all problems of the international front," he said, "and it is here, above all else, where we have to deal the hardest blow ... on the international scale, the key task is to stop American intervention in China."

Fortunately, there may yet be time for the United States to prevent what the State Department fallaciously declares already to have happened.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson says the cause in China is lost. "A decision," he says, "was arrived at in China, if only a decision by default." Mr. Acheson has added his voice to that Chorus of Doom which, repeatedly now for several years, has sung a dirge for China's Government. The only wrong note is that the Chinese Republic refuses to die.

CHINA REFUSES TO QUIT

Even before the fall of Nanking in the Sino-Japanese war,

Japan made peace overtures to China through Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador to China, and these were repeated after the Chinese Government had evacuated Hankow. Japan was willing to restore the status quo prior to the Luchoo Bridge Incident provided only that China recognizes "Manchoukuo".

Considering the defeats China had suffered, these were not unattractive terms. But Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was determined to fight on. If he had not repeatedly turned down Japanese offers of peace, and had become a partner of the Greater Asia scheme, the Pacific war might have taken a quite different turn. While battered China was holding on, the Japanese were taking Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, Bataan and Corregidor, moving into New Guinea and the Solomons and closing the Burma Road, China's only overland supply line.

China still has not succumbed. The Chinese Government still holds a greater area of the country than it did after the first year of war with Japan. What the Chinese Army lacks more than anything else are the weapons which the State Department dangerously advises be withheld from its armies. Against the Government troops, deprived of arms and equipment by this shortsighted State Department policy, the Communists fight with a wealth of weapons. Most of these - as the White Paper points out - were surrendered by the Japanese to the Russians. What the White Paper has neglected to state, however, is that reports indicate that some of the Communists' U.S.-manufactured weapons have been diverted to them out of the

United States' wartime \$11,000,000,000 Lend-Lease to Soviet Russia. For propaganda purposes, Communists have claimed to have captured it all from the National Government.

WAITING-FOR-THE-DUST-TO-SETTLE POLICY

The White Paper says China lost huge quantities of munitions sent from the United States. What it does not say is that China has suffered from an embargo on United States military aid.

The Chinese Government has received from the United States more criticism than help, more advice than material support. When General Marshall acted as a mediator in China, he could bring pressure on the Nationalist Government and not on the Communists because the Nationalist Government depended on the United States for arms and munitions while the Communists were amply supplied by Russia with captured Japanese arms.

When General Marshall failed to bring about a coalition government with the Communists in China, he blamed both sides but he imposed penalties only on the Government, which was denied further military supplies. General Marshall testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that he personally put an embargo on military supplies to China. This helped the Communists eliminate crack Government divisions. They were the veterans of Burma who had been given American equipment and training. Without ammunition, they were impotent and the Communists wiped them out in Manchuria.

General Marshall's personal embargo lasted almost a year, until the summer of 1947 when the sale of .792 rifle ammunition was

permitted. The Chinese Government received 130,000,000 rounds which it had ordered two years before. The ammunition was specially made for the so-called "Generalissimo rifle" and could not be obtained elsewhere.

No real post-war aid to China program started until the passage of the China Aid Act on April 3, 1948, and it is noteworthy that, even then, the first shipment--a meager 600 tons of ammunition and supplies--did not reach China until last December 15. Under the act, the United States made available to China a total sum of \$400,000,000. Of this, \$275,000,000 was earmarked for ECA civilian aid and the remaining \$125,000,000 ultimately was made available for military purposes. The arms and ammunition transferred under this appropriation was not at the United States Army's cost but much of it was at the much higher replacement value. Three-fourths of it was turned over to the United States Army at the Chinese Government's request so that it could supervise procurement for China. Less than 20 per cent of these procurement have been handled by the Chinese.

The impression is widespread in this country that China has received billions of dollars in post-war military aid from the United States. State Department figures add up to more than \$962,000,000. But they include \$300,000,000 charged as services for disarming and repatriating Japanese troops. The Chinese Government contends it has received vital arms and ammunition of a value of only \$110,000,000, and has documentary proof to that effect.

