

GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK: THE NEWSPAPERMAN

By Walter Christensen,

An address given at the annual meeting of the Nebraska State Historical Society in presenting a painting of Senator Hitchcock to the Society.

It would be presumptuous of me to attempt to give an estimate or deliver a eulogy on the life and works of Gilbert M. Hitchcock. Since coming here this evening I have seen a number of people who knew Senator Hitchcock intimately before I was born. They followed his career as a young workman in Omaha, as a courageous young publisher, and as Congressman and Senator of the United States. I feel that nothing I can say would add to the stature of his statesmanship or to the esteem in which he is held by his fellow Nebraskans.

I represent here tonight a group of people who worked closely with Mr. Hitchcock, and who are still active in the ownership, management and operation of the newspaper which he founded in Omaha. They wish to pay this tribute to him not because of the statesmanship for which he is known in other states, but because they consider him a loyal son of Nebraska, a distinguished citizen of his own community, and a publisher of the first rank in America. It was as a publisher that we of the World-Herald staff came to love Senator Hitchcock. He was a newspaperman's newspaperman. The first issue of the World, which appeared upon the streets of Omaha some fifty-one years ago this fall announced that its one purpose was to print the news, all of the news, in a brief and comprehensive manner, and to keep

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the spotlight constantly upon the conduct of public affairs. Those of us who survive him know how well he continued through his career to follow those principles.

The appearance of the World was greeted with mingled feelings by its journalistic contemporaries. The Omaha Bee described it as one of those mushrooms which flourish and die in Omaha each succeeding season. A few years later, however, when the World was making itself felt as a newspaper, the Bee editor referred to the "elongated ears of the editor of the World", to which Mr. Hitchcock replied, "Long ears we have, my dear, the better to hear the news". More charitable was the reaction of the Lincoln Journal. "The World", it said, "Is a newsy non-partisan sheet which will be kept clean and wholesome. While those are good words in general, it cannot operate in that way in Omaha." "All right," replied Mr. Hitchcock, "When the World fails in Omaha it will move to Lincoln." Happily the move was never necessary. The World Herald and Nebraska State Journal are still separated by some fifty-odd miles, and, I might add, still exchanging mutual compliments.

It is difficult to imagine today the commotion, and in some quarters the consternation which greeted the first appearance of the Evening World. You couldn't imagine that a newspaper given over entirely to news and an independent policy would manage to survive the first dreadful year that its contemporary mentioned. You can't imagine a newspaper that was not devoted to partisanship and political plunder; which didn't propose to cover up the crimes and misdeeds of its friends, but to cite progress and

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glorious deeds in their stead. You couldn't imagine that this little newspaper, without any particular standing, could manage to exist standing solidly on its own feet. It created, I believe, a good deal of sensation in that community at that time. I have heard Mr. Hitchcock speak of it a good many times. He stated the case himself in an early issue, "The World stands fairly and frankly upon a platform alone. It believes there is room for a newspaper of virtue in the state. It has no alliances of any kind." That particular paragraph was read to me from a yellowed clipping Mr. Hitchcock took out of his safenet more than a year before he died, and I was interested enough to make a copy of it at that time. It was a thing which he was very proud of, and which he considered set the key for the publishing years that followed.

Mr. Hitchcock and his associates made the attempt to operate an independent newspaper because they had supreme confidence in the merit of the product which they had for sale. That product was honest and unbiased news. If he were here I am sure he would be the first to confess that he had never been able entirely to live up to his purpose, and that he had during his career made a number of errors. He was as ready to confess his own mistakes and his own errors as any great man that it has ever been my privilege to know. His policies during nearly fifty years of newspapering were of the very highest, and almost invariably -- I would say invariably, except for the very warm denial that I would receive from the Senator if he were here in person -- for the best interests of his community. He made the attempt, and as I look about Nebraska today and see the very large number of fine newspapers that are now being published in this commonwealth --

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not only in large cities such as the one in which we are meeting, but in a great many smaller towns -- and as I see that the editors of those newspapers have the courage and decency to fight for what they believe is the right thing, and to fight without fear of the reprisals from any worthy opposition; then, I say, I am very thankful for the life in this state of Senator Hitchcock. That is why tonight his former associates are pleased and delighted at the opportunity to present to the Nebraska State Historical Society a portrait by a distinguished Nebraska painter, J. Laurie Wallace, of Gilbert M. Hitchcock.

Nebraska, the World War and
the World Peace.

Gilbert M. Hitchcock

Before the Nebraska State Historical Society, 1925

In the late afternoon of June 30th 1914 an old rancher who lived out in the Nebraska sandhills about 20 miles from Alliance stopped at the cross roads as he neared his old ranch and got from the rural free delivery box the mail that had been deposited there by the carrier during the day. Then he jogged on to his ranch, put up his team, did his chores, had his supper and sat himself down on his porch to read his daily paper. He was a "Kincaider" owning a broad extent of sandhill country over which his cattle roamed, poor in cash assets and looking forward to a hard and unpromising future. Upon this land was a large alkali pond worse than worthless with its white encrusted border around its bitter waters. It was a blot on the landscape.

We will call the old man Kraus. Either that was his name or quite near it. Like many of his neighbors he was land poor -- a cattle man and a pioneer.

He opened his paper adjusted his spectacles and began to read. Looking first at the market reports to see how live stock was selling he then turned to the news and his eye fell upon this telegram:

" ARCHDUKE ASSASSINATED

A Serbian Assassin Kills the Heir to
the Austrian Throne.

" Vienna Austria, June 28th.

News came to Vienna today that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand heir to the Austrian Throne had been assassinated while on a visit to Sarajevo in the province of Bosnia. The assassin was a Serbian and used a deadly bomb. It is thought he had accomplices in Serbia. He was seized and imprisoned."

Kraus felt but slight interest in this particular item of news and hardly gave it a thought as he passed on to news nearer home. And yet that event which meant so little to him at the time was destined to make him very rich, destroy empires, create new nations, cost the lives of millions of men, double the cost of living in the United States and plunge our country into debt to the extent of 26 billion dollars.

The preliminaries to this great change came thick and fast.

Austria at once set on foot an investigation and learned that the murder plot had been hatched in the Serbian capital.

On July 23d 1914 Austria having finished her examination delivered to Serbia an ultimatum making extreme demands that Serbia suppress anti-Austrian sentiment, punish those guilty of cooperating with the assassin, apologize for the outrage, admit Austrian officials to a share in the investigation of the conspiracy and to the punishment of the guilty. These and other humiliating demands must be acted upon within 5 days.

July 24 - Russia asked Austria to extend the time limit and Great Britain proposed a four power intervention.

July 25 - Austria sent to the Powers copies of the evidence showing the nature of the plot. Serbia replied to the ultimatum accepting part of the terms only and at the same time ordered a mobilization while the Austrian legation left Serbia. Germany declined to mediate between Austria and Serbia but proposed mediation between Russia and Austria. Russia ordered mobilization. Great Britain asked Austria to extend the 5 day time limit and suspend hostilities.