UNRRA

The White Paper runs the total grants up to a misleading and astronomical \$1,596,000,000. But it does this by including purely non-military ECA aid and \$474,000,000 in UNRRA grants. Not only were the UNRRA payments non-military but also they were shared impartially between the Government and Communist-controlled areas. Since the areas under the Communists were primarily food-producing, the Communists' needs were largely for clothing and medical supplies of which 52,000 tons were delivered to those areas.

PACIFIC SURPLUS

The impression is created that large amounts of military supplies were included in this sale. President Truman himself stated on December 18, 1946, that "aircraft, all non-demilitarized combat material and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. Thus no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement." On page 180, the White Paper notes General Marshall's assurances to the Communists that the surplus property contained no combat material.

Due to the tropical weather in the areas where the material was abandoned, it is understood that a great portion of it was in various stages of deterioration. As an example, in the sales agreement, a "truck" was defined as a vehicle "with less than 20 per cent of its parts missing." Approximately one-third of the total of "Pacific Surplus" is represented by vehicles of all kinds.

After one global war fought to protect our shores against invasion, the State Department should have learned that no line of our

defense can be left unguarded. The United States wisely adopts a military assistance program for Europe and joins a North Atlantic pact. But that does not justify neglecting China and the Far East nor brushing off the crisis there with a long apologia for State Department errors.

THE CHINA CRISIS IS A WORLD CRISIS

The Communist Crisis in China is not a domestic problem of China alone as, apparently, the White Paper assumes. If China should fall completely into the hands of the Communists, it would mean the eventual end of progress toward democracy in all Asia. Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist commander, already has proclaimed his intention of joining the world revolution under the Soviet Union's banner.

Victorious in China, the Communists inevitably would push into the Southeast Asia countries. Communist vanguards already are implanted in the Indies, in India, in Indo-China, in Malaya. Our own welfare no less than China's demands that this master plan of Soviet conquest be stopped. We cannot ignore the threat of a Sovietized Asia which would tip the delicate balance between the Communist and the free worlds. It would close the door of Asia to the West, deny markets and material for Western industry and give the Soviet Union manpower and resources for the ultimate blow for world domination, China is in peril, but, contrary to the State Department, it is not lost yet.

The United States spent its blood and wealth in part to protect the integrity of China in World War II. If China then was

important to the peace and security of the United States there seems to be no reason why China is of any less importance now. Certainly there is nothing less sinister about the Soviet plan of aggression, which knows no national boundaries, than there was in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity program.

If our policy still is to contain Communism the world over, then there can be no justification for the policy of our State Department in ignoring the plight of China and discounting the relative importance of the entire Far East. We are spending millions to fight a cold war against Communism throughout the rest of the world and approximately one percent in the important Pacific area. In China there is a hot war. The Chinese Government must have immediate and adequate military aid.

THE YALTA AGREEMENT

Worse than the White Paper's attempt to justify the past mistakes of United States policy, it clearly indicates that the State Department has found new excuses for prolonging them.

Until very recently, American Far East policy was based on the wishful theory that China's Communists were not Communists at all, just an inadvertently labelled group of agrarian reformers, despite the fact that they always have openly proclaimed themselves to be Communists. The State Department persisted in its do-nothing appeasement on the excuse that China's Communists would reject domination from the Kremlin and that a unified China would provide a basis for stability.

But that all blew up a few months ago. Mao and other Communist leaders settled any possibility of doubt with the declaration that "the people of China must side either with imperialism or socialism. There must be no exception, no third line of action. Straddling the fence is a futile thing ... We belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the USSR and we can only look for genuine friendly aid from that front." Last April the Chinese Communist Party officially proclaimed that in another World War they would "march forward hand in hand with the ally of China, Soviet Russia."

There is the reality. In the light of it, American Far East policy has blundered grievously. The Yalta Agreement becomes a sell-out of China. The State Department policy of trying to create a Chinese coalition with Communists becomes a colossal blunder.