July 26 - Russia proposed direct negotiations with Austria. France and Italy accepted a four power conference in London.

July 27 - The Kaiser suddenly returned from his Norway cruise to Pottsdam. Austria notified Russia she will respect Serbian independence and integrity. Russia agreed to four power conference.

July 28 - Austria breaks off negotiations with Russia, refused four power mediation declared war on Serbia and mobilized. Great Britain asked Germany for her plan of mediation between Russia and Austria.

July 29 - Germany attempted to secure neutrality of Great Britain in case of war between Russia and Austria. Great Britain replied that if France is involved Great Britain will support her.

July 30 - Austria on German advice agreed to reopen negotiations with Russia on certain conditions. Germany asked Russia to explain her mobilization. Russia agreed to stop if Austria will respect Serbian sovereignty. Negotiations fail and Russia pushed mobilization. France reminded Great Britain of her naval agreement. Great Britain refused to remain neutral as asked by Germany on condition that French territory be respected and proposed that Germany force mediation.

July 31 - Austria offered to accept four power mediation without suspending temporary measures against Serbia. Germany refused to press Austria as long as Russia mobilizes and sends ultimatum to Russia and France. Germany also refused to answer about respecting neutrality of Belgium in event of war. France agreed to respect it.

August 1st - Austria pushed mobilization but continued negotiation with Russia. Germany orders general mobilization and declared war on Russia. France ordered general mobilization. Great Britain refused Germany's request to secure French neutrality and to remain neutral herself on condition that Germany respect Belgian neutrality. Belgium declared she will defend her neutrality and Italy declared for neutrality.

August 2nd - Great Britain promised naval aid to France in the event of attack. Germany demanded of Belgium free passage of German troops.

August 3d - Germany declared war on France and sent second ultimatum to Belgium. Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Then followed eighteen other declarations of war and the great struggle was on.

President Wilson promptly issued a proclamation of neutrality for the United States admonishing all citizens to remain neutral in thought and deed. Then began Woodrow Wilson's long struggle to maintain our rights as neutrals and to avoid our being drawn into the war. This historic struggle was to end in a declaration of war in April 1917, - a declaration which it fell to my lot to conduct through the Senate of the United States.

Before attempting to give ^{an} my account of our entrance into the war let me for a moment return to old man Kraus out in the sandhills of Nebraska with his cattle and his alkali lake.

It was not long before he discovered that the little item of news meant a big change in his life as it did to many others.

Germany had great deposits of potash and the United States was dependent upon them for use in making fertilizers for our eastern farms and Southern plantations. England having command of the sea cut off this supply during the war and potash became quickly a scarce article in the United States and its price was multiplied several times. Meanwhile some time before this the University had graduated a young man whose knowledge of chemistry and ^{whose} ingenuity were such that he conceived the idea of utilizing the useless waters of our alkali ponds to produce potash -- by evaporation I believe. He laid the matter before some Nebraska business men of moderate means and induced them to erect a plant on or near Krause's land and use the bitter water from his alkali pond. I do not know why they did not buy the property. Perhaps they lacked the capital or confidence. Instead of that they agreed to pay Kraus a royalty on all potash they made and sold and that royalty grew rapidly into a great fortune -- great at least for a Nebraska ranchman.

The company made enormous profits also and its stockholders became rich. That was one of the romances of the war - the romance of Alkali - all ended ofcourse by the advent of peace and the return of cheap German potash to our markets.

I have told this story of Nebraska potash to show how far reaching was that bloody tragedy in the old town of Sarajevo in June 1914 and how extraordinary and picturesque some of its effects were thousands of miles away in Nebraska even before we entered the war.

From the date of President Wilson's neutrality proclamation about August 1st 1914 till he came before Congress April 2, 1917 and asked for a declaration of war, we passed through every stage of uncertainty. Hope for peace alternated with the prospect of war. President Wilson through his secretary of State was in an almost constant diplomatic controversy some times with Great Britain but more often and more seriously with Germany, protesting against the invasion of our rights as neutrals upon the high seas. All through the 12 months following the sinking of the Luistania^{SL} in May 1915, the sinkings by submarines increased American war sentiment also rapidly increased and Wilson's notes to Germany became stronger and more peremptory. In Germany there were two contending parties. One led by Admiral Von Tirpitz wanted unrestricted submarine warfare to starve Great Britain, the other embracing the business element and the better statesmen and including also Ludendorf and Von Hindenberg wanted to placate the United States and avoid drawing us into the war. Tension between Germany and our country grew month by month until at last in April 1916 relief came when the German government apparently yielded to its wiser advisers and gave to the United States a pledge to instruct its submarine commanders to conform to international law and recognize neutral rights on the sea as asserted by President Wilson. They were not to sink vessels without warning. They were to demand that the vessel stop, submit to inspection and in the event that decision to sink it was reached they were to give those

on board an opportunity to escape. This old rule of the sea was embarrassing to submarine work and some times dangerous, but Germany agreed to it and modified her unrestricted war fare. For a time there was relief and all through the campaign of 1916 Wilson was given credit for "keeping us out of war." Now and then a sinking occurred in which Germany was charged with violating her pledge, but on the whole she seemed anxious to keep it. Wilson's notes to Germany during this period -- between May 1916 and the winter of the same year -- were moderate and patient though firm and insistent. He was in fact talking to the people of America and Germany as well as to the German Government. He assumed that Germany intended to live up to her pledge although he had serious doubts about it himself. He was embarrassed also during these months by his campaign for reelection. He was being supported as the man who had kept us out of war but he himself did not take that attitude in his campaign utterances. Indeed he avoided foreign affairs generally and dwelt on domestic issues of an economic nature. After the close of the campaign in December 1916 he made a strong effort to bring about peace. He transmitted to the Allies a German offer to negotiate peace. A week later he suggested to both sides that they publicly state their war aims, so that the people of the world might know. Both sides appeared surprised and the Germans displeased. The Allies, however, after a few days hesitation replied in a fairly high minded statement calculated to appeal to the public opinion of the world, including America. A few days later Germany also replied but avoided submitting her case to the public opinion of the world and merely suggested a conference of belligerents. She lost her opportunity and the Allies got a tactical advantage. Apparently realizing her mistake Germany two weeks later made a statement in which she sought to clarify her war aims and two days later Jan 13, 1917 Germany sent a supplemental reply setting forth the terms on which she thought a peace might be made. In it Germany even suggested international cooperation to preserve the peace of the world in the future. President Wilson a few days later took the stage. He delivered to Congress a message on the

on the subject of peace in which he laid down the general principles which must be adopted as a peace basis. It faintly outlined the idea of a League of Nations. That was January 22, 1917. The prospect began to look promising. Wilson had reason to hope that he might become the peace maker of the world. Then suddenly both sides almost simultaneously acted in such a way as to destroy peace prospects. On January 31st, Great Britain announced the tightening of the blockade of Germany by extending the area of mines and four days later Germany withdrew her pledge to the United States and announced unrestricted submarine warfare on the vessels of all the world. Her purpose was to starve Great Britain as Great Britain was strangling Germany.

It now appeared that since giving the pledge to the United States in May 1916 Germany had been busy in constructing submarines and was now far better prepared to make the submarine war effective and disastrous.

Four days later, February 23 1917, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany but Wilson's address advising Congress of his action was temperate and held forth the hope that peace might still be preserved if no overt act violated American rights.

Three weeks later, however, on February 26, 1917 the president again came before Congress and asked that he be given authority to arm American merchant ships for their own protection. This had been found necessary not so much because American ships had been sunk since unrestricted sinkings were resumed but because American ships feared to venture out and were congested in various harbors.

Congress was to expire by limitation March 4th at noon but under cloture the House of Representatives passed the bill authorizing armed neutrality March 1st with only 13 dissenting votes and sent it to the Senate. There it encountered the famous La Follette filibuster. I had charge of the bill and on March second the debate became continuous most of the speaking being done by the few senators opposed to the bill led

by La Follette. All night of Saturday March 3d the dreary session continued. By midnight the crowded galleries began to empty themselves. By 3 o'clock A. M., only a dozen spectators remained. On the Senate floor there were not over a dozen senators except when now and then a question of no quorum was raised when sleepy senators would come from cloak rooms and nearby offices to answer the roll call. Then the speech making of those opposed to the bill would be resumed. Senator La Follette marshalled the opposition forces so as always to have some one ready to take the floor and ^{thus} prevent a vote. As in other cases he was reserving himself for the last hour or two of debate so that he could close the filibuster in a blaze of glory when the gavel fell at noon. To defeat this purpose on the advice of friends of both sides of the chamber I prepared to get the floor at 10 O'clock Sunday morning. As I was in charge of the bill the presiding officer readily agreed to recognize me providing I was on my feet as promptly as La Follette or any of his followers. To make sure that our plans did not miscarry I arranged with Senator Owen to get the floor if possible about 9 o'clock and stop promptly at ten. He did so. I knew when he would close and La Follette suspected it, so we were both on the alert and on our feet demanding recognition. Vice President Marshall had gone to church and the chair was occupied by Senator Saulsbury, President Pro Tem. He recognized me. A loud protest went up from Senator La Follette but in vain and I started on a two hour speech -- the longest I ever made. I had fortified myself by a nap of about an hour and a light breakfast.

Appearances in the Senate were now rapidly changing. Senators were returning to their desks, the galleries were filling up, members of the House of Representatives and cabinet officers were crowding into the Chamber and the scene was one of life and interest which now and then bordered on excitement. The reporters gallery like the others was soon packed and even the diplomatic gallery which is little occupied was soon filled with members of the foreign embassies and legations.

I never expect again to address so distinguished an audience and certainly never again to make so long a speech.

Senator La Follette watched the clock and watched me. Five or six times during the two hours he interrupted me to ask a question. It was substantially the same each time. He wanted to know whether he was to be shut out from addressing the Senate. I always yielded to him for a question and always replied to the effect that I would yield the floor to him at once if we could have a unanimous consent agreement to close the discussion and vote at ten minutes before noon, the hour of adjournment. This he never would grant, so I held the floor till the gavel fell at 12 o'clock and the Senate was declared adjourned sine die. Thus armed neutrality was beaten and Germany got the erroneous impression that America was not behind the President in his demand for action.

I thought then and I still think it might have been possible if Congress had backed the President promptly that Germany would have hesitated and perhaps reconsidered her plan to make war on American commerce. The resolution was chiefly a vote of confidence in the President. In asking for it he had said he had the authority to arm our merchant ships without ^{a resolution} authority from Congress and he proceeded to do so at once. But the moral effect on Germany was lost and the unrestricted submarine warfare developed rapidly so that the President called an extra session of Congress in April.

There was one effect of the La Follette filibuster which came quickly -- even before the extra session of Congress in April. It was an amendment of the Senate rules establishing a mild form of cloture on a two thirds vote after every senator has had an opportunity to speak one hour. This rule was adopted four days after Congress adjourned at an extraordinary session of the Senate, called to pass on nominations

President Wilson came before the extra session of Congress in the evening of the day it organized and asked it to declare that a state of war existed with Germany. It was not his first appearance in person before the joint session of the house and senate but it was the most solemn and impressive. As the senators were announced and filed into the House of Representatives, the Speaker and members stood to receive them and the Senators took seats assigned to them in the front rows, while the Vice President took his place by the Speaker of the House. Cabinet officers were already there. So were ambassadors and ministers from foreign countries. Last of all the Chief Justice and the eight associate Justices of the Supreme Court filed in and occupied special chairs at the very front. The galleries were packed to suffocation. Then a committee of senators and representatives was named to meet the President and escort him in. We found him in the speaker's room. He looked worn and almost haggard for he had slept but little for several nights. When the committee returned to the chamber with the President the door keeper announced: "The President of the United States" and as the great gathering rose to its feet a storm of applause and cheers swept the chamber. His address was a model and has become historic. It was all the more effective because it came from one who had with endless patience and great ability tried to avoid war.

Let me quote the last paragraphs of that memorable address:

"It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.

"But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts--for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

"To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know ~~and~~ that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured.

"God helping her, she can do no other."

When the President had finished the great audience -- over 500 senators and representatives, leading, burst into a storm of applause and America had virtually entered the Great War. It only remained for the Senate and House in a formal way to consider the resolution declaring that a state of war existed. The resolution was introduced in each house that evening after the joint session adjourned and referred to the committees. Next morning the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met to consider the resolution.

That meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was not very long but it was quite tense. It was held behind closed doors and the outcome was awaited with great interest. Senator Stone of Missouri was chairman and he was thought to be opposed to war. Senator Lodge was the ranking republican and I the ranking democrat. After we had carefully read the resolution a few textual amendments were adopted and the roll was called on a motion to report it to the Senate. The chairman voted "No" but declared the motion carried. He then advised the

committee that he must oppose the resolution in the Senate and turned the conduct of it over to me as the ranking majority member if I cared to accept it. Thus I was put in charge of the war resolution in the Senate just as I had been in charge of the Armed Neutrality resolution.

On the same day, April 5d, 1917 the resolution was reported to the Senate and I asked unanimous consent for its immediate consideration but Senator La Follette called for the regular order and under the rule it went over for one day. Next day it was taken up early in the morning debated continuously till nearly midnight and passed. There were only six dissenting votes including La Follette, Stone and Norris. Next day the House took up the resolution and passed it about daylight of April 6th with 50 dissenting votes. Thus we went to war.

During the struggle the United States did stupendous things.