The present State Department position persists in a breach of what had been the United States' consistent China Policy for a century, from 1843 to 1943. This was a policy of friendship and cooperation which had its strongest expression in John Hay's "Open Door." In many ways it was an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine for it attacked the theory that China could be colonized by European nations, partitioned or split up. Then as now, Russia coveted Manchuria and Korea as stepping stones to empire. Our historic policy was reaffirmed as recently as 1922 in the Nine-Power Treaty which still binds the United States and China.

Again on December 1, 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed with Generalissimo Chiang at Cairo a

declaration that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." A few days later this statement was repudiated at Teheran at the demand of Stalin.

Then, on February 11, 1945, at a secret meeting attended by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta, an agreement was reached which dealt the severest blow to China's chances for postwar peace and unity. In return for Russia's agreement to enter the war against Japan 90 days after the defeat of Germany, Stalin was rewarded with great concessions. Outer Mongolia was permanently detached from China. Russia was restored rights she had seized in Manchuria and which Japan had taken from her in 1904. The pact gave Russia a primary interest in the Port of Dairen and the two main Manchurian railroads and control of the naval base of Port Arthur.

This, in effect, was a trade of territory which did not belong to either the United States or Great Britain. It was a repudiation of the Cairo Declaration signed just fourteen months earlier. It vitiated the Chinese Government's twenty years of struggle against the Communists and made meaningless the Chinese people's eight years of war and misery. It is generally agreed now that this tragic and dishonoring agreement at Yalta is at the root of the present turmoil in China.

The White Paper said the agreement was made for military expediency and that "at no point did President Roosevelt consider that he was compromising vital Chinese interests." True, at that

time the atom bomb had not been dropped. But it was obvious that Russia would enter the Pacific war because Moscow could not have participated in the peace for Asia without having participated in the fighting for Asia. Cordell Hull had been assured in Moscow before Yalta that Russia would enter the war in the Pacific.

The Yalta agreement was made in secret. It was not until June 15, four months later, that Gen. Hurley, United States Ambassador in China, informed Generalissimo Chiang. The White Paper wryly notes, however, that from the Generalissimo's reaction he appeared to have learned about it from Stalin.

The Open Door that was shut by Yalta has remained closed although the State Department has had ample time to discern whether that immoral secret diplomacy compromised vital Chinese interests. The White Paper itself mentions assurances which Marshal Stalin gave Harry Hopkins in Moscow in May, 1945, that he proposed no alteration over the sovereignty of Manchuria or any other part of China, that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the only Chinese leader qualified to undertake the unification of China, that the Communist leaders were not as good or as well qualified, and that he would welcome Chinese civilian participation in the administration of Manchuria.

These were the assurances but they only underscore the fallacious belief that Stalin could be appeased into democratic cooperation. Yalta and State Department policy in Asia since then reflect the belief that post-war peace depended on cooperation of the two

opposing ideologies, therefore no sacrifice was too big. Instead, it encouraged and strengthened the Soviet expansionists, not only in China but also in Poland, Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Subsequent events proved the Soviet appetite increased with eating. Not until the Soviet influence in Poland, Hungary, Austria, Roumania, Bulgaria, Iran, Manchuria and Korea became entrenched, did the Western powers get nervous about the situation. It took the misery and suffering of the population of half of Europe and most of Asia to convince the Americans of their mistake.

But instead of facing facts in China and admitting its error, the State Department still buries its head in the sand and issues a White Paper. If one set of circumstances does not justify its policy, another set must be found. Now it says Nationalist China is dead and undermines the Kuomintang and the government. Worse than attempting now to whitewash its past mistakes, the State Department tries to prolong them.

MARSHALL URGED A COALITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS

Some nine months after Yalta, General Marshall was sent to China by President Truman to try to unite the country by peaceful means. The Soviet Union then was still viewed as a peace-loving democracy and the Chinese Communists as mere agrarian reformers unrelated to Moscow. The Marshall Mission was a sequence of Yalta, based on the assumption that the Communists could be appeased and that Russian-American friction in China could be held down. The Marshall Mission declared its aim as effectuating a coalition,

actually participated in negotiations and compelled the Chinese Government to sign several agreements. What it did not declare was the threat to withdraw United States support--as it later did--if the Government should refuse to settle on terms laid down by General Marshall.

China did not settle, and, therefore, paid its penalty when it approached the Export-Import Bank late in 1945 with applications for credits for rehabilitation needs. The White Paper says no action was taken on these requests "and in January 1946, the National Advisory Council, acting in accordance with General Marshall's recommendations, decided that a major program of financial assistance to China must await satisfactory political and economic developments in that country." General Marshall, therefore, was able to use funds for rehabilitation as a lever to attempt to achieve his political objective of forcing the Chinese Government to accept the Communists.

The White Paper now contends that the Marshall Mission did not envisage a coalition between the Nationalists and Communists. On page 273, the White Paper quotes the President on March 11, 1948 as having "expressed his hope that the Chinese liberals would be taken into the Government but stated that 'we did not want any Communists in the Government of China or anywhere else if we could help it.'"

But the strife in China exists between the Chinese Government and the Communists. Marshall's Mission was to unite the country

by peaceful means. If that does not mean by agreement between the two sides, then it must mean by the capitulation of one or the other and that was not possible. The State Department would know this if it attempted to reconcile what is quoted above with page 211 in which it quotes General Marshall as summing up China's situation on December 1945, "with the statement that the Communists were too large a military and civil force to be ignored ... He believed, therefore, that it was imperative that efforts should be taken to bring them into the Government ... "

It is obvious now that State Department failure was a fortunate one for had it succeeded the stories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would have been repeated in China. We know that whenever a government is forced into a coalition with Communists, the result is domination of the government by the Communists. Wherever they are a minority, their technique is to rule by coalition. The "people's democracy" of which China hears is not a Chinese invention. It is a special term in the Marxist lexicon which denotes a form of transition government that is socialist in theory but tolerates capitalist elements. Like the Eastern European Communist rulers, the Chinese Communist leaders are Soviet-trained and look to Moscow both for ideology and orders.

CHINA PROVES ITS MORALE

Not the least of the White Paper's canards is the statement that China has lost fighting morale. The fact that it still has

armies in the field attests not only to its fighting heart but also to the use to which it has put such material as it has been able to acquire. The State Department mentions the Government armies' losses. The Communists themselves admitted on July 19th to 1,432,000 casualties and they hardly would be accused of exaggerating such statistics. The White Paper does not mention the Communist losses.

Long before many of us here in the United States awoke to the threat of Communism, Chiang Kai-shek was fighting it. His beliefs and tactics have been criticized but still he has not wavered. He did not capitulate in the face of tremendous difficulties and he chose to go into retirement when pressure was brought upon him to surrender to the Communists. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year on the China Aid Bill contained this passage:

"In the judgment of the Committee, the Nationalist Government of China, led for twenty years through tremendous difficulties by the selfless patriotism of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, represent our common contest against threats to international peace and security and against Communist aggression and deserves support within our resources as proposed in this act. Further, the aid authorized by this act is a tangible proof of American interest in the independence and integrity of China, in the welfare of the Chinese people, and in stabilized peace in the Far East."

CHINA REFUSED TO LISTEN

China, which has received more advice than tangible help from the United States, now is accused by the State Department of having refused to be guided by this counsel. The main advice, backed up with penalties, was to form a coalition with the Communists. There no longer can be any question but that such advice was wrong on the inevitable terms of any coalition with Communists. China should not be blamed, but congratulated, for having had foresight to be first in the field against Communist aggression and to have persevered in the struggle through two decades of grievous hardship. The White Paper fails to whitewash the errors of the State Department. It does underline the immediate necessity of the utmost support of the United States for a staunch ally.

CONCLUSION

The White Paper utterly fails in whatever it may have been intended to accomplish. It could probably be compared to a legal plea of "Confession and Avoidance." Yet it fails in this for such a plea must have color and, certainly, the confession in this instance entirely lacks color. It does avoid the issue--the one from which there is no escape. It attempts to leave the impression that the decision has already been written. To accept this means the decision has been made in Moscow. It may be that is where many people prefer that it be made, but the policies of the U.S. Government enunciated so clearly in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as well as the China Aid Act of 1948, cannot so lightly be dismissed.