It raised and equipped four million men and officers and sent two million to Europe. It borrowed twenty-six thousand million dollars at about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest. It raised in taxes about twenty thousand million dollars. It loaned to other nations nine thousand million dollars. It built hundreds of ships. It took charge of the railroads of the United States and operated them. It took control of food, coal and other necessities of life and of war and apportioned them and limited their use.

After we entered the war, it lasted only 19 months. Nine months of that time had elapsed before we were able to land troops in any great number in France.

I was privileged to have some contact with war operations and some inside knowledge of war progress because of the fact that I was a member of the committee on Military Affairs. This committee, under the leadership of its Chairman, Senator Chamberlain, was a very strong body. It had such aggressive members as Senator Weeks, now Secretary of War, Senator Wadsworth, now chairman of the committee, Senator McKellar, and others. We soon became aware that America's military organization was weak. The War Department was officered largely by swivel chair veterans accustomed only to the red tape circumlocution ways of peace. We had the power to call them before the committee, from the youngest lieutenant up to the Secretary of War himself, and we proceeded to do so. A great rattling of dry bones ensued. The hearings were for the most part public and some shocked the country by revelations of mismanagement. We discovered unsanitary camps, soldiers without adequate clothing, medical attendance or hospital facilities. We found contractors behind with contracts, delays in placing contracts or making plans and above all the confusion and lack of system in the War Department, which had grown to three or four times its former size, but which was still snarled up in red tape.

The result of these revelations and the stirring work of the committee was a great reform in the War Department. Secretary Baker himself was forced to realize the need of drastic action. A new chief of Staff-- General March, was installed. A new assistant Secretary of Business Ability

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Mr. Crowell, was chosen. Another Assistant Secretary, Mr. ~~Stettin~~, a man of manufacturing experience and a fine executive, was named and put in charge of the production of ordnance and other war supplies, and our committee was invited to meet at 9:30 o'clock every Saturday morning at the War Department and receive the fullest and latest information of the progress of preparations and operations. Instead of being compelled to corkscrew information out of hesitating bureau chiefs, who often did not know the facts, everything we asked for and much that was volunteered was laid before our committee in the shape of maps, tabulated statements, diagrams, graphs, and other devices of skilled statisticians. As our soldiers began to arrive in France in force at the beginning of 1918, their operations, as well as those of the other nations, were shown week by week on great maps.

These extraordinary meetings of our committee with the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and their officers at the War Department brought us into close contact with inside workings and enabled us to witness the wonderful way in which war operations could be speeded up. Red tape was discarded, circumlocution was cut short, business methods were substituted. We felt that the military affairs committee of the Senate had done its bit and had demonstrated how the legislative branch of government could be of value to the executive branch. Our weekly meetings at the War Department were in addition to our regular weekly meetings at the Capitol and ~~lasted~~ *continued* about one year.

While our Military forces did not become a factor in Europe for nearly a year after we entered the war in April, 1917, our financial resources became an enormous factor instantly.

The financial resources of France, Italy and Russia were at a very low ebb and even Great Britain with all her wealth had reached a point of serious financial strain. It has been said that her account with her American bankers was overdrawn \$200,000,000 when we entered the war. Those bankers held as security American stocks and bonds which

were owned in England and deposited by the British government, but to put them on sale on the New York Stock Exchange would probably have brought on a panic. So it happened that within 24 hours after Congress authorized the President to advance funds to the nations fighting Germany, the United States made a payment of \$200,000,000 to J. P. Morgan & Company, for the account of Great Britain. Thus began that remarkable process by which we financed the war to its end.

Thus far I have spoken of war and preparations for war although Secretary Sheldon suggested in his invitation to me that I discuss the making of peace. I shall necessarily, however, be brief in carrying out his suggestions. I have dwelt too long on the war.

Unfortunately the unity which had characterized our country during war disappeared when it came to making peace. Partizan antagonisms which had been suppressed became active. I shall not seek to place the responsibility for this misfortune. It generally comes after war. Each side shares the responsibility. President Wilson made a great mistake in the Congressional Campaign of 1918 in asking the voters to uphold his hands by electing a democratic congress. This aroused opposition, resentment, and contributed to a republican victory. He aggravated matters when he went to Paris to negotiate peace without consulting Senators as to the members of his commission or as to the character of the treaty he proposed to make. Indeed, he not only ignored the body to which he must bring back his treaty, but he virtually defied his political opponents although they ^{had secured} ~~now held~~ a majority of the Senate and were soon to reorganize its committees. Thus he left behind him in the Senate the worst possible psychology. His political opponets, the republican leaders, allowed their personal dislike and partizan interests to displace patriotism and public ^{interest}. They entered into a conspiracy to thwart Wilson. They did everything to embarrass and weaken him abroad in his great struggle there and also to prepare for his downfall in America when he should return with the treaty. They picked out one feature of the treaty for special onslaught--Wilson's part of the treaty--the covenant of the League of Nations.

Thus were the foundations laid for the great struggle over the League of Nations in the United States along party lines.



President Wilson went to Europe accompanied by his commissioners in December 1918 and accompanied also by dozens of scientists, historians, economists, military and naval authorities and other experts. His arrival at Brest in France is thus described by Wm. Allen White:

"Down the gangplank walked this Yankee Knight Errant followed by a desperate crew of college professors in horn rim glasses, carrying text books, encyclopedias, maps, charts, graphs, statistics, and all sorts of literary crow bars with which to pry up the boundaries of Europe and move them around in the interests of justice as seen through the fourteen points."

He was an idealist, come with an altruistic purpose, to the old world to persuade three or four victorious nations to make a peace of justice, wisdom and leniency. He wanted a peace with such foundations that it would last. A peace that would restore friendship, cooperation and good will. A peace that would give the world a new international organization to make future wars impossible. He represented the most powerful, the richest, and the most disinterested nation in the world. Everywhere he was given an ovation.

But in January 1919 when Wilson met the cynical Clemenceau, the crafty Lloyd George, and the astute statesmen of Italy Belgium and Japan he found them moved by a common purpose to get all possible material gain for their various countries out of the peace.

The struggle went on night and day in endless conferences and sessions. He fought to secure the incorporation in the treaty of the League of Nations Covenant. He got it at last but to do so was forced to consent to some things he knew were bad. And then he had to come back to America on a flying trip with many things unsettled. He came in February 1919 and he brought the Covenant of the League of Nations as it had been agreed to. Too late he realized that he must consult the Senate before finally signing the treaty with the covenant in it.

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When Wilson first went to Europe the democrats still held control of the Senate and I was Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. That was true also when he returned in February, but after March 4th all was to be changed. The republican opposition elected in the preceding November was to take control of the Senate and organize the Committees. Lodge was to displace me as Chairman and the Committee on Foreign Relations was to pass into republican control. In adding republican members to the committee care was taken to select only such republicans as were opposed to the League. The result was a committee packed against the League and this committee resorted to every possible delay.

During Wilson's short stay in the United States before he returned to Paris he adopted a somewhat more conciliatory attitude towards the opposition. He accepted a number of amendments to the Covenant proposed chiefly by republicans friendly to the League and undertook to secure their adoption. I also noticed a decided change in his attitude towards me due to the fact that I had become active in support of the League. He had tried to prevent my selection a year earlier as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations because he considered me too independent and not responsive always to his leadership. It was therefore an agreeable surprise to him apparently when I became so strong a supporter of the League and such an active advocate of it in the Senate and elsewhere. In friendly letters and personal interviews he sought in many ways to show his appreciation and approval. Instead of being persona non grata at the White House as I had been during the Federal Reserve Bank Controversy from this time on I found myself in high favor.

When the President returned to Paris after his short visit and the special session of Congress which he had called assembled with its republican majority in both houses the fight on the League of Nations broke out afresh although the treaty was not yet in existence and was not laid before the Senate until May or June when he finally returned to the United States.

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At that time President Wilson invited the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to come to the White House for a conference. He met us in one of the parlors about ten o'clock in the morning. He made a short statement about the work he had done in getting the Covenant accepted and then suggested that he would be glad to answer any questions that might be asked.

Friends and supporters of the League asked but few questions, while the opponents asked a great many. Lodge, Brandegee and Harding--all now dead--were quite active. So was Senator Fall, later disgraced by oil exposures. Of course all were respectful. Wilson was rather nervous, but in his replies was keen and careful. The discussion closed about noon, with a general impression that the President had maintained the Covenant very effectively.

At this time Mrs. Wilson entered the parlor and the Senators were duly presented to her. Then President Wilson invited us to lunch and we proceeded to the dining room two and two. I recall a little embarrassment in getting started. Mrs. Wilson took Senator Lodge's arm and the President took mine. He motioned to her to lead the way, she laughingly shook her head, and then hesitatingly Wilson led me out with Mrs. Wilson and Lodge following, with the other Senators falling behind.

That was the last time that Lodge was entertained at the White House in Wilson's term and it would be hard to say who was the most embarrassed by his being there--Lodge himself or the President. Indeed, the feeling ^{later} became so strong that Lodge could not discuss Wilson without a sneer and even three years later was not permitted to go ^{to} the Wilson funeral, although named by the Senate to do so.

Senator Martin the Democratic leader in the Senate having died I had become acting democratic leader by virtue of the fact that I was vice Chairman of the Democratic Conference. During the weeks of struggle in the Foreign Relations Committee during the Summer of 1919 therefore I also had much active work on the floor of the Senate.

Finally after holding the treaty in Committee for an outrageous length of time it was reported to the Senate with Amendments and Reservations.

The fight came first on proposed amendments. One by one we defeated all of them. Then the much more serious fight on Reservations began. Thirteen had been recommended by the committee. They were called the Lodge reservations because he was Chairman of the Committee.

About this time President Wilson became impatient over the outlook and decided to go over the country on a great speech making tour to arouse public sentiment and compel Senators to vote for ratification. I tried to dissuade him and urged him to stay in Washington and send for one Senator at a time with a view by persuasion, presidential influence and compromise if necessary, to reach an adjustment and ratification. He hesitated a few days, sent for one senator, found the effort distasteful and abandoned it. He could not stoop to conquer. His imagination was fired by the suggestion that he could go out and arouse such a popular storm as would force Senators to ratify. The plan appealed to his fighting spirit notwithstanding that his health had already become impaired by the Paris struggle. So he went forth on an impossible task and came back a wreck.

When Wilson started on the ill fated trip in August 1919 the struggle in the Senate as I recall it was still over amendments. The last one was defeated after he returned to Washington. On one or two the vote had been very close. The Senate then took up reservations which it was proposed to incorporate in the resolution consenting to ratification.

The popular impression was that the President was as opposed to reservations as to amendments. This is not the fact. To amend the treaty might mean to kill it because it required the assent of the other countries, including Germany. Reservations on the other hand if legitimate interpretations and if not nullifying in character could be permitted and did not require the action of other countries.

President Wilson, however, felt that if he began to assent to reservations his enemies would make use of his yielding to demand more and more because they wanted not only to defeat the League but to discredit and overthrow him. He therefore concealed from the public his willingness to accept reservations and got the reputation of being more stubborn and unyielding than he was. To me however before he started on his unfortunate trip he entrusted a list of reservations that he could accept. He had personally run them off on the typewriter in order that no one could know of their existence. He charged me not to reveal their authorship to any one but authorized me to use them as my own. Later on after he was stricken and lay for weeks helpless in bed he remembered them. At his dictation Mrs. Wilson wrote me asking for the reservations and promising to copy them and send me the copy. This was done so that the copy I now hold is in her handwriting.

One by one the Lodge Reservations were adopted after protracted debate. It required only a majority vote to adopt a reservation and the republicans had the majority. Finally when the Lodge Reservations had all been adopted and the resolution had been perfected I offered as a substitute resolution with a series of reservations interpretative in character. They included the list which the President had entrusted to me and a few others that I had discussed with him ^{later}. My reservations received 41 votes as I recall it and were therefore rejected. The resolution of ratification containing the Lodge reservations then came to a vote. On this vote a two thirds majority is required and it failed to receive that number -- so the senate refused to ratify the treaty. As I recall it now 93 Senators voted. Sixty two votes were necessary to carry ratifications but only 58 voted for it. Four votes switched from "No" to "Yes" would have changed the result. I had a hard struggle to keep a majority of the democrats in the "No" column although I had a letter from Wilson urging them not to vote "Yes". As I recall it 23 Democrats voted "No" and so did about 12 republican irreconcilables. The reservations were too strong for us and not strong enough for them. About 22 democrats voted "Yes" with about 36 republicans -- just four less than the necessary two thirds.

I have often wondered since then whether I made a mistake in the

final vote. Had I voted "yes" it is quite probable that several democrats would have joined me and ratification would have been authorized. Whether Wilson would have perfected ratification or pigeon holed the treaty no one can tell. He certainly would not have ratified it at once because his convictions were strong that the people would vindicate him at the next election. When, however the election occurred in November 1920 the popular verdict was apparently against ratification. He however remained President till March 4th and seeing no chance of vindication he might have taken the treaty out of its pigeon hole, Lodge Reservations and all, between November and March and filed it with France to perfect ratification. That would have changed history somewhat--probably for the better.

Indeed several months after the vote in the Senate, I think in the early Spring of 1920 after consulting senators of both parties I sought to secure reconsideration of the vote by which the treaty had been rejected with a view to securing a compromise on reservations and found that President Wilson was in a more receptive frame of mind to my suggestions. Lodge also at first agreed to informal conferences to see whether a compromise was possible. I selected several democratic associates on the Committee. Lodge selected Senator Kellogg and Senator Lenroot and in five or six meetings we made real progress. Indeed we had adjusted everything practically ^{Except} up to article ten and we were on the very point of agreeing on that when someone called Lodge from the committee room. We waited an hour for his return and adjourned till next day, but he refused to meet with us again. I have always felt that a committee of irreconcilables kidnapped him. They wanted no compromise.