Certainly the ideals of the Nationalist Government, as contained in its Constitution, in its legislative and judicial systems, are those to which this country, as well as every independent democracy, can well subscribe.

Although men may have been derelict in their duty and in the exercise of the office they have held, it does not settle the matter to attempt to write off the entire Nationalist regime for that leaves the issue still to be met. That issue is the same today as it was in 1945 and 1946. Certainly the future is not as cloudy now as then with respect to the opposition. If nothing else has come out of this catastrophe, it is a clarification of those who are sincerely against Communism and those who are not so sincere. It is inevitable that bureaucratic agencies, having taken a position, are reluctant to acknowledge that that position was wrong. Better evidence of such a situation cannot be found than the White Paper. It meticulously avoided the inclusion of matters which reflect upon it the same degree of misadministration, lack of integrity, and wilful neglect of the will of the people as expressed through its Congress. It does not indicate that the majority of the economic assistance given by the U.S. was administered in such a way as to detract from the Nationalist Government rather than to encourage faith of the Chinese people in its government. Certainly the expenditure of such sums of money, even though they did add to the material betterment of some of the Chinese people, did not contribute in the least part to the objective of encouraging the

people to support their government in the stand it was making against the Communists. In fact, the administration of much of this aid was on a basis entirely divorced from the political considerations so that the recipients were always under the impression that the aid received from the U.S. was not or had no connection with their government and that whether under the Communists or the Nationalists, the aid was for the people. This certainly is not the same course that has been followed in Europe. The policy there is clear that the aid given is in support of the democratic governments as opposed to the Communists.

Such examples merely emphasized the degree to which the State Department has been inept in its handling of U.S. foreign policy in the field of ideology. The issue is not solved nor is it clarified by the White Paper. The issue is as it has always been, the containment of Communism. The solution of the issue is not easier today because of the events contained in the White Paper. They are, however, susceptible of solution and if they are to be solved, certainly they must be solved by people with more imagination than the White Paper indicates is contained in the State Department.

Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, in his letter transmitting to the Congress the Department of State's White Paper, concludes:

"One point, however, is clear. Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's

neighbors, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening international peace and security.

"Meanwhile our policy will continue to be based upon our own respect for the Charter, our friendship for China, and our traditional support for the Open Door and for China's independence and administrative and territorial integrity."

Thus, in effect, Secretary Acheson writes off loss of all of China to the Russia-directed Communists and retreats to the borders of China. He serves notice that if the Communist regime of China lends itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism against China's neighbors, the United States would consider such action a violation of the United Nations Charter.

The United Nations could perform helpful assistance in focusing opinion of the free world on Russian aggression, but effective measures for action could be blocked by Russia's veto in the Security Council.

We submit that despite all the evidence that the United States policy regarding expansion of Russian aims in China has been a failure in protecting the interests of the United States, he is still vacillating when the situation cries aloud for decisive forthright action to retrieve losses already sustained.

Secretary Acheson belatedly recognizes in the above quoted

statement that, perhaps, Soviet Russia may be shown to have had imperialistic aims in trying to overrun China. With the evidence so plain that the Communists' armies in China are Russia-directed, Secretary Acheson's policy of retreat to the borders of China is illogical and certainly not good strategy. There is no publicly revealed evidence that Secretary Acheson is making any forthright efforts for unifying China's neighbors against the oncoming Red armies. His effort to make Chiang Kai-shek a scapegoat for the blunders of present and past administrations in Washington is shallow. It has been rejected by every competent observer of the tragic record of betrayal of China running back years.

We believe Communist control of China would endanger gravely America's strategic position in the Pacific. There is amply substantiated evidence in the files of the State Department and the Department of National Defense that the Communists through their fifth columns of infiltrators already have begun to terrorize countries bordering China.

Much of China is still free of Red armies. In view of all of the disquieting developments, we submit that it is high time--the hour is getting late--for President Truman to institute a forthright policy of tangible assistance to those free areas in China, and to get on with cooperation of bordering countries for their mutual defense.

(END)