In a way this experience served to verify Wilson's judgment of the situation. Months before when he lay upon his bed of pain and suffering and I visited him from time to time in his bedroom I sought to persuade him now and then to consent to compromise on reservations. In some cases he yielded but generally his attitude was expressed by this conversation which I recall:

"Mr. President", I said, "It might be wise to compromise with Lodge on this point."

"Let Lodge Compromise", he replied.

"Well of course" I added, "he must compromise also, but we might well

22

hold out the Olive branch."

"Let Lodge hold out the Olive branch", he ^{retorted} ~~concluded~~, and that ended it for that day for he was too sick a man to argue with in the presence of his anxious doctor and his more anxious wife."

Fate was against ratification. The race prejudice of the Germans and the Irish, the political prejudice of partizan opponents and the hatred of personal enemies, ^{an} ~~all~~ adverse majority in the Senate, a broken and sick president in the White House who would not yield and who could not conquer ended the possibility of ratification and the United States refused to enter the League of Nations. Whether the decision is final or temporary the future alone can reveal.

The Political Rivalry of Gilbert M. Hitchcock
and Wm. Jennings Bryan

The political rivalry of Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock and Wm. Jennings Bryan forms an important and interesting chapter in the political history of Nebraska from Populism to the New Deal. More than this, the mixture of political friendship and friction between Mr. Bryan and Senator Hitchcock forms a neglected chapter in the public life of the Peerless Leader.

In Democratic party circles in Nebraska this relationship first produced an alliance that lasted without open rupture from 1890 through 1908. With Bryan dominating the party organization and Mr. Hitchcock owner of the state's most widely read Democratic newspaper, their political friendship was mutually beneficial. But even in this period of alliance, jealousy and a selfishness of ambition had already formed the background against which an open clash took place in 1910. Nebraska democracy then divided into a Bryan faction and a Hitchcock faction and there followed a rivalry which persisted long after these two leaders had passed from the scene of battle.

After the death of Wm. Jennings Bryan in 1925, Chas. W. Bryan became the heir to the Bryan tradition as well as the

1 Brief accounts will be found in Morton, J. Sterling, Watkins, Albert and Miller, Geo. L., Illustrated History of Nebraska. 3 vols. Lincoln, 1907-13. Sheldon, Addison E., Nebraska, The Land and the People. 3 vols. Chicago, 1931.

Bryan appetite for public office.² The eclipse of Chas. W. Bryan in the senatorial race of 1934, the death of Mr. Hitchcock's powerful ally Arthur Mullen in 1938, and the ascendancy of the New Deal marked the end of the Hitchcock-Bryan feud and closed a colorful chapter of Nebraska history.³

It was the surge of the Populist movement in the 1880's that brought both Mr. Hitchcock and Mr. Bryan their first prominence as political leaders.⁴ In 1889, when the Populists were strong enough to consider state-wide political action, Mr. Hitchcock combined the old, Democratic Herald with his Omaha Evening World.⁵ Bryan had been in Lincoln scarcely a year but "he took to politics as swiftly and as naturally as a duck takes to water."⁶

While Bryan immediately became "the darling of the Democrats" and a champion of fusion, Mr. Hitchcock was a "converted" Republican who supported Cleveland in 1888 but did

- 2 In 1936, for the first time in nearly twenty years, Chas. W. Bryan's name was not on a Nebraska ballot. In 1938 he ran far behind as an independent candidate for governor. He has a large amount of W. J. Bryan's correspondence.
- 3 Mullen's personal account of this period appears in his Western Democrat. New York, 1940. He died July, 14, 1938.
- 4 Hicks, John D., The Populist Revolt. Minneapolis, 1931. p. 99-102.
- 5 The combined paper appeared first July 15, 1889.
- 6 Current Bryan biographies touch only in part on his Nebraska career. Werner, M. R., Bryan. New York, 1929; Hibben, Paxton, The Peerless Leader. New York, 1929; Long, J. C., Bryan The Great Commoner. New York, 1929.

not make his "public confession" as a Democrat until 1892. Before 1890, Mr. Hitchcock indicated no particular sympathy with the program of the Farmer's Alliance. But he had become definitely interested in Wm. Jennings Bryan and his rhetorical flights in advocacy of tariff revision. And in 1890, Mr. Hitchcock's newspaper the World-Herald, fervently supported Bryan in his first race for Congress as the leader of "the aroused masses against the fortifications behind which the favored classes are entrenched."⁷ It took its full share of credit for Bryan's victory and within a week after election day began pleading for fusion of Democratic and Alliance forces. The fact that Mr. Hitchcock was heavily in debt can not be overlooked in appraising his willingness to add currency reform to his advocacy of tariff revision.⁸

In 1894 the free silver Democrats took full command of the party with Bryan as their prophet and the World-Herald as their fervent journalistic organ.⁹ In April of that year, Bryan wrote Mr. Hitchcock that he planned to retire from Congress. He said, "If I am foot-loose I can help make combinations and can go where I can do the most good . . .

7 World-Herald, July 31, 1890. Files of this paper are complete in the Nebr. State Historical Society Library and the file room of the World Publishing Co., Omaha.

8 Mr. Hitchcock endorsed the free and unlimited coinage of silver in 1893.

9 On the organization of the Nebraska Free Coinage League see World-Herald, January 22-24, 1894.

and I might stand a good chance for senator." ¹⁰ To further these plans, Bryan suggested that he take over the editorship of the weekly edition of the World-Herald which had its circulation chiefly among farmers. Mr. Hitchcock objected to this proposal but urged Bryan to become editor of the daily World-Herald "as a boom for the paper, a large advertising and a political revolution." ¹¹ Financial arrangements were agreed upon and with the issue of September 1, 1894 Bryan became editor. ¹² Actually he spent little time in Omaha but was an "absentee editor" sending in by mail his long-hand drafts of his views on free silver, the tariff and theology.

Bryan's connection with the World-Herald was immediately reflected in increased circulation figures and cash receipts. On the other hand, his views were given wider advertising than ever and it is not without justification that Mr. Hitchcock later asserted that "without this the Bryan era would have been a failure." His paper now proudly proclaimed itself "the foremost champion of the restoration of silver in the west and the restoration of silver as the great issue

- 10 Bryan to Hitchcock, Apr. 14, 1894. The Hitchcock correspondence is in the possession of Mrs. Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Washington, D. C.
- 11 Hitchcock to Bryan, May 30, 1894 (Copy). Mr. Hitchcock was badly in need of cash and suggested that Bryan invest \$25,000. The latter promised \$15,000 most of which was to be raised among Nebraska Democrats. Only \$9,600 was ever paid. Hibben, p. 165, repeats the "Silver Miner's Fund" myth. All the money was raised in Nebraska.
12. World-Herald, August 28, 1894. Bryan was to receive 10c for each new subscriber and 10% of the net cash gain in weekly subscriptions.

13
for 1896."

The campaign of 1896 marked the zenith of the silver crusade and the end of Mr. Bryan's editorship of the World-Herald.¹⁴ In the subsequent campaigns of 1900 and 1908, Mr. Hitchcock's newspaper continued to support Bryan but a cleavage had developed that in 1910 opened a long period of factional division.

Bryan biographies to date have not done full justice to his long connection with Nebraska politics. His role as a national figure has been given due emphasis but he personally considered his political fortunes in his home state as a very important matter. He worked zealously to keep control of the Nebraska Democratic party and to keep his adopted state thoroughly orthodox and righteous according to the best Bryan standards. Indeed, in 1908 Bryan made victory in Nebraska a paramount personal objective. Chafing under his failure to carry the state in 1900, he made one of his most vigorous speaking tours in Nebraska.¹⁵

The growth of Bryan's power and influence in Nebraska was accompanied by the development of a species of political selfishness and a suspicious jealousy toward any possible

13 World-Herald, April 21, 1895. Actually Mr. Hitchcock's newspaper lost a considerable amount of local and foreign advertising after Bryan became editor.

14 August 8, 1896 Mr. Hitchcock announced, "This is an appropriate time to announce that Mr. Bryan's work as editor has been finished."

15 Mullen, Western Democrat, pp. 129-31. Omaha Rec. Dec.

rival for his place in the sun of popular acclaim. By 1896 it was likewise evident that Senator Hitchcock had definite political ambitions and his newspaper was obviously a powerful aid in his plans to make a bid for public office. Herein lies the basis of the first Hitchcock-Bryan clash in 1899.

The specific occasion was the choice of a successor to Senator M. L. Hayward (Rep.) who died in December, 1899.¹⁶ Senator Hayward had not breathed his last before hungry Democrats and Populists lay siege to the office of Governor Poynter (Pop.) whose unhappy duty it was to name a successor. The two most prominent candidates were Wm. V. Allen, a Populist, and Mr. Hitchcock. Populist leaders looked with alarm at the prospect of permanent submergence in the Democratic party while the latter thought the Populists should be content with possession of the governor's office.¹⁷

Mr. Bryan was the deciding factor. He was in Texas for a rest but he never got so far away from Nebraska that he failed to consider what was best for himself, for the party and for the state. When Mr. Hitchcock became convinced that Bryan was going to endorse Allen he telegraphed Bryan the following message:

If you insist on sacrificing me we
part company forever. 18

16 Omaha Bee, December 6, 1899.

17 For details of this controversy see files of Omaha Bee, Lincoln Journal and World-Herald, Nov.-Dec., 1899.

18 A copy of the telegram is in Hitchcock MSS.

In a long letter justifying his endorsement of Allen, Bryan makes it clear that he had uppermost in mind his own fortunes in the coming Second Battle of 1900 and the advantage of catering to Nebraska Populists. But, he promised:

If we win in 1900 I shall take pleasure in proving my appreciation of your services to the party and your friendship for me. . . 19

Mr. Hitchcock's expression of disappointment supplied a catch-phrase, "the sting of ingratitude," which symbolized the rivalry with Bryan in later years. He said,

I cannot honestly deny that I have been deeply disappointed, and I feel most keenly the sting of ingratitude. . . 20

"Doc" Bixby, the Lincoln Journal's humorous commentator, was moved to write:

I haven't language to express
Without being far too rude,
My inner feelings of distress
At such d--- base ingratitude.

Time after time and time again,
When the bright stars twinkled like a flame
Has Hitchcock siezed his trenchant pen
To write in praise of Bryan's name.

Does Mr. Bryan think that his
Desires are always paramount?
That he is nearly all there is
On earth of any great account?



19 Bryan to Hitchcock, December 11, 1899. At the same time, Bryan wrote James Dahlman of Omaha "to pour oil on the troubled waters, and soothe any disappointments." Printed in Carey, Fred, Mayor Jim. Omaha, 1930, p. 111.

20 World-Herald, December 14, 1899.

Fie on such ignorance as that,
 And an ingratitude that shows
 The interests of a plutocrat
 In whom ambition only grows. 21

But Mr. Hitchcock and Mr. Bryan did not "part company forever." The Great Commoner's name was magic in Nebraska and Mr. Hitchcock's ambition to go to the United States Senate was still unrealized. So, in 1900 and 1908, the support of Bryan's candidacy by the World-Herald was as enthusiastic and zealous as ever.

But beginning in 1910 the Hitchcock-Bryan feud reached the stage of an open break. By that time, Bryan's star was somewhat dimmed by three defeats and Mr. Hitchcock felt that his was just rising. The immediate occasion was Bryan's adoption of prohibition as a new paramount issue. He had never previously favored prohibition. ²² Free silver, imperialism and in part the trusts were dead issues but a fight against the liquor traffic offered tremendous possibilities for a politician seeking a new sounding board. Mr. Hitchcock had always opposed prohibition and now he decided to challenge the Peerless Leader.

After Mr. Hitchcock announced his candidacy for the Senate, Bryan asserted that he would oppose all candidates who did not join him in his determination to commit the Democratic party

21 Lincoln Journal, December 15, 1899.

22 Long, Bryan, p. 210; Mullen, Western Democrat, pp. 138-42.

to county option.²³ He denounced Mr. Hitchcock as "a tool of the brewers" and

When he trimmed up the World-Herald even the dullest man present could realize that a new era was dawning in Nebraska politics.²⁴

The controversy reached its climax in the state convention,²⁵ "The Battle of Grand Island." The Bryans, W. J., and "Brother Charley," and brother-in-law Tom Allen, were on hand to direct the Bryan forces while in the Hitchcock camp were Governor Shallenberger, Arthur Mullen and Mayor James Dahlman of Omaha.

Here for the first time in his political career, Bryan heard himself excoriated and assailed by men of his own state and party who had formerly been his devoted followers.²⁶ He fought back courageously but his pleas fell on deaf ears. His county option resolution was overwhelmingly beaten. From then on, Mr. Hitchcock became "not a thorn but a festering arrow under the skin of Lincoln's greatest citizen."²⁷

In the primary which ~~followed~~^{ensued} Bryan supported his follower

23 The Commoner, February 18 and March 7, 1910.

24 Lincoln Journal, July 10, 1910. Mullen, Western Democrat, p. 132 states Bryan always opposed prohibition "until other issues ran out."

25 Long, Bryan, Ch. 11 contains a brief account.

26 For newspaper accounts see files of World-Herald, Omaha Bee and Lincoln Journal, July 15-31, 1910.

27 Mullen, Western Democrat, p. 145.

Richard L. Metcalfe against Mr. Hitchcock but the latter was nominated by a two to one majority. A week later, the Commoner announced that "Mr. Bryan will do all in his power to secure Mr. Hitchcock's election to the Senate" though he bolted the equally wet candidate for governor, James A. Dahlman.²⁸

To follow the numerous evidences of Bryan-Hitchcock factionalism after the schism of 1910 would make it necessary to recount the history of nearly every primary campaign through 1934. Of course, in the general elections of that period, the rivals cast aside their political harpoons and either spoke only of harmony or maintained a discreet silence. With Senator Hitchcock and Mr. Bryan both in Washington during the first Wilson administration, the feudists clashed over Nebraska federal patronage. As long as Bryan remained in the cabinet, Mr. Hitchcock's recommendations for appointments were quite successfully blocked or held up.²⁹

From 1910 to 1920 the Hitchcock forces were, in the main, in control. But in the latter year the balance of power turned definitely toward the Bryans and Chas. W. Bryan successfully maintained it until the ascendancy of Arthur

28 The Commoner, August 26, 1910. Also Mullen, Western Democrat, pp. 143-45. For details of this election and disclosures of the sensational "Bartley Scandal" episode see Patterson, R. F., "Gilbert M. Hitchcock, A Story of Two Careers," an unpublished doctor's dissertation, University of Colorado, 1940.

29 Senator Hitchcock's complaints on this score are much in evidence in memoranda and correspondence with Secretary McAdoo, Attorney General Gregory and President Wilson in Hitchcock MSS.

Mullen in the New Deal victory of 1933. ³⁰

Only once in this period did the two factions make a special effort to join forces in a primary campaign. This was in 1922 when Senator Hitchcock wanted to make certain his re-election to the Senate and Chas. W. Bryan wanted to be elected governor. 1922 is appropriately known as "the great year of harmony" in Nebraska politics. Senator Hitchcock and Chas. W. Bryan embraced each other and it was declared that a new era of brotherly love and friendship was at hand. The World-Herald revived its encomiums of the Bryans though they had been buried in the editorial graveyard for a decade. The Peerless Leader himself took time from his real estate ventures in Florida to publicly beam at Arthur Mullen and Senator Hitchcock. ³¹ Nevertheless, Mr. Hitchcock was retired from the Senate though Chas. W. Bryan went on to serve three terms as governor.

After Governor Bryan refused to appoint Mr. Hitchcock to the Senate in 1933 to fill a vacancy caused by the death of Senator R. B. Howell (Rep.), the World-Herald and Arthur Mullen finally got their revenge. Senator Hitchcock was dead but Mullen determined "to drive Bryan completely out of

30 The most scathing editorial indictment of W. J. Bryan ever to appear in the World-Herald appears in the issue of November 19, 1918. On May 1, 1920 it characterized Chas. W. Bryan as a "rather hopeless sort of ass."

31 The carefully staged "reconciliation" was presented at the state convention of August, 1922. See Omaha News, August 16, 1922.

Nebraska politics" when the Governor sought nomination to the Senate in 1934.³² As a result, Chas. W. Bryan suffered the most crushing defeat of his long political career.

But the eclipse of Chas. W. Bryan, the death of Senator Hitchcock, the ascendancy of the New Deal, the estrangement of Mullen with President Roosevelt and Mullen's subsequent death, all brought to an end the Hitchcock-Bryan theme in Nebraska politics. New leadership and new issues came to the fore and a colorful era of western party politics was closed.

A story of factional state politics is by no means new. But in Nebraska its leadership emerged in the turbulent years of agrarian discontent. Other issues came with the passing years and personal ambition and jealousy wove their threads in^{to} the pattern.

But here it seems lies a proper place for a larger emphasis on Wm. Jennings Bryan's career as a Nebraska politician. And certainly, the history of the state cannot be completely told without doing full justice to the long relationship between Senator Hitchcock and the Great Commoner.

32 World-Herald, May 8, 1934.

~~The contrast between~~

Let me congratulate
the Democrats of Nebraska upon the
size character and spirit of this
convention gathered ~~to~~ here today to
start the campaign work for 1924.
It presents a strong contrast with the convention of 1920.
Four years have wrought a
notable change. ~~The contrast~~
~~is strong~~ when we met at that
time the shadow of impending defeat
was already upon us. ~~to~~ without
deserving it the Democratic party had
become the victim of the aftermath
of the war. All of the discontents and
all of the unsettledness ~~and all of the~~
~~disappointments which followed in the~~
~~wake of war were laid at the door~~

United States Senate,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

(2)

which inevitably follow war became
Democratic liabilities and Republican
assets x ~~The high cost of living, the an-
falling prices of products and ~~light~~~~

Consumers were told to blame the
high cost of living on the Democrats
and producers were told to hold
Democrats ^{responsible} for ~~the~~ falling prices x
Dissatisfied service men ~~and neglected~~
~~veterans~~ were taught that Democrats
were ~~the~~ responsible for harsh
military discipline and neglected
veterans were told that Democrats
were to blame x All ~~the~~ racial
antipathies and all forms of discontent
and unrest were united and
mobilized against the Democrats x

United States Senate,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Hughes Speech in N.Y.

Imports Before & after Tariff bill

17 mas - Ending Sept 1922 - \$ 3,761,322,000
17 " " Feb 1924 5,353,186,000
Inc 42%

Exports - Before & after Tariff bill

17 mas Ending Sept 1922 \$ 5,353,893,000
17 " " Feb 1924 6,025,162,000
Inc 12%

Duties Collected

17 mas before bill - \$ 521,000,000
17 " after bill - 807,000,000

League votes in Senate.

	<u>yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>
Nov 19- 1919 - On ratification	39-	55
Republicans	34}	{ 13
Democrats	5 }	{ 42
Absent 1		
Dead 1		
Second ballot after reconsideration	41	51

Early in Jan - 1920 Bi Partisan Conference
Lodge New Linnott Kellogg
Hitchcock, Simmons McKellar Walsh Owen

Jan 31 - Lodge & Hitchcock explain
why conference broke up.

March 1920 - On ratification	49	35
Dems	23	24
Republicans	35	14

At the end of the informal bipartisan conference held during January 1920 we reached Article 10.

Taking the Lodge reservation on this Article, three important changes were made in its phraseology. Striking out and inserting words as indicated below.

The words stricken out are enclosed in parenthesis and red ink.

The words inserted are indicated by caps. The reservation as amended was as follows:

The United States assumes no obligation TO EMPLOY ITS MILITARY OR NAVAL FORCES OR THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country (~~or to interfere in controversies between nations whether members of the league or not~~) under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. NOTHING HEREIN SHALL BE DEEMED TO IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION IN ARTICLE 16 CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.

I submitted above to Pres Wilson & received from him the reply dated Jan 26th 1920.

We were considering this reservation as above amended when Lodge left us & thus ended the bipartisan conference.